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C h a p t e r  1  –  I n f o r m a t i o n i s t  S c i e n c e  F i c t i o n  T h e o r y  
INFORMATIONISM FROM SCIENCE TO SCIENCE FICTION 
The titles of this thesis and of this chapter are neologisms with high information values. This statement will 
be fully explained in chapter two, but basically it reflects the fact that, although structured according to 
the grammatical rules of English, the word informationist is not in any normative English vocabulary to 
date. Thus, out of all of the possible lexical strings that might appear where ‗informationist‘ does, it is one 
of the less probable selections relative to the vocabulary of the English language and an English speaker‘s 
knowledge thereof. Therefore, you as the reader were perhaps surprised to see it, and likewise perhaps to 
see the phrase ‗science fiction theory‘, which is not a semantically normative assemblage of these three 
words, conveying as it does a nascent concept. Mathematicians have coined another neologism to 
describe this property of the relative improbability of occurrence of such neologisms or neologised 
phrases: they refer to it as the surprisal value. Its origin is in the 1948 formula devised by mathematician 
Claude E. Shannon to provide a measure of information or entropy in a message. It applies to, among other 
things, words, concepts, realities, symbols, phrases, ensembles of functions, messages, and signs. We will 
have cause to return to the concept of the surprisal value or surprisal numerously henceforth1.  
Generally, criticism and literary theory as applied to science fiction are structuralist, poststructuralist or 
modernist – or some hybridisation of these. What I term informationist theory is not properly aligned with 
any of them. What I have called informationism describes the embracing of information-scientific and 
information-theoretic imperatives, paradigms, tools and principles across numerous human disciplines 
and epistemes from the sciences to literature and aesthetics. Attempts were made to demonstrate a link 
between information theory and aesthetic affect as early as 1958, with Abraham Moles‘ Information Theory 
and Esthetic Perception. In science, informationism involves the implicit recognition of information as a 
natural as well as a man-made commodity2, and the conception of information as a substantive, quantifiable, 
empirically verifiable entity in all natural sciences, as well as a conceptual and theoretic abstracta for 
problem solving and elucidation. Scientific informationism is also signified by the increasingly 
information-centric nature of scientific practice due to advances in digital computer technology and 
especially software. As Daniel Cordle has observed, Richard Dawkins‘ landmark The Selfish Gene sees gene 
sequences and DNA as coded information3. In The Blind Watchmaker, Dawkins has this to say about life 
itself from a scientific perspective: 
 What lies at the heart of every living thing…is information, words, instructions…If you want a 
metaphor…If you want to understand life, don‘t think about vibrant, throbbing gels and oozes, 
think about information technology.4 
As Cordle discerns, however, Dawkins is not just instancing informational metaphors for explaining 
biological systems like DNA. He sees genes as actually informational: 
On the bank of the Oxford canal at the bottom of my garden is a large willow tree, and it is 
pumping downy seeds into the air…It is raining instructions…it‘s raining programs; it‘s raining 
tree growing, fluff-spreading algorithms. This is not a metaphor, it is the plain truth.5 
There are similar trends in physics and mathematics. Recent contributions to quantum physics seek to 
reframe vectors in state space in quantum mechanics as fundamentally about information rather than the 
unpredictability of the direction and velocity of particles as defined by vectors in state space6. 
Mathematicians like Stephen Wolfram and Edward Fredkin see the material universe as computational in a 
                                                 
1 Especially in chapter two. 
2 Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. London: Basil Blackwell, 1981, 46-7. Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1976, 50, 62, 64, especially 157. 
3 Cordle, Daniel. Postmodern Postures: Literature, Science and the Two Cultures Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, 128-9. 
4 Dawkins, R. The Blind Watchmaker. London: Folio Press, 2007, Quoted in Cordle, 128-9. 
5 Ibid., Quoted in Cordle, 115. 
6 Bubb, Jeffry. Quantum Mechanics is About Information.<arXiv:quant-ph/0408020v2.> Maryland: University of Maryland, 2004. 
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very real sense: as what N. Katherine Hayles refers to, implicating the language of computer scientists in 
describing computer systems, as a platform for computation7. 
The philosophy of information theory proposes that information is universally ubiquitous and exists 
naturally as well as artefactually8. Moreover, the philosophy of information theory recognises a general 
understanding of the nature of information, and a coherent metaphysics of information, as essential to 
understanding and defining epistemology, cognition and meaning, and how these are encoded as 
messages and exchanged in artefactual information sources such as texts. I define artefactual information as 
any kind of information created by humans for the purposes of communication. Contemporary 
philosophers of information correspondingly propose that a unified theory and conception of 
information may be attainable and would result in unprecedented advances in many fields of science and 
thought, including aesthetics and literary theory. Contemporary philosopher of information Luciano 
Floridi believes that such an understanding may even render the distinction between continental and 
analytic philosophy redundant9. 
In linguistics, informationism is most readily evidenced in the structuralist practice of applying 
mathematical information theoretic principles, usually directly or indirectly based on The Mathematical 
Theory of Communication, to linguistic analysis. John Lyons was one of the numerous linguists to thus apply 
Shannon‘s theory during the two decades following the publication of his The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication10. Tendencies towards informationism in linguistics include the non-logocentric conception 
of language that acknowledges the role of non-verbal components in human language communication - 
context, situation, habitus, repertoire, gestures, tone, mood and so forth - and an informational 
impression of semiotics which is, perhaps surprisingly, at least as old as C.S. Peirce‘s Logic as Semiotic: The 
Theory of Signs11.  
Informationist philosophers increasingly associate what I term informationism with a growing tendency in 
both science and philosophy to regard natural complex systems and processes as involving information 
production and exchange. Information is thus regarded as a commodity in numerous different natural 
and man-made economies. Postmodern informationist science fiction authors like William Gibson pursue 
this theme fictively in multiple contexts. Cordle emphasises the parallel presence of the theme in the work 
of both Gibson, and biologist and science populariser Richard Dawkins: 
Information lies at the heart of the fictional world described by Gibson, because the economy 
and the lives of the protagonists are driven by exchanges of information; in Dawkins work, it is 
important because it is at the center of the natural world…12 
Analytic Philosopher Fred Dretske and his European contemporary Jean-François Lyotard both regard 
information as a commodity13. Lyotard‘s formulation echoes Jean Baudrillard‘s: 
Knowledge in the form of an informational commodity indispensable to productive power is 
already, and will continue to be, a major --perhaps the major --stake in the worldwide 
competition for power.14 
Baudrillard also saw informational simulation as a hyperreal hypercommodity15. Dretske sees information as 
tangible, if not easily quantifiable, and identified true information as necessary for knowledge. This 
                                                 
7 Halyes, N. Katherine. My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts. 2nd. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005, 17-
18. 
8 Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. London: Basil Blackwell, 1981, . and Long, Bruce. Shannon and Dretske: Information Theory 
and Philosophy. Honours thesis. Sydney, 2008. 
9 For this ambitious outlook, refer to Aadrians, Pieter and Johan van Benthem, Philosophy of Information. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2008, 4. 
10 Lyons, J. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968-9. 
11 Peirce, C. S. ―Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs.‖ in Philosophical Writings of Peirce Ed. Justus Buchler. New York: Dover, 1955. 
12 Cordle, Daniel. Postmodern Postures: Literature, Science and the Two Cultures Debate. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999, 110. 
13 Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. London: Basil Blackwell, 1981, 45-7.(Note that this book was published in the same year as 
Baudrillard‘s ‗Simulacra and Simulation‘.) Dretske‘s connotation includes the naturalistic one that regards a commodity as anything beneficial 
or of value to an organism (there is also a sense of that which is transferable) and does not necessarily entail the Marxist economic sense of 
commodity. 
14 Lyotard, F., The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Theory and History of Literature Volume 10), Minnesota: The University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984. 
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outlook is associated with the perception of matter and nature as in some significant sense computational – 
an embracing of metaphysical computationalism16. This conception relies on the information theory of 
mathematician Claude E. Shannon. This computational view of the universe - as literary critic Hayles 
explains in her My Mother was a Computer - is based on both information theory and what Hayles terms the 
regime of computation: those practices and modes of thinking about and interpreting the complexity of the 
world and human affairs as being ultimately emergent from iterative combinatory processing of simple base 
elements according to simple logical rules17. Also related to Hayles‘ regime is what she describes as the 
information perspective18: an ontological view of information similar to that propounded by philosopher of 
information Dretske, wherein information is regarded as it is frequently assumed to be in scientific 
practice - a fundamental natural entity, not just a linguistic and computational artefact. I will place all of 
these conceptions under the descriptor-category of informationism, along with numerous popular cultural 
attitudes, social analyses, and modern and postmodern fictions.  
INFORMATIONIST STRUCTURALISM AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM 
In literary theory, informationism in structuralist - and sometimes in poststructuralist - treatises often results 
in attempts to appropriate rigorous information theoretic ideas and principles from Shannon‘s 
mathematical theory as a basis for drawing conclusions about text processing, reader response and the 
aesthetic object (Wolgang Iser and Stanley Fish,) semantics and aesthetic signification (Barthes,) affect, 
and aesthetic effect (Moles.) In Juri Lotman‘s The Structure of the Artistic Text, the author attempts to adapt 
the work of Kolmogorov and the Russian formalist school of metrics to poetry, leveraging adaptations of 
formal information-theoretic posits in analysing verse, and attempting to systematise a notion of ―the 
entropy [information] of a message and the specifically artistic entropy of its expression.19‖ 
Poststructuralists and two-cultures unifiers like Cordle and Hayles tend to focus on the metaphorical and 
thematic presence of information theory and science in fiction, although David Porush has identified 
similar efforts in this direction by structuralist era critics of the cybernetic science fiction works of 
Thomas Pynchon20. As will be discussed below, many of these attempts at what I call informationist literary 
theory, whilst elucidatory to an extent, tend to falter from an information-theoretic and analytic 
standpoint. 
As Paulson observes, ―[t]he theory of information has not gone unnoticed by literary researchers.21‖ He 
notes the structuralist work of Roman Jakobson and of Lotman, and cites the contributions from 
numerous early informationist philosophers researching the informational basis of aesthetics and 
semantics, including French analytic philosopher Abraham Moles, and philosophers Donald Mackay and 
Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. In the introduction to the first English translation of Moles‘ 1958 Information Theory 
and Aesthetic Perception, translator Joel E. Cohen describes information theory as a ―young man in a very 
great hurry, who jumped on his horse and rode off in all directions‖ and observed that in the decade 
following Claude E. Shannon‘s landmark monograph, ―standard bearers of information theory were 
plunging into genetics, neuro-physiology, sociology, experimental psychology, linguistics, and philosophy 
with great enthusiasm and greater hopes.22‖  He then observes, soberingly, that 20 years later 
―information theory seems to have stimulated a great deal of highly imaginative and occasionally fruitful 
analysis in fields other than communications engineering.‖  
Many structuralist and poststructuralist attempts at analysing and understanding texts and text processing 
or signification from an information-theoretic standpoint ultimately fail, not on deconstructive grounds – 
                                                                                                                                                                  
15 Baudrillard, J. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994., 67. 
16 Aadrians, Pieter and Johan van Benthem, Philosophy of Information. Amsterdam: North Holland, 2008, 12. 
17 Hayles, N. Katherine. My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts. 2nd. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005, 15, 
17, 18. 
18 Hayles, N. Katherine. ―Information or Noise? Economy of Explanation in Barthe's S/Z and Shannon's Information Theory.‖ One Culture: 
Essays in Science and Literature. Ed. George Levine. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 120. 
19 Paulson, William. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, 62. 
20 Porush, D. The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction. Methuen, New York & London, 1985, 115. 
21 Paulson, William. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, 60. 
22 Moles, Abraham A. Information Theory and Esthetic Perception. Trans. Joel E Cohen. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966 (Trans.) 1958, 
Translator‘s preface. 
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but because of some kind of faulty phallogocentrically or hierarchically motivated assumption in the 
principles and theory being investigated (although this can also be the case.) Rather it is because of the 
flawed assumption that the epistemic and empirical validity of the scientific will somehow transfer to the 
non-scientific simply through the analogical appropriation and application of discourse, terminology and 
theoretical premises. Principles from science will not work for literature, culture and the arts by virtue of 
some hidden functional power of analogy and the appropriated discourse alone, and certainly not without 
proper recourse to the meaning, analytical rigour and true scope of application implications of the original 
theories - nor without the isolation and elucidation of the theoretical abstracta and simples necessary to 
map and validate such adaptations. The theories of Saussure, Iser, Barthes and Derrida all exhibit such 
problems. Otherwise stated, it is the habit of appropriating terminology and principles from rigorous 
mathematics and science and employing them for analogical parallels in theorising, whilst simultaneously 
re-referencing or appealing to the epistemically stronger and demonstrative outcomes of the original 
science from one‘s conceptually weaker and less rigorously developed analogical position. Perhaps 
unintuitively, I think science fiction is much less prone to exhibit this error than literary theory, since SF23 
focusses on counterfactual fictive estrangement of scientific objects, theories and facts, rather than on the 
appropriation of the latter for application to other disciplines. This pervasive application, in literary 
theory, of the conceptual and theoretic analogical non-sequitur, results in numerous category errors, and an 
epistemological and semantic pseudo-isomorphic mapping of a theory and its attributes from one domain 
to another. Shannon himself warned against such outcomes for information theory: 
While we feel that information theory is indeed a valuable tool for providing fundamental 
insights into the nature of communication problems … it is certainly no panacea for the 
communication engineer or, a fortreriori, for anyone else…It will be all too easy for our 
somewhat artificial prosperity to collapse overnight when it is realised that the use of a few 
exciting words like information, entropy, redundancy, do not solve all our problems…[W]orkers in 
other fields should realise that the basic results of the subject are aimed in a very specific 
direction, a direction that is not necessarily relevant to such fields as psychology, economics, 
and other social sciences. Information theory is, essentially, a branch of mathematics, a strictly 
deductive system. A thorough understanding of this mathematical foundation and its 
communication application is surely a prerequisite to other applications.24 
Many literary and cultural theorists appropriate ‗exciting words‘ from science and mathematics to lend 
authority to their own arguments, and then simultaneously seek to denigrate the cogency and scientific 
status of the very scientific discipline or source of authority upon which they have relied. Interdisciplinary 
literary theorists such as Hayles and Damien Broderick both identify this error. Hayles laments Roland 
Barthes‘ misappropriation of mathematical terminology in his informationist S/Z: 
He appropriates concepts and terminology from information theory to posit it as a putative 
center of control and communication, and then situates himself…disdainful of – the 
controlling centre…Barthes‘s misunderstanding of Shannon‘s position is fundamentally 
equivocal, for it repudiates the control over communication that it imputes to information 
theory, at the same time that it seeks to gain control over the ―delectable‖ noise that it offers 
for consumption. Repudiation of control in one context is thus inseparable from the strategy of 
gaining control in another25. 
Broderick, who argues convincingly that metaphor and literary language does pervade scientific discourse 
at least at the descriptive level, expounds at length and with cogency about similar problems with 
Derrida‘s appropriation of Kurt Godel‘s rigorous mathematical principle of undecidability, before 
concluding: 
                                                 
23 This abbreviation for science fiction will be extensively employed henceforth. 
24 Shannon, C. ―The Bandwagon.‖ Information Theory, IRE Transactions on 2.1 (1956): 3-3. 
25 Hayles, N. Katherine. ―Information or Noise? Economy of Explanation in Barthe's S/Z and Shannon's Information Theory.‖ One Culture: 
Essays in Science and Literature. Ed. George Levine. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. 134. 
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Arbitrary codes, complex isomorphisms - it is easy to see the attraction of this domain of 
undecidables for literary theorists who have become accustomed to Saussurean and Lacanian 
doctrines. It is also, alas, all too easy to see how strict results borrowed from one domain and 
introduced into another can lapse into analogies which loiter…unshaved by Ockham‘s razor, in 
the blindest of alleys.26 
These problems are quite prevalent in informationist literary theory and criticism, and in informationist 
cultural theory. I am convinced that one of the main reasons for these failings, aside from basic 
intellectual ‗looseness‘, is that linguists and literary theorists understandably approach information theory 
and its principles logocentrically by design or by necessity, and usually rely on the assumption that 
Shannon‘s theory provides a universally stable metaphysics of information. Shannon‘s information theory is 
in fact inherently non-logocentric – over half of The Mathematical Theory of Communication deals not with 
linguistic messages, but with messages that are ensembles of mathematical functions modelling signal 
frequencies for such applications as television image transmission. Theorists who assume the 
logocentricity of information theory thereby confuse the metaphysics and ontology of information, and 
thus undermine their own theories. It is for these reasons that I, surprisingly perhaps, seek to avoid being 
situated in literary theory, and instead attempt to offer an informationist theory of science fiction and 
science fiction texts on the basis of informational principles and informationist aesthetics. This does not mean 
that I decry or denigrate natural and literary language, only that I recognise them as manifestly one very 
important type of information – artefactual information – about which I will say much more in Chapter 
two. This approach avails me of the theoretical latitude to explore the interaction between science and 
science fiction on a basis more fundamental than culture or discourse, which are the mainstay of most 
contemporary theorists professedly working to engage Snow‘s two cultures. A similar aversion to 
logocentricity was evident in the work of philosopher Michel Serres, who, as Paulson notes ―did not see 
linguistics, and the fact that literature exists in language, as the foundation of a structural analysis of 
texts.27‖ Paulson interprets Serres‘ early structuralism as involving ―an abstraction from specific contents, 
a formal invariant, structure as defined [by Serres] does not have any particular kinship with linguistics or 
semiology or anthropology.28‖ Serres‘ views are disciplinarily multifarious and esoteric, and often viewed 
as notoriously obscurantist, but his aversion to logocentrism and his engagement with information theory 
make him an informationist, if not a philosopher of information theory proper29. Although averse to 
―seeking global paradigms, universal ways of ordering, that can join the literary and the scientific‖ because 
―Serres contends that there are no such paradigms or methods,‖ Paulson himself nevertheless follows the 
metaphysical views of Serres and Henri Atlan in attempting to develop an approach to criticism based on 
regarding literature generally and literary texts specifically as entropic in the informational sense and as 
exhibiting traits of systemic self-organisation in structure30. This is supposed to rest on the putatively 
information-theoretic and mathematical analogy of ―passages from one domain to the other,‖ where, 
both analogically and on Paulson‘s terms actually, ―passages between science and literature…are offered by 
theories of information, self-organisation, and autonomous systems.31‖ The information-theoretic analogy 
in this is multiple: the passage ascribed to information theory involves literature seen as a communication 
channel32, and simultaneously as cultural noise33. Curiously, Serres does not engage significantly with 
science fiction, and Paulson barely mentions it in The Noise of Culture. 
My own approach seeks to avoid overarching logocentrism and terminological misappropriation by 
attempting to integrate what I will call informationist SF theory into an encompassing information theoretic-
framework, wherein the central theoretic isolate is not putative meaning, semantics, culture, knowledge, 
                                                 
26 Broderick, D. The Architecture of Babel: Discourses of Literature and Science. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994, 115. 
27 Paulson, William. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, 31-2. 
28 Ibid., 32. 
29 Serres, Michel, Bruno Latour and Roxanne Lapidus. Conversations on science, culture, and time. An Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, 1, 
125. 
30 Paulson, William. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, 36, 48-9. [Emphasis 
mine.] 
31 Ibid., 37. 
32 Ibid., 132-4. 
33 Ibid., 180. 
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psychology, social norms, external narratives, meta narratives, repertoire, or episteme – or one of several 
other nebulously or multiply defined terms - but is instead information considered in a specific non-
logocentric way such that it is the substrate upon which meaning, language, and knowledge all supervene34. 
Although the information ontology and typology I employ is unique, an aversion to logocentricism has 
been familiar even to some literary theorists for some time. In discussing the veracity and utility of Juri 
Lotman‘s centrally informational distinction between message entropy (information) and artistic entropy 
(information) in literary texts, an informationist Paulson notes that: 
 Anyone trained in deconstruction could challenge this distinction with a by now familiar 
argument: since there is no signified preceding, and exterior to, its production by signifiers, all 
language is already literary, since no variation in signifiers can be said to leave the ―message‖ 
expressed unchanged. Theoretically therefore, we are dealing with an ultimately untenable 
distinction.35 
However, Paulson feels that this deconstructive criticism is deceptive and vacuous by its very ease, and 
that, of his message entropy versus artistic entropy model, ―heuristically, the distinction is both necessary 
and useful.36‖ Broderick, in considering the discursive and epistemic difficulties potentially faced by those 
in the sciences and the humanities working with a contemporary episteme prospectively in crisis, offers a 
more complex and semiologically attuned analysis which implies one must deal with more than just 
lexemes and language: 
All that can be said with certainty, perhaps, is that our language is always already inadequate to 
inscribe prescriptions or memorials on a grand scale. There is no outside-the-text, because 
everything used by multi-levelled subjectivity to turn graphemes into meaning is ‗inscribed‘ in 
some text or other, some semiotic system. Even our apparently direct access to the world 
arrives through narrow sensory codes and channels, and vast quantities of neural 
processing.37 
He seems to place these sensory codes in the context of a semiotic system along with lexical codes, 
apparently categorising them similarly to graphemes and regarding them in some way as a text, and 
perhaps exposing them to deconstructive strategies. It is perhaps not clear what a sensory code actually is, 
or how it is that such are narrow, but at the risk perhaps of producing SF out of context, let us assume 
Broderick intends to refer to non-linguistic informational elements in sense-perception which contribute 
information to multiple-levelled subjectivity in cognition. This seems to be borne out by his computational 
approach to cognition. He suggests a cognitive-scientific explanation for the synthesis of rigorous 
technical and metaphorical narrative expression in scientific expository, identifying the heterogeneity of 
human cognition and thought – the informational complexity of the human brain – as causal38: 
The human brain/mind is primarily a hermeneutic device…Where a computer needs to be told 
be an explicit algorithm to go to a specific ‗address‘…a human mind reaches directly for a 
desired ‗content‘. This information (including codes for feelings, wishes and the rest of what 
makes us human) is dispersed throughout the brain, each location linked to the others by 
networks of affinities. 
What seems at first to be a thoroughgoing logocentric subsumption of the non-lexical to the linguistic is 
instead intended to establish Broderick‘s notion of epistemic and discursive synthesis39, and thus he 
emphasises the non-lexical nature of perception from the perspective of cognitive science, and more 
specifically a physicalist representational or computational theory of mind. Although, vis-à-vis Feyerabend 
and Serres (via Paulson,) Broderick also emphasises the narrative, metaphysical and even mythologised 
aspects of scientific discourse and meta-narratives, his conception of synthesis requires acknowledgement 
that the scientific episteme, unlike the social sciences, is strongly influenced by raw information attained 
                                                 
34 Long, B. ―The Ontology of Information.‖ (In preparation.) 
35 Paulson, William. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, 65. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Broderick, D. The Architecture of Babel: Discourses of Literature and Science. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994, 126-7. 
38 Broderick, D. The Architecture of Babel: Discourses of Literature and Science. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994, 130-31. 
39 Broderick, D. The Architecture of Babel: Discourses of Literature and Science. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994.See especially the final 
chapter ‗Synthesis‘. 
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from nature empirically through channels of sense perception, and methodologically organised by scientists 
―decoding the objective world40‖. These conceptions all imply an informal and intuitive awareness of the 
relevance of what I refer to formally as different types of information or information types. Broderick articulates 
no formal metaphysical view of information. However, he intuitively discerns that it is information – 
distinguished from language - that is the common metaphysical substrate and term of reference for both 
science and fiction.41 I think any semiotic logocentricity he exhibits necessarily arises from a lack of any 
available cohesive ontological conception of information to draw on for his inferences – a problem 
shared by all informationist literary critics and theorists to date42.  
The metaphysical Achilles heel of the deconstructive model of the signified is that it essentially depends on 
an inherently logocentric expression of idealism - it conflates the objective existence of external objects or 
referents with their recognition and attribution by signification, then renders the latter somehow the cause 
of the former. This is partly because of the confusion of information loss through information synthesis with a 
conception of insensibility (which terms will be fully explored in chapters two and three.) Mostly, 
however, it is due to the equivocation43 of what it means for purely imaginary internal objects to be 
materially non-existent, with the material non-existence of external material objects or events. It does not 
logically or rationally follow, just because we must use language to communicatively express a correlate 
with existing real world object or facts, that the existence of those objects or facts supervenes on said 
linguistic expression. This is a theological predicate: it requires that lexical language is somehow 
metaphysically a-priori and causal - that it exists before and somehow causes the material sans human agency. 
A cogent ontology of information is necessary to correct such errors. That science and scientific discourse 
are prone to occasional seemingly mythic metaphor and a-priori metaphysics in trying to understand nature 
does not somehow make this error something other than an error: it simply means that the natural world 
is complex and explaining it is recondite. Although utterances are analogue, language is digital type of 
information, which means linguistic representation and description of reality necessarily involves a 
significant loss of information from any natural non-lexical information source44. If we describe a frog 
with words, assuming a practicable length of description, we will necessarily lose and fail to represent 
enormous amounts of information about the amphibian in question. SF texts are replete with 
counterfactual and estranging narrative elements, but the modal speculation and estrangement encoded 
within them are, on Darko Suvin‘s theory, extrapolative or analogical in relation to some material 
scientific or technological object or reality, or to mathematically or empirically underwritten scientific 
principles. Thus SF texts, although packed with counterfactuals and scientistic metaphor, nevertheless rely, 
for their cognitive aesthetic and effects, upon an implied unambiguous distinction between actual 
scientific, technological, or natural objects and their fictively estranged or counterfactual textual and 
narrative representation. According to Samuel R. Delany, Suvin, and Stanislaw Lem, quality or competent SF 
texts achieve the combination of superior aesthetics and style with cognitively intriguing counterfactual 
extrapolation and estrangement relative to actual fact. 
INFORMATIONIST SCIENCE FICTION THEORY PREFIGURED 
Leaving aside the question of the literariness of science fiction, there have been numerous attempts to 
distinguish competent science fiction writing from pulp and the mediocre or ‗junk.‘ Suvin‘s original central 
requirement for ‗competent SF‘ in The Metamorphoses of Science Fiction is partly technical-stylistic and partly 
idealistic: the author must exhibit prowess in cognitive estrangement and integrity in the strict observation of 
the materialist tenets of the science with which science fiction engages45. Delany requires, on an 
informational basis, that the author exhibit superior style by engaging with estranged themes and concepts 
in such a way as information is revealed sententially to the reader in an elegant, logically tenable and 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 129, 131, 127. 
41 Broderick, D. The Architecture of Babel: Discourses of Literature and Science. Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1994., 23, 81, 100. 
42 Addressed in Chapter 3. 
43 The philosophical sense of the word. 
44 Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. London: Basil Blackwell, 1981, 175, 177, 180, 183, 188, 189, 193, 57, 61, 81-2. 
45 Suvin, D. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction. Yale: Yale University Press, 1980. 
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convincing way which preserves a smooth flow of reading and imaginative genesis from encoded 
information: 
The ablity to utilise effectively this refinement in generated information is what makes 
Sturgeon a better writer than Heinlen…The illusion of reality, the sense of veracity in all 
fiction, is controlled by the author‘s sensitivity to these distinctions46. 
Delany here reveals himself to be an informationist SF theorist. If the first half of Delany‘s essay leaves any 
doubt that he is interested in an informational aesthetic, then it dissolves with: 
When the corrections when we move from word to word produce a muddy picture, when 
unclear bits of information do not resolve to even greater clarity when we progress, we call the 
writer a poor stylist.47 
This is also a striking anticipation of Wolfgang Iser‘s reader-response theory. Broderick, seeking a 
comprehensive picture of SF, cites the elegant management of the multifarious attributes espoused by 
Suvin, Delany and Gary K. Wolf: the stylistically elegant development of SF novum, the deft management 
of the objective mood Delany realises is prevalent in SF, and clever intertextual engagement with the SF 
mega-text48. Broderick defines the SF mega-text as an abstract and amorphously bounded and subjectively 
experienced collective text which provides ―behind every item in the syntagm a certified and secure 
paradigm of reference49‖ and which is realised for the practised SF reader who is familiar with the 
common tropes and themes SF and its sub-modes: 
 Using a strategy of semiological compensation, or redundancy and over-coding…the s-f mega-
text works by embedding each new work, seen by Delany as a self-structuring web of non-
mundane signifiers and syntagms, in an even vaster web of interpenetrating semantic and tropic 
givens or vectors. 50 
Tom Shippey recognises, in informational terms, the cognitive and aesthetic value of Suvin‘s novum as an 
ideation accompanied by words which are both ‗high information‘ or have high surprisal values for the 
reader, and the necessity of competent management of the SF mise en scène which he associates with a 
closed system or universe51. Novums are science-inspired modal and counterfactual ideations and their 
accompanying neologisms identified as special to SF by groundbreaking SF theorist and dialectical 
materialist Suvin in his Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: 
I do not see any tenable intrinsic determination of SF which would not hinge on the category 
of the novum, to borrow (and slightly adapt) a term from…Ernst Bloch. A novum of cognitive 
innovation is a totalising phenomenon or relationship deviating from the author‘s and implied 
reader‘s norm of reality...Clearly the novum is a mediating category whose explicative potency 
springs from its rare bridging of literary and extra-literary, fictional and empirical, formal and 
ideological domains, in brief from its unalienable historicity.52 
I do not wish to approach quality science fiction – which I will refer to as SF proper - as literature in the 
normative sense, nor as sub-literary, nor necessarily as para-literary. While I am sure that the works of 
George Orwell, Neal Stephenson, Gibson, Pynchon and Philip K. Dick may be literary on some popular 
or propounded literary-theoretic interpretation, I am more interested in the informational basis of the 
fictionality, narrative power and cognitive aesthetic effects of SF texts. This is what I mean by informationist 
science fiction theory.  This approach has been prefigured by other theorists.  
It is not a new idea that science fiction is something nascent in the world of fiction – a new form of 
writing productive of a new type of text – younger than the modern novel itself as a form in the literary 
                                                 
46 Delany, Samuel R. ―About 5,750 Words.‖ in The Jewel-Hinged Jaw New York: Berkley Windhover, 1978, 23-4. (emphasis mine.) 
47 Ibid., 28-9. 
48 Broderick, D. Reading By Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction. London: Routledge, 1995. 
49 Ibid., 57. 
50 Ibid., 59. 
51 Shippey, T. ―Hard Reading: The Challenges of Science Fiction.‖ Seed, David. A Companion to Science Fiction. Malden: Blackwell, 2005. 11-26. 
52 Suvin, D. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, Yale: Yale University Press, 1980, 64. 
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world and not necessarily or adequately describable as a minor form of fiction or as a literary sub-genre. 
The popular critics and fans of American pulp SF were convinced that SF was an incipient form of writing: 
Its participants were primarily fans, avid readers - many of whom were active writers - who 
were encouraged by the influential editors of the period, Hugo Gernsback and John 
Campbell...They approached SF not as an interesting minor branch of literature, but as a new 
form of writing altogether.53 
Various theoretically sophisticated re-statements of Gernsback and Campbell‘s view have been 
forwarded.  Carl Freedman, following Suvin, refers to SF and its sibling mode of Utopian fiction as ―the 
critical genre par excellence54‖ on the basis of its being socially motivated and possessed of an innate 
capacity for cultural comment and revision, and being simultaneously specially equipped to this latter end 
with a device for scientifically and materialistically inspired demythologisation and cognition in the cognitively 
estranging novum. Tom Moylan, also endeavouring to demonstrate the specialness of SF, cites Suvin‘s 
development of novum categorisation, wherein the true novum is invested with ideological and political 
impetus, and the false-novum or pseudo-novum is associated with what is tantamount to postmodern 
depthlessness and simulation arising from commodification and market economics55.  Broderick sees SF 
as possessed of distinguishing narratological, linguistic and textual traits by virtue of its naturalistic 
narrative foregrounding of object over subject, and through its intertextual engagement with a greater SF mega-
text invested with a rich array of icons and motifs inspired by both anti-quotidian scientific discourse and 
worldview, and postmodern uncertainty56. He also embraces an assertively formalist Delany‘s thesis of the 
subjunctivity of SF – the tendency for its language to reflect the speculative and anticipatory attitude of 
scientific futurological positivism57: 
Of course, Delany was not denying the cognitive novelties of sf. His definition of its singular 
level of subjunctivity was that it dealt with events that ‗have not happened...‘58 
Broderick further cites SF‘s subjunctivity pursuant to asserting the specialness of the language of SF, and 
seeking a broad categorisation thereof: 
My developing case is that sf‘s special language, clichéd and flattened as many of its routine 
moves have now become, remains a tongue uniquely shaped for the articulation of the 
subjunctivity of our current episteme. (Recall my definition of ‗episteme‘: ‗the complex of 
discursive templates within a given space and epoch‘)59 
In chapters two and three, I will subsume the complex of discursive templates of which Broderick speaks to a 
definition of a set of contributing external and internal information sources, the semantics of Broderick‘s templates 
supervening on the information of said sources60. The subjunctivity proposed by Delany is a functional 
characteristic of, and narrative outcome associated with, futurological speculation and estrangement 
rooted in the technologically and scientifically inspired episteme which Broderick identifies. The latter 
notes that, in an effort to supplant analytic word-object reference mechanisms with Saussurean 
syntagmatic signification chains, Delany revises the definition of said subjunctivity, incorporating ideas 
from philosopher Jerry Fodor‘s representational theory of mind, and Iser‘s reception theory. There are 
both modern structuralist and postmodern-poststructuralist aspects to Broderick‘s theorising, and, largely 
on the basis of the former, he asserts that: 
                                                 
53 Csicsery-Ronay Jr., I. ―Science Ficton/Criticism‖ A Companion to Science Fiction, Ed. David Seed, Malden: Blackwell, 2005, 43-59. 
54 Freedman, C. ―Science Fiction and Utopia‖ in Learning from Other Worlds: Estrangement, Cognition, and the Politics of Science Fiction and Utopia, 
Liverpool: Duke University Press, 2001, 72-96. 
55 Moylan, Tom. ―Look into the Dark: On Dystopia and the Novum‖ Learning from Other Worlds: Estrangement, Cognition, and the Politics of Science 
Fiction and Utopia, Liverpool: Duke University Press, 2001, 50-71. 
56 Broderick, D. Reading By Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction. London: Routledge, 1995.67-8, 140, 155-6. 
57 Ibid., 168 note 6. 
58 Ibid., 66. 
59 Broderick., Op. Cit., 75. 
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The major result of such explorations has been a growing recognition, I think, that in SF the 
impulses of science and fiction do indeed overlap, not as opposed variant forms of human 
understanding but in sharing deep identity...that deep identity is the discursive unity…at the 
intersecting knot between the two great fields known…as ‗the two cultures.‘‘61 
In Suvin, Delany and Broderick‘s theories, the engagement of SF with the discourse of science and the 
scientific episteme of modern and postmodern culture is variously implicated. Discursively, the language 
of authentic SF often appears and functions as much like the language of science as that of literature, and 
it engages with scientific, post-industrial and post-enlightenment epistemic commitments to cognition, 
materialism, defeasibility and progressiveness62. Both Broderick and Delany himself also variously allude 
to and cite the informational density and properties of SF texts as special, making allusive reference to 
Shannon‘s mathematical theory of communications, and anticipating Shippey: 
Certain codons manifested in the text, such as the narrative units Gary Wolfe was to identify as 
sf‘s icons, alert the reader to a special way of actualising the words. The text is then received in 
such a manner that the information density and texture of the discourse is 
appropriately decoded. ‗The particular subjunctive level of s-f expands the freedom of the 
choice of words that can follow another group of words meaningfully.63 
Discourse usually implies semantics. Philosopher Fred Dretske lamented that child prodigy and founding 
father of cybernetics, Norbert Weiner, conflated information with meaning64. This results in equivocating 
on, or at least failing to distinguish between, the semantic decoding of discourse and the decoding of 
Shannon information, the latter being something categorically different. Moreover, the definition, usage 
and semantics of the word discourse seems multifarious in literary studies. However, Broderick‘s overall 
premise - that the inclusion of improbable words and vocabulary increases the informational density of a 
text and that there is an associated distinguishing discursive dynamic or trait - is valid on Shannon‘s 
theory. Moreover, ―the semantic aspects of communication have little to do with the engineering 
aspects...[but] this does not mean that the engineering aspects are necessarily irrelevant to the semantic 
aspects.65‖ Meaning-information equivocation is significantly abated by an approach to the ontology of 
information that formally recognises information types and semantic supervenience, which I will explicate in 
chapter two. Fred Dretske‘s externalist informational epistemology, and even more so my own 
information ontology, treat information as multiply realisable. That is to say, information can exist externally 
in a text, or internally in something that, ontologically speaking, is unlikely to resemble a text in any way, 
even if one does accede to the idea of some kind of lexically representational syntactic mentalese (which I 
do not.) 
Informationist SF exhibits subjunctive semantic markers at the sentential, phrasal and lexemic level, which 
Broderick, in a conscious act of apt informationist scientific analogising, refers to as codons: terms which 
intertextually pick out familiar themes and motifs from the larger repository of all SF texts66. Here I will 
appropriate an informationist Broderick‘s DNA-science inspired term codons for informationist SF theory. I 
will use it to refer explicitly to a greater range of textual, semantic and narrative markers than could be be 
categorised as simply narrative units. I will apply it to Suvinian novum and novum neologisms. I classify 
also as codons: general scientistic neologisms, scientific neologisms, futurological counterfactuals, 
speculative or extrapolative scientistic modal invention and the SF mega-text icons of Broderick.  
On my own account SF texts - and especially informationist SF texts - are generally information-age SF 
texts which exhibit a broad information synthesis encapsulating marked scientifically ascribable veridical 
                                                 
61 Broderick., Op. Cit., 100. 
62 This comment may embody a misleading neglect of ancient philosophers such as Aristarchus of Samos 2260 BP - 2180 BP, who, according 
to Aristotle, may be the earliest proposer of the Heliocentric model of the solar system. I use the term defeasibility in keeping with its usage 
and connotation in philosophy and science, where a defeasible theory is one that can change – be strengthened or be invalidated - 
contingent upon the discovery of further information or evidence. 
63 Ibid., 66. 
64 Dretske., Op. Cit., 42. 
65 Weaver., Op. Cit., 8. 
66 Broderick, D. Reading By Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction. London: Routledge, 1995, 48, 67-8. 
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information, largely existing as counterfactual pseudo-information67. Informationist SF texts also frequently exhibit 
narrative engagement with computational and information-theoretic themes (in numerous guises) 
narrative engagement with information science and technology proper, and engagement with cyber-
culture and other information scientistic cultures and their discourses.   
INFORMATIONIST SCIENCE FICTION AT THE MULTIVARIATE NEXUS 
Mid to late 1990s cultural and interdisciplinary critical studies in science and literature exhibited a trend 
towards engaging with C.P. Snow‘s binary of the two cultures and either providing a common discursive, 
cultural, or interdisciplinary basis for each, or demonstrating commonalities between science and the arts 
along the lines of shared discursive, linguistic or rhetorical traits in both non-fictional scientific and 
fictional literary texts. Broderick sees scientific theories as heavily indebted to the use of metaphor and 
analogy, and as prone to conceptual aporia as literature when indeterminable and indescribable outcomes 
are encountered. He follows Feyerabend in noting the degree to which armchair metaphysical speculation 
and opinion often becomes pre-eminent in science when hard data and facts are unavailable68. Cordle sees 
a ―late twentieth century reworking of our conceptions of the natural and artificial‖ stemming from 
information theory and cybernetics and accompanied by a ―shift from a mechanical to an organic 
vocabulary‖ in the sciences69. In drawing parallels between the discourses of identity employed in the 
writings of Gibson and Richard Dawkins, Cordle emphasises that he has no intention ―to read (or 
misread) [Richard] Dawkins as a closet postmodernist‖, but goes on to highlight ―the centrality of 
information (and therefore information technology) to the world views of both writers70.‖ Hayles sees the 
discourses of science and literature as similarly influenced by informational and computational world 
views, and that texts have come to be regarded as encapsulating informational and computational 
characteristics and outcomes71. 
It is science fiction texts which emerge at the median point of the science to fiction spectrum: at the 
conflux of the metaphoric and fictive extreme of science writing and the empirical and cognitive extreme 
of fiction writing. However, a binary distinction, even on a continuum, is not realistic. SF is fiction that 
emerges at what I will refer to as the multifaceted or multivariate nexus: the simultaneous cultural and 
disciplinary nexus of science and art, and at the epistemological nexus of the empirical and rational, the 
counterfactual, and the imaginary that exists for both the imaginative scientist and the scientifically astute 
author. It supervenes on and exhibits the information synthesis that arises at the nexus of the empirical-actual 
and the imaginary-counterfactual, and the discursive synthesis that supervenes thereupon. I do not think 
that informationist SF theory will readily yield terms for delineating a science fiction canon, nor for 
defining the boundaries of SF as a genre, and neither is a pursuit which I find promising or meaningful. 
However, I do expect some cohesive picture of the informational properties of competent SF to become 
evident through informationist SF theory, and especially that it will provide a cohesive description of the 
traits of informationist SF. Information-age informationist SF narratives, due to their political, cultural, and 
ideological non-uniformity draw on perspectives about information and information science and what 
they mean for the future which are as diverse, and yet convergent, as the treatment of information itself 
given by continental philosophers like Jean Baudrillard and Anglo-American philosophers like Fred 
Dretske. This is partly because such texts also appear over a surprisingly long epoch, concomitant with 
the fact that informationism is older, although perhaps arbitrarily so, than the digital age. 
Any question or assertion of the historicity of any cultural or historical era or movement is potentially 
prone to interminable dispute and revision. I will thus tentatively locate the historical inception of the 
information age no earlier than the mid to late 1940s, which decade saw the construction of Eniac72 
                                                 
67 These new terms will be fully expounded in chapter two. 
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(194673) and thence the development The Mathematical Theory of Communication by American 
Mathematician Claude E. Shannon at Bell Labs in the United States in 1948. I take it also to date perhaps 
no later than computer networking visionary Joseph Carl Robnett Licklider‘s 1960 Man-Computer Symbiosis, 
in which he speculated about the benefits of networking computers, ultimately perpetuating the birth of 
the Internet at the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency in the United States in the mid 1960s. I 
will defeasibly take the origin of computational informationism in the sciences to coincide with Shannon‘s 
paper, and perhaps also with the earlier work of Weiner, Nyquist and Hartley from which Shannon 
derived impetus. However, it is arguable that, by mathematical lights, one might trace this origin as far 
back as the origins of modern probability theory in the 17th century with the exchange of letters between 
Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat. Informationism in the media and in broader culture, I tentatively take to 
coincide with, but not necessarily to be solely determined by, the inception of the cybernetics movement 
at the hands of Norbert Weiner, with his landmark book Cybernetics. The earnest popular onset of 
informationism, whence the global community began to conceive of information as an information 
technology related commodity, and to perceive information technology as instrumental in globalisation, is 
seen to coincide with, but again not to be wholly determined by, the subsequent development in 1989 and 
1990 by Tim Berners-Lee of the hypertext and distributed multimedia technologies used to implement 
the World Wide Web upon the substrate of the internet and its component technologies74.  
Postmodernism has been called a practise of theorising about the failure of structuralism or structuralist 
positivism, and the ideology of modernism, by questioning modernist assumptions and identifying the 
ideological  and theoretical aporia of modernity and failings of structuralism, and yet to be prefigured in 
structuralism and modernism75. Simultaneously, the maturation of informationism corresponds with the rise 
and wane of postmodernism. Moreover, informationism pays homage to scientific modernism and the 
technological prowess associated with and lauded by it, as well as simultaneously embodying postmodern 
indifference to and wariness of modernist assertions about the intrinsic value of science and technology, 
exemplified in Jean-Francois Lyotard‘s thesis regarding the collapse of metanarratives. Such themes of 
ambivalence about information science are reflected in the cyberpunk works of Gibson. Gibson‘s 
informationally estranged characters and settings extol the power of information technology, and 
simultaneously present it as a dystopian anticipation of human apocalypse wrought through something 
similar to the technological singularity coined by computer scientist, futurologist, and SF writer Vernor Vinge. 
Technological singularity is a speculative neologism referring to a point in the near future of human history 
when computing machines will become more intellectually capable than their human inventors76. Vinge‘s 
anthropologically and sociologically astute informationist space opera, A Fire Upon The Deep, engages 
constantly with information technology as an enabling boon which empowers humanity and other 
sentient species, and yet simultaneously renders it a threateningly estranged and estranging phenomenon 
which spawns daemons, hordes of super-sentient invaders, and informational god-despots. There is real 
scientific debate about whether the technological singularity will occur, and if so when. Although it has 
detractors, the idea is regarded not as mysticism, but as scientifically defeasible, and is formally debated as 
such in actual professional scientific forums77. 
Information technology is a tool for facilitating and accelerating the manipulation and commoditisation of 
what I refer to as human-abstracted78 or artefactual information: information generated and/or structured 
by human beings. Information technological developments in computer networking, databases, computer 
control systems, and data compression and encryption technologies in the 1980s and 1990s brought a 
dramatic change to the power and speed with which certain types of artefactual information could be 
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75 Connor, S. ―Introduction‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, Cambridge: CUP, 2004., 5, 8, 9. 
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manipulated and used79. Thus I see the emergence of informationism, as a cultural and social dynamic, as 
motivated by multifarious cultural and environmental factors, but the advance and effects of technology 
and specifically information technology are seen as embodying its primary causal motivator, culturally and 
otherwise. Informationism also embodies a concomitant obsession with information as a commodity. It is 
partly the outworking of a struggle for the control of the commodity of information pursuant to 
influencing cultural, sociological and sociographic outcomes. Ironically, many of the conceptual 
difficulties, and theoretic aporia intrinsic to informationism, and by extension postmodernism and 
modernism, may well revolve around the failure to adequately define and understand the ontology of 
information80. A cogent ontology of information is important in the definition or parameterisation of 
informationism as a cultural phenomenon, since it allows us to differentiate the informationally real, the 
informationally false, and the informationally hyperreal, and to distinguish mythologies from substantive 
factual discourse within texts and other persisted information repositories or sources based on the types of 
information they engage and encapsulate81. Informationism is related to but distinct from both modernism 
and postmodernism. SF in the information age is as engaged with the social, ideological and cultural 
impact of science and technology as it was during the scientific revolution, the cold war and modern era. 
Information age informationist SF is also, and again in keeping with traditional SF commitments, centrally 
interested in the science and technology itself, and thus especially in information science and technology, 
from a cognitive and philosophical standpoint. 
In discussing the origins and definition of SF, semiotician and theorist Broderick cites, among others, 
Brian Aldiss, Isaac Asimov and John W. Campbell Jr.82 as supporting the thesis that SF is motivated by 
the cultural and practical influence of science and technology on homosapiens during and after the 
scientific and industrial revolutions83. Broderick emphasises that this critical positioning of SF as 
specifically a literary adjunct to the technological era renders it a more historically recent form of writing 
than is often claimed, with some other literary theorists reaching as far back as Plato‘s Republic and the 
epic of Gilgamesh for SF‘s origins84. Broderick himself eventually defers to semiological and other 
structuralist and poststructuralist theoretic constructs in the pursuit of a quasi-categorisation and 
definition of SF, but with ample caution and dubiety in regard to the veracity, stability and reliability of 
structuralism, generic classification and genre theory85. He follows the general approach of Suvin and 
Delany in elucidating the special qualities of SF through the analysis of devices employed by SF writers to 
engage in their texts with the ideological and cultural commitments and discourses of science, ideological 
progressivism and scientism. This approach provides an explanation for the correlation of SF with the 
historical rise and empowerment of science on the world scene, and as a worldview alternative to the 
supernaturalist and mythologically inspired worldviews that largely prevailed from before the dark ages86 
to the Western enlightenment and scientific revolution87. I agree that SF should be regarded, as suggested 
by Campbell, as something which embraces or at least engages with the idea of scientifically and 
technologically inspired change as ―the natural order of things,88‖ and as specially correlated with the 
ideological penchant for facing and embracing such change identified with later human eras. SF is 
uniquely influenced by science and its progressive discourses and ideologies. Although I too am wary of 
purely structuralist codifications of literature, the question of how it is so influenced, and what makes it 
unique, is important. In this chapter and subsequent chapters I seek to provide an answer which uniquely 
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engages information theoretical posits and which demonstrates further special informational characteristics of 
contemporary information-age SF, including the relationship thereof to informationism as I have defined it. 
READING INFORMATIONIST SCIENCE FICTION TEXTS: META-INFORMATIONAL WRITING 
The earliest clearly identifiable information-age informationist SF text, on the informationist SF theory 
being presented herein, is Delany‘s 1967 Babel 17. Lem‘s 1961 Solaris and Arthur C. Clark‘s Childhood‟s End 
also contain intriguing prefigurations of meta-informational characters and what I will refer to as 
informationally estranged ontologies. Ursula K Le Guin‘s 1966 Rocannon‘s world has an astonishing early 
example of an informationist novum – the ansible – which I will discuss later. Pynchon‘s 1963 V. can 
probably be considered as a precursor, if not a proper representation of the mode, from the perspective 
of informationist SF theory. Pynchon‘s 1977 Gravity‟s Rainbow and Delany‘s 1984 Stars In My Pocket Like 
Grains of Sand are later landmarks, but as I will demonstrate in chapters three and four, by the late 1970s 
there were numerous other informationist SF novels. Investigating what I call meta-informational writing is a 
good way to preview informationist SF theory at work prior to rigorously engaging with numerous 
theoretical constructs and postulates relevant to my theses. It also provides a strong introduction to 
informationist SF, since meta-informational writing is a motif that was approximately prefigured in theory 
in the structuralist to poststructuralist era by both Wolfgang Iser and Porush. Iser, working outside of SF, 
regards Joyce‘s Ulysses as a work wherein the narrative actually represents and reflects the very 
communication principles which inform reader-response theory, mostly via the French philosopher of 
information Abraham Moles. Joyce‘s works were something of a fashion for early informationist literary 
theorists, since Claude Shannon‘s original mathematical paper engages with the text of Finnegan‟s Wake.  
In developing his reader-response theory, Iser appropriates and extends Abraham Moles‘ definition of 
repertoire to refer to a kind of sociological, linguistic and cultural episteme or field of knowledge outside of 
the text: that which Moles calls, in relation to human communicators, the sociocultural field89. Initially Moles 
defines repertoire according to psychophysicological usage and Shannon‘s theory as the ―repertoire of 
elements associated with a given physical sensation‖90, but then radically alters the definition of the same 
term to apply to a new communication concept: 
The concept of a social communication matrix is an important extension to the concept of 
communication.91 
Iser further appropriates the term analogically to refer to a conception of the general epistemological 
elements which contribute to a text from such nebulous externalities as culture and normative values: 
The repertoire of the text is made up of material selected from social systems and literary 
traditions. The selection of social norms and literary allusions sets the work in a referential 
context within which its system of equivalences must be actualised.92 
In later writings Iser seems to drop this term, favouring instead collective referential fields93. In The Act of 
Reading, however, Iser expounds at great length on various analytic philosophical and epistemological 
theories and models - including the speech-act theory of J.L Austin, the process philosophy of Alfred 
North Whitehead, and the empiricist associative-ideation of Locke – in order to construct the functional 
theoretical abstraction that is the repertoire. It is correspondingly notable that the definition of the repertoire 
that Iser offers, although basically coherent, is ultimately conceptually nebulous and ontologically 
imprecise. As I will reiterate In Chapter three, such a metaphysical flaw might be interpreted as irrelevant 
in application to literature and aesthetics, except that Iser implicitly and explicitly largely authenticates his 
theory by reference to the metaphysical and mathematical rigour of both Shannon‘s mathematical theory 
and Moles‘ mathematical theorising. The scope of reference of Iser‘s repertoire is necessarily general, but no 
general conceptual term or common ontological substrate is offered to validate its coherence as an 
                                                 
89 Moles, Abraham A. Information Theory and Esthetic Perception. Trans. Joel E Cohen. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1966 (Trans.) 1958, 52-
3. 
90 Ibid,12. 
91 Ibid,52. 
92 Iser, W. The Act of Reading: An Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978., 86. (my italics.) 
93 Iser, W. ―Reception Theory.‖ in How to Do Theory Ed. Wolfgang Iser. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006., 59. 
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explanatory abstraction. This is a result of the scope and complexity of that which Iser is trying to capture 
with his theory, and of the largely analogical and terminologically appropriative approach he adopts to 
theorising. Iser‘s repertoire consists of all cultural and social systems, all thought systems and values, all 
empirical experiences, all knowledge and memories, all symbols and signifieds, all historical and political 
contingencies, all situations, all information and implications – in short anything and everything related to 
the author, text and reader - which contributes in some way to the meaning and messages communicated 
within the text, and thus to the meaning and aesthetic effects produced in reader response. Anything 
which is part of the external reality of the world which contributes elements of the meaning ultimately 
derivable from the text by the reader is part of the repertoire. It ―consists of all of the familiar territory 
within the text94‖ and results from ―a selection of norms and allusions95‖ from external reality. The theory 
also simultaneously has it that the repertoire is an outcome of the ―selective combination of [social and 
cultural] norms96‖ and that as this apparently functional object it ―reshapes familiar schemata to form a 
background for the process of communication, and it provides a general framework within which the 
messages or meaning of the text can be organised.97‖ Significantly, Iser‘s repertoire becomes something 
specifically external to the text, as well as being something specifically internal to it, such that the 
definition semantically bifurcates at least once, resulting in a confusing polysemy. Critically, although Iser 
rejects language as the mode and medium of the function of the repertoire, he offers no explanation of 
exactly what it is that does enable all of these disparate elements to interrelate and combine to produce the 
stipulated outcomes of ―the innovative character of the repertoire98‖ whereby ―the observer will grasp 
something which has hitherto never been real for him99‖, through the repertoire‘s recursive self-altering 
dynamics during text processing. The repertoire is, however, like Broderick‘s episteme, an attempt to 
grasp what I will refer to, in chapters two and three, as a contributing set of information sources. As I will then 
explicate, the supervenience base which Iser ironically fails to identify to provide ontological clarity is in fact 
the focus of the very theory which motivates his fundamentally informationist approach to literary theory: 
information.  
Iser‘s pre-figuration of the aesthetic motif of meta-informational writing comes with his view of what 
happens when the complexity of a text‘s repertoire causes the repertoire itself to be foregrounded in the 
text. The repertoire of Ulysses as a text is ―derived from a great number of different systems, but is also 
presented in such density that the reader finds himself disoriented.100‖ For Iser, ―the problem is not so 
much the unfamiliarity of the elements, for these themselves are not difficult to identify.‖ It is instead 
―the intermingling and sheer mass‖ of elements of the repertoire that cause it to become ―increasingly 
amorphous.‖ The reference to elements not only confirms Iser‘s analogical appropriation of Moles‘ 
terms, but again indicates ontological ambiguity and conceptual nebulousness. However, Iser continues 
unperturbed in his literary-theoretical situ, and thus: 
Not only are the elements themselves recoded, but they all seem devoid of any identifiable 
frame of reference. And so, even where the repertoires of sender and recipient partially 
overlap, the incoherence and density of realistic details and literary allusion make all points of 
contact too tenuous to hold onto. If the overlap, however, is diminished, the repertoire tends 
to be robbed of one of its usual functions- to provide the framework for the 
communication of a message-and instead it serves to turn attention to the process of 
communication itself.101 
As such, Iser asserts that in Ulysses, ―the communicatory function of the repertoire moves into focus and 
itself evolves into a theme.102‖ Because of the terminological ambiguity and loose descriptivism that Iser 
employs, it is unclear how some of the dynamics described above are outworked. It is not clear how 
                                                 
94 Iser, W. The Act of Reading: An Aesthetic Theory of Response. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978., 69. 
95 Ibid., 70. 
96 Ibid., 76, 80. 
97 Ibid., 81. 
98 Ibid., 78. 
99 Ibid., 79. 
100 Iser, W. The Act of Reading: An Aesthetic Theory of Response. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, 84. 
101 Ibid, 84. 
102 Ibid, 84. 
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something as over-determined and yet conceptually abstract and ambiguous as repertoire is able to be seen 
as that which, on Shannon‘s mathematical theory, is very specifically and unambiguously modelled and 
mathematically defined: the communication channel. Problematically, one must ultimately accept, not on 
the basis of rigorous demonstration or convincing logic, but on faith, that the analogical appropriation of 
scientific terms from information theory and communication theory (elements, channel, sender, receiver 
etc.) will somehow ensure the cogency of Iser‘s theory and postulations. However, the main point here is 
that the observation being made based on these terms is that the text and the narrative encoded upon or within it 
begin to refer to and present, pursuant and contributory to their aesthetic and cognitive outcomes, the very communication-
theoretic dynamics which Iser is expounding. I refer to this as only a partial prefiguration of a theoretical description 
of meta-informational writing for two reasons. Firstly, it is dissimilar in some significant theoretical aspects, 
and concomitantly, but perhaps more importantly, it is not clear that what Iser has produced is not simply 
a theoretical projection onto the text. If Joyce intended of Ulysses that its structure and narrative would be 
such that ―the repertoire of this novel both reflects and reveals the rules that govern its own 
communication‖ - if he did intend for such effects through encoding such self-reference into the 1922 
Ulysses – then he could not have done so with the same communication-theoretic terms in mind. 
Shannon‘s theory and its precursors date from the late 1930s at the earliest. However, Iser‘s repertoire is 
loosely enough defined and makes enough reference to general polysemous terms like knowledge, culture 
and values that it could perhaps be claimed that the author who perfected the complex and experimental 
stream of consciousness narrative was pursuing just such self-referring outcomes. I will seek to demonstrate 
below that, unlike Ulsysses, information age informationist SF texts actually exhibit narrative engagement 
with the very information-theoretic terms and concepts which they self-reflexively represent, and often 
directly name or allude to these principles, sometimes in a way that recursively references them, and often 
simultaneously in an estranged and counterfactual sense. 
THE META-INFORMATIONAL WRITING OF PYNCHON 
Yet another recognisable theoretical pre-figuring of meta-informational writing in SF specifically, exists in 
Porush‘s analyses of Pynchon‘s novels The Crying of Lot 49, V. and Gravity‟s Rainbow. Porush focusses on 
the prevalence therein of complex self-reflexive prose and especially self-reflexive metaphor. His posits are salient 
because his interest is in the impact on literature of cybernetics, a scientific bedfellow of information theory. 
His expository of Pynchon along these lines is exemplary enough that I will not need to extend it. Aside 
from its prescience, the importance of Porush‘s thesis is that it provides an opportunity to introduce an 
information-theoretic analysis of metaphor using the terms of the metaphysical information theory upon 
which my thesis ultimately depends. Porush isolates some of the prose which makes Pynchon‘s 1976 
Gravity‟s Rainbow a representative of the informationist SF mode. Whilst he does not approach the ontology 
of information per se, he nevertheless notes the ontological shift in the view of information in accordance 
with its newly perceived role as a commodity whereby it comes to be percieved as a type of substance, to 
the extent that the addict Slothrop tries to acquire some from the black-marketeer Semyavin as if for a fix: 
―What is it you‘re after…stimulants, depressants, psychomimetics?‖ 
―Uh, Information?‖ 
―Information? What‘s wrong with dope and women? Is it any wonder that the world‘s gone 
insane…It‘ll get easier. Some day it will all be done by machine. Information machines.‖103 
 
Written at the paranoid height of the cold war, Gravity‟s Rainbow here directly engages with the concept of 
information as commodity, questioning it on humanistic terms. Porush chooses to link Pynchon‘s 
engagement with information theory with Pavlovian behaviourist psychology in the context of 
cybernetics, asserting that:  
                                                 
103 Pynchon as quoted in Porush, David. The Soft Machine: Cybernetic Fiction. New York & London: Methuen, 1985, 133. 
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Pynchon‘s refinement is to link the raw information with the desire to have meaning. Humans 
are partly machines that take data and abstract them into knowledge that is never certain or 
complete.104 
Appropriating the information-theoretic conceptions of uncertainty and information loss (both of which 
we will meet in the next chapter) and applying them to knowledge instead of information is a strategy 
familiar from Iser‘s theory, but here Porush also demonstrates a superior understanding of the distinction 
between information and meaning proposed by mathematician Shannon and philosophers Moles and 
Dretske. The above dialogue from the novel is a direct, not a metaphorical, reference to information. Its 
self–reflexivity is only in the fact that the text itself is a repository of information, and the reader is 
perhaps the implied information junkie. Of more relevance to the conception of what I am calling meta-
informational writing is Porush‘s interpretation and application of the observations of numerous critics who 
have noted the information-centric self-reflexivity of Pynchon‘s work: 
As many critics have proposed, Pynchon‘s work is eminently self-reflexive. V., The Crying of Lot 
49, and Gravity‟s Rainbow inspire in the reader the same compulsive desire to organise a welter of 
data…105 
Porush astutely situates the epitome of informational self-reflexivity in Pynchon‘s novels in V. where ―the 
most interesting – and one of the most direct – references to cybernetics concerns the distinction 
between noise and information.106‖ In the novel, German engineer Kurt Mondaugen is a familiar example 
of Pynchon‘s informational characters: he is information-metaphorical and information-allusive. The 
primary loci of Mondaugen‘s actions are information and communications articulated intertextually 
through the science and discourse of communication theory, and his behaviour and experiences provide a 
metaphor for the same. The narrative encoded upon the text, which tells of Mondugen‘s efforts to record 
―atmospheric radio disturbances: sferics for short‖ and his efforts to decode a coded pattern in his 
recording, stands itself as a metaphor for the manner in which Pynchon‘s dense, complex text encodes 
messages to be extracted or decoded by the reader107. Porush‘s conclusion about the ultimate implications 
of such self-reflexivity is that it is conducive to cognitive aesthetic effects and cognitive outcomes for the 
reader: 
Pynchon‘s fictions employ machinery to expose the very un-machinelike machinery of the 
reader‘s consciousness at work. If Pynchon‘s work is systematically meaningful, it is on the 
cognitive level: it brings the reader into a hyper-alert state that goes beyond mere self-
consciousness. If we read Pynchon‘s work seriously, we are ultimately forced to observe 
ourselves as we are compelled…to explain what we are reading. Works like Gravity‟s Rainbow, in 
particular, punch certain cortical buttons that respond to the stimuli of indeterminacy, 
incompletion, paradox, complex metaphors, near crystallizations of sense out of super-
saturated solutions of information.108 
 
Undecodable hyperbole and pleonasms notwithstanding109, Porush is echoing Suvin and Lem on the 
cognitive value of science fiction, and ascribing this cognitive effect and affect largely to the informational 
and specifically information-theoretic self-reflexive metaphor in Pynchon‘s text.  
In V. Mondaugen is presented with an information-theoretic problem to solve, when his ‗sferics‘ recorder 
records a peculiar and ambiguously noisy or encoded message: 
―DIGEWOELDTIMESTEALALENSWTASNDEURFUALRLKIST‖ 
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106 Ibid, 122. 
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It turns out to be compound and nested, like Pynchon‘s informationist text itself, such that when 
decoded it reveals two messages – one an anagram of the engineer‘s own name, the other a ―direct quote 
of Wittgenstein‘s first principle in the Tractatus, “The world is all that the case is”.110‖ The efforts by the 
engineer to decode the message are a metaphor for the effort required by the reader in processing the text 
of V., and concomitantly there is the question of whether one or both of the messages revealed is an 
accident due to noise and the projective scrutiny of the human decoder or reader111. This indeterminacy 
references exactly the question of meaning production and the encoding of knowledge in texts that is 
posed by Iser‘s reader response theory, and prefigures philosopher Fred Dretske‘s suggestion that 
knowledge attained from a source by a receiving person is affected not only by noise between the source 
and the receiver, but by what the receiver already knows112. The jumbled encoded message Mondaugen 
receives is a metaphor for the text the reader is receiving – which is also specifically technically (not 
analogically) a message from a source on Shannon‘s information model. Simultaneously there is the 
straightforward and metaphorical intertextual invocation of the technical problems of channel fidelity, and 
of interference from noise affecting a message, as presented by Shannon himself. Furthermore, this entire 
section of the text alludes, in an intuitive way, to the dynamics of information synthesis, which I will pursue in 
earnest later. This style of layered self-reflexive informational writing, has been reprised skilfully by Neal 
Stephenson in the informationist Snow Crash and Cryptonomicon (which reprises also the wartime and cold 
war mise en scene,) and perhaps in the former with a similar degree of self-reflexivity in metaphor that is 
ascribable to Pynchon.  
The metaphoric device itself is in fact a recursive metaphor for the technical conception of 
communication processes. This is because metaphor simply is a message influenced by multiple contributing sources of 
information and noise, or else it is a message exhibiting such ambiguity through information loss and inexact encoding that 
multiple meanings or decodings are available for its interpretation. Metaphors work as metaphors because of noise 
and the loss of information resulting from the impossibility of perfectly representing the author‘s image to 
the reader, and the author‘s intention to inject ambiguity and noise into a metaphor to begin with – when 
encoding it as a message. When an SF text combines metaphor and other devices with narrative 
references to information theory and communications theory such that the narrative recursively implies 
the text itself on informational terms, then this is meta-informational writing. Much informationist SF, such 
as the cyberpunk SF of Gibson and Neal Stephenson, simultaneously engages with and foregrounds the 
use and effects of information technology. As in the case of Pynchon‘s Mondaugen, such works also 
exhibit another dynamic special to the informationist mode: the scientific object and human subject 
become co-focal, and each emphasises the other. This corresponds with the shift of emphases in SF texts 
generally, as observed by Broderick following Ebert, from the subject to the object, where the object is 
usually scientific or technological113. For Broderick, SF texts encapsulate a ―comparable positioning 
towards language which is many ways closer to scientific discourse than to traditional literature‖ since 
―both new forms of writing, reference to the world: in a word, the object.114‖ When the object is 
information either alone or in conjunction with information and communication science, then meta-
informational writing is frequently manifest. Meta-informational writing is a primary contributor to the 
informationist SF aesthetic. 
A READING OF A CONTEMPORARY META-INFORMATIONAL SCIENCE FICTION TEXT 
Fictional narratives in general involve and supervene upon special artefactual encodings and 
encapsulations of information. Information-age SF texts encode curious meta-fictional narrative and 
expository attributes that I have referred to as meta-informational. As I have suggested, texts encoding 
fictions which engage with information scientific and informational themes are themselves open to 
information theoretic analysis, and often meta-fictionally and meta-informationally imply their own 
informational status and configuration, simultaneously diegetically engaging with communication theory 
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and information theory either directly or counterfactually through the novum and other SF codons, 
delivering cognitive aesthetic outcomes for readers. Often this meta-informational self-reference is recursive 
and layered, and is sometimes achieved through self-reflexive metaphor. The word recursive is often used 
ambiguously by literary theorists: here I mean that the text and narrative both encode and imply - 
metafictionally, analogically or otherwise diegetically - informational themes and information-theoretic 
principles and structures, and that the thus implicated informational principles and structures in turn apply 
to and reflect what is happening in the text itself from an informational and information-ontological perspective. Thus the 
text references both information theoretic and information ontological principles and thereby indirectly 
and directly implicates itself, and the mechanism of reference itself as also informational and meta-
fictional. To be more precise, in a quasi-axiomatic sense, there is the statement: ‗this text and its encoded 
narrative and semantics infer or reference information-theoretic and information-ontological principles, 
dynamics, and structures‘; and then there is a second statement: ‗the informational principles, dynamics 
and structures implied by the narrative and semantics of the text in the first statement apply to the text 
mentioned in the first statement‘. There is then a third statement or quasi-axiom: ‗The mechanism of self 
reference described in the second statement exhibits, and is describable in terms of, information theoretic 
and information ontological principles, dynamics and structure‘. The second two statements are 
established with recourse to the statement(s) preceding them, and thus the meta-informational meta-
fictional mechanism is recursive. This recursive meta-informational meta-fictional device is only present in texts which 
engage the discourse(s) of information science and technology, communication theory115, information theory, or information 
ontology in a descriptive, analogical, explicative or expository way. Thus, I suggest that this occurs in few, if any, 
non-SF texts in which discursive and informational synthesis does not centrally involve scientific discourse 
and information associated with scientific endeavour, or where counterfactual estrangement of the 
ontology of characters and objects is not directly informational. Moreover it is far more likely to occur in 
informationist SF specifically. It is a metafictional tropic and narratological marker of informationist SF. 
Meta-informational meta-fiction results in a unique and unusual aesthetic experience for the reader, and 
contributes to what I refer to as the aesthetic of complexity, which I will explicate fully in chapter four.  
Readers familiar with Broderick‘s SF mega-text, who are able to decode the icon-codons related to the 
discursively subjunctive scientific and futurological episteme that he identifies as special to the modern 
and postmodern world and as important to SF116, are perhaps more likely to be cognisant of the 
metainformational devices of informationist SF. However, if the reader is not familiar with information-
theoretic principles, dynamics and structures, the cognitive aesthetic effects of reading such a text are not 
necessarily nullified, since the informational dynamics can often be gleaned from the narrative and its 
encoded semantics. Moreover, it is because of the oft-maligned expository and quasi-pedagogical narrative 
characteristics of SF that informationist SF texts can deliver cognitive and general aesthetic effects via 
meta-informational metafictional devices, even for the SF mega-text uninitiated reader. This is because 
character or world related novum description and construction through expository SF narrative - whether 
autodiegetic, homodiegetic, heterodiegetic or even hypodiegetic – facilitates the encapsulation within the 
text of the very semantic explication and decoding required for understanding the novum or other 
informational codons. The codes for both informational and semantic decoding of the novum or SF icon can 
actually be conceptually ‗bootstrapped‘ from the text and the narrative encoded upon it. Put simply, if the 
reader doesn‘t possess the requisite internal information and knowledge, the fictive text can supply it at 
the time of reader text processing. Ergo the effectiveness of Pynchon‘s self-reflexive metaphor. The best 
SF authors can effect this reflexive pedagogical and informative construction subtly, such that although 
the reader must engage cognitively with the text at an elevated level, their aesthetic enjoyment of the 
narrative is not disturbed by an awareness of their status as the subject of partly explicative narrative. 
Alternatively, the exposition can often be foregrounded as exposition whilst retaining aesthetic effects, so 
long as the flow, voice and structure of the narrative are thoughtfully executed in accordance with 
Delany‘s informational stylistic requirements. 
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To pre-theoretically consolidate and exemplify, at this early point in our theory construction, some of 
principles, ideas and theoretical vocabulary thus far mentioned, we now turn to a close reading of a meta-
informational excerpt from Alastair Reynolds‘ 2000 informationist SF novel Revelation Space. The 
terminology and principles of information theory and information ontology are philosophically and 
analytically rigorous and exacting, but the intention here is not only to leverage them for investigating the 
language and semantics of texts, but to address questions of the aesthetics and style of the text as a work 
of informationist science fiction, and thus pre-theory is adequate. Nevertheless, the philosopher of 
language will need to delineate between analysis and aesthetics at some points in what follows, and the 
literary reader allow for some rather structural posits, and some exacting theoretic terminology. This is 
not a dissimilar set of cognitive demands to those placed on the reader of informationist SF itself.  I think 
that the locale of SF texts and their encoded fictions at the cultural, discursive, ideological, and linguistic 
multivariate nexus of science, philosophy and fiction naturally – perhaps necessarily - imputes such duality 
to SF theorising. Such admixture and hybridisation of the analytic and aesthetic – the linguistic and 
stylistic – is a natural upshot of theorising about texts which hybridise and synthesise scientific, 
philosophical and fictive discourses and their respective associated information types. Such is evidenced in 
the literary theoretic and critical musings of many SF theorists including Broderick, Delany, Suvin and 
Parrinder. Even the politically attuned Suvin and the almost constantly heterodox Delany are interested in 
the analytic and cognitive, to the extent that both pursue analyses which draw significantly, at various 
distances, on cognitive science, linguistics, and the philosophy of language. As has already been revealed, 
Delany even engages with information theoretic ideas, and is interested not only in the semiotics of SF 
but in the processes of cognitive concept-formation associated with reading SF117. 
 In addition to exhibiting numerous uniquely SF narrative and discursive characteristics including 
counterfactually estranged118 setting and character ontology, Revelation Space provides an easily recognisable 
example of recursively meta-informational meta-fiction. Reynolds employs polyphonic third-person narrative 
which combines heterodiegesis and free indirect discourse to construct, and to explicate the ontologically 
estranged nuances of, the character-novum of the Jugglers: vast ocean-dwelling aqueous bio-informational 
superorganisms whose life is spent absorbing matter and actually converting it to structured information: 
The jugglers…had the ability to mediate the biospheres of the worlds in which they 
had been seeded, acting like a single, intelligently acting mass of phytoplankton – but 
no one knew if this was merely secondary to some hidden, higher function. What was known – 
and again not properly understood – was that the jugglers had the capacity to store and 
retrieve information, acting like a single, planet-wide neural net. This information was 
stored on many levels, from the gross connectivity patterns of surface floating tendrils, 
down to free-floating strands of RNA. It was impossible to say where the oceans began and 
the Jugglers ended – it was just as impossible to say whether each world contained many 
Jugglers or merely one arbitrarily extended individual, for the islands themselves were linked by 
organic bridges. 119 
The Jugglers are a rendition of an SF  mega-text codon which originates with Lem‘s Solaris, wherein is 
developed the informationally and ontologically estranged and estranging subject-object of the ocean: a vast 
body of liquid on a distant planet which takes information in the form of thoughts and instantiates from 
it physical objects and realities. Reynold‘s novel is an example of what I refer to herein as informationist 
space opera. It is a linguistically, discursively and informationally dense space opera with copious hard SF 
content, which has been lauded by reviewer-readers as exhibiting high ideational complexity, well 
appointed narrative and convincing characterisation. Not only does the above explicatory excerpt 
recursively refer to itself meta-informationally, but almost the entire passage can be read as a meta-informational 
recursive reference to the SF text, the reader, the author and the acts of writing and text processing.  
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A fiction text indeed has ―the capacity to store‖ and the reader in processing the text the capacity to 
―retrieve information.‖ Both meaning and information in an SF  text is ―stored on many levels‖ through 
intertextual engagement with the codons of the SF mega-text, and through overlapping and hybrid 
discourses and what I will refer to later as discursive and informational synthesis, the latter being realised 
through discursive polyphony, reader reception in text processing, novum implementation, semiotic 
information sources, and especially the combination of information types. Information and semantic 
content in the fiction text are conveyed in both ―the gross connectivity patterns of surface floating 
tendrils‖ – a ready metaphor for the overall narrative structure, intertextuality, voice and style – and in the 
―free floating strands of RNA‖ that are embodied in SF codons, novum and novum neologisms, in 
discursive polyphony and expository and explicatory narrative and hypodiegesis. All of the latter generally 
supervene on different types of artefactual lexical information from or associated with artefactual lexical 
information sources. Such sources include other texts and any linguistically or lexically encoded man-made 
data. As a heterodiegetic free indirect discursive and expository narrative which inherits the internal voice 
of the character Dan Sylveste and that of the normative narrator, the passage itself is and embodies a 
strand of free floating textual ‗RNA.‘ In genetic science, Riboneucleic Acid (RNA) and particularly the 
messenger variety (mRNA) is responsible for carrying transcribed segments of genomic information 
between DNA sequences and thus providing genetic information for the synthesis of new DNA strands: 
in terms of information theory120 it is a message sent from a source to a destination, and in information 
ontological terms RNA is an information source itself, and a natural incidental emission121of information. 
This fictive RNA element of the Jugglers construction implements an informational metaphor which 
recursively implicates the expository passage itself, again according to our three quasi-axiomatic 
statements. Moreover, the expository excerpt carries ‗genetic‘ thematic microtropes or codons122 inherited 
from the SF mega-text in the form of the superorganism icon and the mind-absorption icon, among 
others, and like RNA embodies the concepts of message transmission and the information source, being 
as it is an information source itself. The reader, in processing this text, is informed by the transmission of a 
message, and must perform information synthesis internally - via what we will at this point refer to as 
cognition - to realise encoded semantics in the narrative. On the semiotic level, the syntagms associated 
with the terms borrowed from scientific discourse are themselves a kind of informational strand, and by 
information ontology they and the symbols that comprise them are both messages and sources. The 
actual act of reading this text is an analogy for the informational functions that the narrative is describing: 
there are functional and ontological parallels between the counterfactually described novum and the 
reading act. 
In addition to being a meta-informational metaphor for the SF novel, and the relationship of the reader to 
the text in the act of reading, this passage arguably also invokes, in the highly ontologically estranged, 
fragmented, and information-synthesising character of the Jugglers, an image of the author‘s imagination 
and internal information sources: their internal semantic and cognitive structures. Not only does the 
counterfactual and highly mereologically estranged ontology of the Juggler result in a cognitively 
challenging and highly affective extreme otherness, but it is pervasively informational. Jugglers are physical, but 
also recursively informational123, beings: they embody information supervening on other different types of 
information. Like a writer or reader, they absorb and synthesise information from multiple sources to gain 
knowledge124. Like a text, their physical configuration is subsumed to the task of information storage and synthesis. The 
estranged informational ontology of the Jugglers makes it ―impossible to say where the oceans began and 
the Jugglers ended‖: it is concomitantly impossible or very difficult to identify and quantify the 
boundaries of the information sources encapsulated within and absorbed by them. As we will discover in 
chapter two, this is a metaphor for textual informational synthesis: the external and internal information 
sources involved in the production of an SF text and in the information synthesis associated with text 
                                                 
120 On Shannon and Dretske‘s models. 
121 Long B. ―The Ontology of Information.‖ (In preparation). 
122 My adaptation of Broderick‘s sense thereof – see chapter one, pages 32-35. 
123 Recursion here refers to information supervenience – not the recursive quasi-axiomatic meta-informational mechanism defined in chapter 
one (p. 33-5.) 
124 Knowledge is not the same thing as information by either Dretske‘s information ontology or my own. Knowledge supervenes upon 
information in the strong sense of supervenience. 
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processing are only abstractly quantifiable or delineable. This source indeterminacy also implies 
intertextuality. Accordingly, the entire passage itself exhibits, effects and embodies an actual information 
synthesis. This is recursively meta-informational, according to the quasi-axiomatic definition provided above. In 
a striking simultaneous analogical citing of the theoretic posits of the mega-text, intertextuality, the anxiety 
of influence and informational synthesis, the passage has it that ―it was just as impossible to say whether each 
world contained many Jugglers or merely one arbitrarily extended individual‖. The multiplicity and 
synthesis of identity, voice and information are all implied here. Readers are linked to texts and authors by 
conceptual ‗bridges‘ through common context and knowledge, and the Jugglers are internally structured 
as linked information repositories: ―the islands themselves were linked by organic bridges.‖ This novum 
implies an organic data network. The text continues: 
They were world-sized repositories of living information; vast informational sponges. 
Almost anything entering a juggler ocean would be penetrated by microscopic tendrils, 
partially dissolved, until its structural and chemical properties had been revealed, and 
that information would then be passed to the biochemical storage of the ocean itself. As 
Lascaille had intimated, the Jugglers could imprint these patterns as well as decode them. 
Supposedly those patterns could include the mentalities of other species which had 
come into contact with the Jugglers – such as the Shrouders. 125 
Just as SF texts, authors and readers are informational insofar as they absorb copious information in 
storing or processing texts and discourses from multiple internal and external information sources, so the 
Jugglers are ―vast informational sponges.‖ The Juggler‘s organic form is informational: dedicated to 
information storage and processing. At this point we can return to the first sentence of the passage, in 
which the narrator declares of the Jugglers that they ―had the ability to mediate the biospheres of the 
worlds in which they had been seeded, acting like a single, intelligently acting mass of phytoplankton‖, 
which invokes not only impressions of author and reader through the mention of mediating intelligence, 
but also further metafictionally establishes an analogical impression of the SF mega-text. The 
informational Jugglers are not only constitutive of the information associated with the world they inhabit, 
but also have some mysterious and obscured purpose: ―– but no one knew if this was merely secondary 
to some hidden, higher function.‖ The information-synthesising, information-absorptive Juggler provides 
a metafictional analogy for the reader-mediated coupling of the specific SF text with the abstractly 
conceived but real contributing set of texts which is the SF mega-text. Incidentally, the Juggler is 
concomitantly also emblematic of the informationist commodificaton of information: everything that is 
consumed by them is information, and their function is inferred to be one of information storage and 
production.  SF fictions in general  implement world-sized settings and represent counterfactual worlds in 
narrative, and by the lights of information theory, reader reception theory and Bakthin‘s theory of 
novelistic discourse (through embodying captured utterance) are ―repositories of living information126‖, 
albeit mostly what I will introduce in chapter two as counterfactual pseudo-information. The next line of the 
passage contains a striking combination of SF novum and meta-informational allusion. In a complex 
metaphoric invocation of the synthesis of discourses and information sources in an SF  novel, the 
narrator explains that ―[a]lmost anything entering a juggler ocean would be penetrated by microscopic 
tendrils, partially dissolved, until its structural and chemical properties had been revealed, and that 
information would then be passed to the biochemical storage of the ocean itself.‖ In other words physical 
objects, including the physical bodies and brains of sentient beings, are systematically metamorphosed 
from their initial form into a kind of biochemically encoded stored information, and the structured 
information supervening upon or contained within them is also synthesised and stored127. The Jugglers 
perform a naturalistic kind of reading - natural in the same sense as the decoding performed by DNA 
transcriptase and reverse transcriptase – but which combines and synthesises information from many 
disparate and related natural and artefactual sources. They exemplify information transmission, 
                                                 
125 Reynolds, A. Revelation Space. New York: Ace/Orion/Victor Gollancz/Penguin, 2000, 96. 
126 Bakhtin does not refer to information as such, but later in this chapter I provide an information ontological interpretation of novelistic 
discourse. 
127 Information is not meaning. See the explanation of the informationist SF megatext icon The Infomorph in chapter four. Meaning, like 
knowledge, supervenes upon information. 
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information storage, information synthesis and writerly textuality in this: a (fictive) materially embodied 
ontologically estranged parallel of the informationist SF novel.  
The Juggler‘s uniquely appointed novum involves the conversion of matter, and the information 
supervening on it, to differently supervening information. The Jugglers of Revelation Space are specifically 
and uniquely ontologically configured, and the highly counterfactual naturalistic mechanism is explicated to 
reasonable depth in the narrative. The original physical object or body that they absorb, and any 
information inherent in its form, is effectively lost: it is dissolved in its entirety and lossfully converted to 
information. This is a novum that directly references information theory128, and a speculative anticipation of 
certain aspects of my information ontology which might be surprising, except that Reynolds was a 
working astrophysicist at the time of writing. By Shannon‘s theory the process of encoding a message for 
transmission involves converting the information upon which that message is encoded from one 
mereological configuration and physical state to another often completely physically distinct mode of 
material existence129, such as what occurs when a page of text is scanned and then transferred as an 
encoded signal over conducted (cable) or radiated (satellite and radio) transmission media constituting a 
channel. The information ontology I have devised sees any information transmission requiring information 
type conversion as involving a loss of information and some change in configuration or mode of existence of 
the initial information from a source130. The next sentence of the passage both consolidates the 
informationist novum and continues the complex simultaneous recursive meta-informational reference to 
the text, author and reader, since ―the Jugglers could imprint these patterns as well as decode them.‖ It is 
salient that the sense of the word ‗decode‘ in the context of this passage, by virtue of the aforementioned 
information-ontological allusions, seems to relate to information rather than meaning: a subtly important, 
albeit philosophically debatable distinction which I have already mentioned in conjunction with Delany‘s 
perspective on style and content, and which will be expanded upon in chapter two. 
I propose that one of the primary differences between SF and other modes of fiction writing is the way 
that SF approaches, encapsulates, presents and - particularly - synthesises information. I am not concerned 
with the question of informationist and information age SF as literature, but as modes of fiction writing 
which can deliver complex and altogether aesthetically and cognitively rich fiction. Quality informationist 
SF proper has a commitment to cognitive enrichment through speculation and discursive hybridisation 
through information synthesis. Many of the most famous works of literature are lauded because of their 
poesy and increased vocabulary – those of Shakespeare and Joyce for example. Quality SF writing exhibits 
sophisticated prose and psychological insight, whilst expanding its vocabulary not just into philosophical 
discourses, but also through extensive counterfactual novum neologising and engagement with scientific 
discourse and scientific neologisms. I will suggest SF inherits the neologising practices of science and 
scientific discourse, albeit with some important differences with regard to the types of information 
involved in SF‘s own fictive discourses. I have already ascertained that SF, and especially informationist 
SF, is unique in its employment of meta-informational tropes and devices, and this is a first push toward 
the claim that SF is special by virtue of information synthesis. First, I must devote the next chapter to 
explication and elucidation, and establish a new information theoretic and meta-theoretic framework for 
analysing information age SF texts. This will require engagement with the philosophy of language, 
linguistics, metaphysics, information ontology and information theory. 
 
                                                 
128 Dretske [1], Op. cit., 183. 
129 Shannon, C. E., The Mathematical Theory of Communication, Reprinted with corrections from The Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 
379–423, 623–656, July, October, 1948. URL: http://cm.belllabs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf, 2 (bullet points 2. 
Transmitter and 3. Channel) 
130 Long, B. ―The Ontology of Information.‖ (In preparation.) 
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C h a p t e r  2  -  I n f o r m a t i o n  T h e o r y  a n d  t h e  L a n g u a g e  o f  
S c i e n c e  F i c t i o n  T e x t s  
INFORMATION AND MEANING 
Tom Shippey, in his insightful essay Hard Reading, refers to Suvin‘s novum, or more precisely to novum 
neologisms, in the context of the information-theoretic model founded by Claude E. Shannon. Shippey, 
drawing on the work of Shannon and of linguists who adopted Shannon‘s theory131, stipulates that a 
novum word – the kind of neologism ubiquitous in SF texts by virtue of the need and desire to name the 
kind of speculative ideas and wondrous objects or principles developed to elicit aesthetic and affective 
value through cognitive elicitation – embodies higher information than words in existing established 
lexicons132.   The foundation for this assertion is based on objective probability in that the number of possible 
novum neologisms is vastly greater than the number of words in the natural language lexicon. The SF 
author can invoke almost any string of letters, even without regard for normative grammar133, to achieve a 
novum neologism. Arbitrarily combining parts of existing normatively referring terms and verbs into new 
permutations also results in a far greater set of possible novums. The inclusion of neologising in scientific 
discourse and texts, and the same neologising habit associated with the novum in SF texts, means that the 
vocabulary associated with each text kind is instantly made arbitrarily much larger. Moreover, scientific 
neologisms and SF novum neologisms have comparatively much lower probabilities of occurring 
compared to normative lexical and grammatical words – there is more uncertainty associated with 
neologisms and novum words. This means that, as Shippey observes, a much less likely novum word 
chosen from a much larger prospective vocabulary, will involve comparatively much higher information. 
He concludes that: 
Science fiction...is an intrinsically high-information genre. Novums, because they are novums, 
are very hard to predict.134 
Shippey uses the concise and economical term ‗novums‘ for what I refer to variously as ‗novum terms‘, 
‗novum neologisms‘ or ‗novum words‘. I prefer the latter options because a novum on Bloch and Suvin‘s 
definition is technically not just a word, but in Ernst Bloch‘s case can apply to a metaphor and on Suvin‘s 
(re)definition renders it as a category which applies to the cognitive ideation associated with cognitive 
estrangement and speculation in SF, which often involves neologisms135. Nowadays, the ultimately 
mathematical definition of information that Shippey employs, which refers to what is known as Shannon 
entropy136, is not the whole story in information theory, although it is pervasive and central in information 
science, and lately also even in new interpretations of quantum mechanics involving quantum information137. 
I seek here to add other information-theoretic insights for the study of texts and especially information 
age SF, which I will concomitantly determine to be informationally special: to have a special informational 
profile. 
SF texts themselves frequently engage with the discourses of science, and often include within their 
narratives quite technical hard-scientific exposition and explication, frequently incorporating mathematical 
and logical components. In a similar way, both modern structuralist and postmodern poststructuralist 
literary theory and criticism often engages with quite recondite philosophical and technical material. Much 
                                                 
131 Shannon, C. E., The Mathematical Theory of Communication, Reprinted with corrections from The Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 
379–423, 623–656, July, October, 1948. URL: http://cm.belllabs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf, 4-7, 14-15. See also 
Hockett, C.F. ―The Mathematical Theory of Communication by Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver Reviewed by Charles F. Hockett,‖ in 
Psycholinguistics; A Book of Readings, Reprinted from Language 29, 69-93 (1953,) New York: Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1961. and 
especially Lyons, J. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968-9.68, 84-87. 
132 Shippey, T. ―Hard Reading: The Challenges of Science Fiction.‖ Seed, David. A Companion to Science Fiction. Malden: Blackwell, 2005. 11-26, 
15-17. 
133 Recall the name of the central protagonist of Italo Calvino‘s Cosmicomics stories: Qfwfq. 
134 Shippey, Op. cit., 15. 
135 Suvin, D. Metamorphoses of Science Fiction. Yale: Yale University Press, 1980, 64. 
136 Shannon., Op. Cit., 10-15. 
137 Bubb, Jeffry. Quantum Mechanics is About Information. arXiv:quant-ph/0408020v2. Maryland: University of Maryland, 2004. 
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of the material that follows will call for this same spirit of broad technical and philosophical adventurism, 
and will involve a significant vocabulary of technical terms. The most important ideas for the reader to 
grasp to this end include that of the internal and external information source, and the idea of source type and 
information typology. The concept of a discrete source and the idea of a source configuration are also important, 
as is the definition of a message.  
It is important to understand the difference between the strictly information-theoretic denotation and 
definition of the terms ‗message‘ and ‗encoding‘, and the normative literary-critical meaning of the same 
terms. On the information-theoretic definition neither message nor encoding directly involve either semantics 
or meaning. The following is a perfectly valid message in information theoretic terms by Shannon‘s TMTC: 
―ARKL FROBBIT SDFHJ ? !@#$‖. One problem with applying the ideas of information theory to SF 
theory is that the term encoding used in a literary and linguistic context is generally not the same as the 
sense of encoding by Shannon‘s theory, which preserves the distinction between information and 
meaning138. The literary theoretic definition is usually only analogical to the mathematical one. The verbs 
encode and decode have become almost as homonymous as the noun-verb code. Both essentially indicate that 
symbols or representational artefacts of some kind are used to encode something which can be retrieved, 
extracted or unpacked from the product of the encoding – a message or text in the case of discrete 
linguistic sources – by a reader or receiver somehow possessed of the requisite mental, linguistic, cultural 
or sociological codes. The linguistic and semiological sense of encoding familiar to Peirce, Saussure and 
Barthes generally refers to this analogical sense of encoding or semantic encoding - the encoding of 
meaning, denotation or reference. In literary theory the idea of encoding is loosely defined at best and 
involves semantics and reference and also may encompass, among other things, the cultural and the 
aesthetic, and other more arbitrary and less analytic impressions and unquantifiable things such as affect. 
Encoding on Shannon and Dretske‘s theories is not the encoding of meaning139. For Dretske, information 
requires truth, but meaning can exist without truth: one can express a meaningful statement that is not 
true140. On the theory of Long[2], the encoding of meaning supervenes upon information synthesised from 
multiple sources. Shannon encoding is the encoding of sequences of selected symbols in the discrete 
source case, or in the case of a continuous source – the selection of points from a continuous statistical 
distribution function based on an ensemble of functions determined by mathematically quantising the 
continuum to produce messages and signals. When approaching structuralist or postmodern-
poststructuralist theory, these distinctions between semantics and information must be carefully observed. 
Philosopher Fred Dretske echoes Shannon‘s colleague Warren Weaver in asserting that, although 
meaning and information are not the same thing, information does have something to do with meaning141. 
It is possibly Weaver who motivated Roland Barthes‘ assertion that semantic noise contributes to 
information proliferation142. Dretske asserts that ―communication theory does not tell us what 
information is‖ since it ―ignores questions having to do with the content of signals, what specific information 
they carry, in order to describe how much information they carry,‖ but that nevertheless some aspect of 
semantics depend on information, since ―although information, as ordinarily understood, may be a semantic 
concept, this does not mean that we must assimilate it into the concept of meaning143.‖ Moreover, meaning 
is notoriously ill-defined, and the word information is also unavoidably polysemous in common usage. 
Shannon‘s theory at least provides a rigorous, axiomatic, practically proven base from which to approach 
the definition of information. Thus Dretske is justified in claiming that ―the failure of information theory to 
tell us what meaning is should not be used to discredit it as a theory which can tell us something about 
                                                 
138 See also Moles‘ discussion in Moles, Abraham A. Information Theory and Esthetic Perception. Trans. Joel E Cohen. Illinois: University of Illinois 
Press, 1966 (Trans.) 1958, 52-3. 
139 Shannon, C. E. and Warren Weaver. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998, 8. 
140 Dretske, F. ―Epistemology and Information.‖ Adriaan, P. in Philosophy of Information (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science,). Ed. Johan 
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379–423, 623–656, July, October, 1948. URL: http://cm.belllabs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf, 1. See page 10 herein. 
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information.‖ For Dretske, meaning and information are both intrinsic to semantics, and it is not the case 
that ―meaning is the only semantically relevant concept.144‖ He asserts that ―[i]nformation theory should 
be able to tell us what information is without telling us what the word ‗information‘ means,145‖ and 
suggests that its meaning is simply the ―commodity that, given the right recipient, is capable of yielding 
knowledge.146‖  
To refine the definition of information, what it is, and how it exists and moves from an ontological and 
logical perspective is part of the project I pursue in my The Ontology of Information. Here I can only present 
those aspects of that project which are salient to developing the theoretical equipment for analysing texts 
with a view to then demonstrating the informational and discursive specialness of SF texts. The 
ontological definition of information which I present in Long[2] does not assert the centrality of 
perceptive agents, but sees it fundamentally as a source event configured or causally configured effect. In simpler 
terms, information is defined by the source which produces it, not according to the way it is perceived by 
intelligent agents, or expressed by linguistic agents. Information is not anthropocentric nor is it 
logocentric – it is a natural kind first and foremost. Lexical or linguistic information is of a secondary type 
which supervenes upon the natural kind. The natural kind is a-priori, the lexical artefactual type is 
contingent upon production by intelligent agents. Natural phenomena and intelligent agents are both 
different types of sources of information, but of course intelligent agents are themselves natural phenomena147. 
When coupled with the theory of concepts as internal sources (information sources ‗in the head‘), this is a 
foundation for a sound definition of meaning and communication, and a workable basis for an informational 
epistemology. A workable metaphysical theory of information provides a basis for understanding the 
synthesis of information from disparate information sources, which is key to understanding SF as 
involving special information synthesis and a special information profile. The above definition of information 
is absolutely central to this thesis, but this paraphrasing summary is sufficient for our purposes here. 
DISCRETE LEXICAL INFORMATION SOURCES 
Information sources, by the lights of information theory, are quite familiar to communication theory and 
information science in general. Information types are a more original and nascent postulate148. As such I 
will begin with the normative definition of the information source. In his landmark 1948 paper The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication, eminent American mathematician Claude E. Shannon developed an 
applied mathematical theory which marked the beginning of modern machine-based communications as 
we know it today. Shannon was interested in facilitating efficient human communications over limited 
bandwidth telecommunications lines. He was interested in the hi-fidelity conveyance of teletype messages 
and human voice over noisy physical lines – cables that were imperfect media for conducting message 
carrying signals because of magnetic interference, malfunctions, material imperfections, and so on. To 
solve these problems, Shannon built a model in which the point of origin of any information to be 
communicated was called a source, and the point to which it would be communicated a destination. To go 
from the source to the destination, any message must first be encoded into a signal, then passed over a 
channel, then decoded from the signal so conveyed by a receiver, for final delivery at the destination. On 
Shannon‘s model, any stochastic (statistically measurable or describable) process which produces a 
sequence of symbols, including a text (writing and parsing,) can be considered as a source: 
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We can think of a discrete source as generating the message, symbol by symbol. It will 
choose successive symbols according to certain probabilities depending, in general, on 
preceding choices as well as the particular symbols in question. A physical system, or a 
mathematical model of a system which produces such a sequence of symbols governed by a set 
of probabilities, is known as a stochastic process. We may consider a discrete source, therefore, 
to be represented by a stochastic process. Conversely, any stochastic process which 
produces a discrete sequence of symbols chosen from a finite set may be considered a 
discrete source. This will include such cases as: 
1. Natural written languages such as English, German, Chinese. 
2. Continuous information sources that have been rendered discrete by some quantizing 
process. 149 
Note that although a discrete source is technically considered to be a generative process, regarding texts and 
languages as sources is not necessarily proscribed. A contemporary of Shannon, the Russian formalist 
Mikhail Mikhailevitch Bakhtin, regarded natural languages as heteroglot multi-discursive processes of 
development150. This definition has the benefit that it accommodates the very real dynamic and changing 
nature of a living language – with a shifting, metamorphosing and (in the case of English) growing lexicon 
and semantic base. Shannon regards words in natural language to be themselves tantamount to symbols, 
as are letters and other graphemic or morphemic items, since words are defined in and can be chosen 
from a defined lexicon – a finite set. The model is the epitome of engineering and mathematical elegance, 
but its outworking is non-trivial, and employs some recondite pure and statistical applied mathematics, 
which I will elide. As already indicated, a source is any process that produces a sequence of symbols or a 
message. A text would generally be considered a message or a sequence of messages produced by a source 
on Shannon‘s theory: 
Stochastic processes can also be defined which produce a text consisting of a sequence of 
―words.‖ Suppose there are five letters A, B, C, D, E and 16 ―words‖ in the language with 
associated probabilities151: 
.10 A          .16 BEBE   .11 CABED  .04 DEB 
.04 ADEB  .04 BED     .05 CEED    .15 DEED 
.05 ADEE  .02 BEED  .08 DAB       .01 EAB 
.01 BADD  .05 CA       .04 DAD      .05 EE  
Suppose successive ―words‖ are chosen independently and are separated by a space. A typical 
message might be: DAB EE A BEBE DEED DEB ADEE ADEE EE DEB BEBE BEBE 
BEBE ADEE BED DEED DEED CEED ADEE A DEED DEED BEBE CABED BEBE 
BED DAB DEED ADEB. 152 
As can be seen from the above example, the text or message on Shannon‘s model does not have to have 
any meaning in the normative sense. Semantics are not relevant to the functioning of a machine 
communication system, only the faithful encoding and transmission of a sequence of symbols, which is 
effectively the message in the discourse of information theory. Briefly, it is supposed that at any source 
there are a finite number of words to choose from and a finite (although prospectively very large) number 
of sentences and phrases that can be assembled from those words. Shannon develops a special 
logarithmic formula based on the mathematical principle of Markov Chains to determine what he calls the 
entropy of the source, and the entropy associated with each symbol or message selected at the source153. In a 
Markov chain, the probability of each successive element (symbol or word) chosen is dependent on the 
immediately previous element only. Entropy means the amount of uncertainty involved in the outcome 
of the selection – the more alternatives there are to choose from, the more uncertain we are of what the 
next selected symbol or word will be. Selection here can be considered roughly tantamount to choosing a 
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word to put into a sentence. On Shannon‘s theory, if one has a set of only two words to work with, then 
the uncertainty associated with the set is maximised if each word has a ‗fifty-fifty‘ chance of occurring. If one 
word was far more likely to occur than the other, then the more likely word would involve less uncertainty, 
just in the same way as a weighted coin or a loaded dice involves less uncertainty – because it will be more 
certain that the more heavily weighted outcome will occur. Less uncertainty means less information in Shannon‘s 
theory. Information scientists refer to entropy and information on Shannon‘s model as Shannon entropy and 
Shannon information respectively, and the two terms are largely considered synonymous, or at least interchangeable. 
Shannon entropy, which corresponds to a quantity arrived at mathematically, is generally considered as the 
definition of Shannon information. The term entropy was famously suggested to Shannon by Von Neumann, 
when the former could not think of an appropriate name for what it was he was dealing with154. He 
sought a new term, with similar motivations to many SF authors when they implement a neologism for a 
novum: it referred to something specific and new, and the word ‗information‘ was already overused. 
Shannon was seeking to signify ideational and conceptual newness, and to disambiguate terms. 
Unfortunately, Shannon‘s use of terms like ‗entropy‘ and ‗uncertainty‘ are ambiguous within the context 
of his theory, although this does not undermine his machine-mediated communications project155. In any 
case, no understanding of the details of Shannon‘s formula are necessary here, only the understanding 
that information on Shannon‘s definition has a mathematical and probabilistic foundation, and that the 
Shannon information associated with a word in a sentence involves the probability and uncertainty that it 
will be chosen from a set of alternative possible words or terms.  
The Shannon entropy (denoted H) of a stochastic process regarded as a source is actually calculated on 
the basis of the Shannon entropy of an arbitrarily long sequence or message produced by that source: 
H is thus approximately the logarithm of the reciprocal probability of a typical long sequence 
divided by the number of symbols in the sequence… a series of approximations to H can 
be obtained by considering only the statistical structure of the sequences extending 
over 1, 2,..., N symbols. 156 
Basically, a string, sentence, phrase, paragraph, chapter, book etc. can all be regarded as message 
sequences made up of symbols. There is in fact a time component involved in this definition, which I 
have elided for conciseness, but the average Shannon information in a long message is still the basis of 
the approximation used to determine the Shannon information of a source. Although not technically a 
stochastic process on Shannon‘s model, I suggest that a text can effectively be regarded as a latent discrete 
source of information, because the sequence of symbols or words generated in the processing of a text by 
the reader matches the sequence generated when the text is initially produced: the stochastic behaviour of 
the original source of the text is persisted in the message, and thus the message can be regarded as a 
source in isolation, and especially in text processing157.  As was noted above, Shannon regards a language 
as a source. On Shannon‘s definition of a source as any stochastic dynamic process, a text such as a book 
is not technically a source. However, Abramson demonstrates that source input alphabets, the set of 
possibilities for selection at the source as governed by probability laws, have an information/entropy 
measure, and I correspondingly regard a book or text as a latent information source. 
THE TEXT AS MESSAGE AND SOURCE 
As a persisted structured repository of a subset of a greater input alphabet, a text is clearly recognisable as 
very close to a source, as well as being a message or complex of messages.  A similar view is propounded 
by William R. Paulson, who defines texts as information sources on the basis that they contain 
information generative noise, and with reference to Michel Serres‘ assertion of texts as sources of 
knowledge158. I suggest that it is a latent source or potential source by virtue of its information-causal 
origins (having been produced by a source or sources) and information-causal potential. A deeper analysis 
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156 Shannon., Op. cit., 13-14 
157 Long B. The Ontology of Information, (In preparation). 
158 Paulson, William. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. New York: Cornell University Press, 1988, 155, 32. 
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which makes reference to the metaphysics of process philosophy is necessary for a full explication, which I 
will not pursue here. Suffice it to say that there is specific information encoded in the text when it is 
regarded simply as a persisted repository159: it exists as a discrete image of the source that produced it over 
time160.  This conception fits with Dretske‘s adaptation of Shannon‘s theory for specific signals, whereby 
he accommodates specific message selection and transmission instances, rather than the average of runs161 
of the same which Shannon‘s own application to efficient machine-mediated communication requires. 
Dretske is interested in the amount of information from a specific selection event or state of affairs at a 
source – resulting in a specific message or symbol - that a signal manages to convey to a receiver: 
Although the surprisal of a given event...and the amount of information carried by a 
particular signal are not significant quantities in engineering applications of information 
theory…these are the important quantities for the study of information as commonly 
understood, and hence for the kind of cognitive studies that depend on a semantically related 
concept of information.162 
Dretske does not explicate what the ontology of this kind of singular signal would be. It can be regarded 
as a singular representation which captures some, but – due to normative information loss - not all, of the 
outcome of a specific individual selection event or message generation event. Presumably for discrete 
sources (those which involve one discrete selection event at a time) it would involve the representation 
for transmission of the outcome of one symbol or message selection event only. As such, an individual 
sequence of symbols such as a text, regarded as just the kind of source state ‗snapshot‘ which I have 
proposed – a persisted repository which stores the message selected by a source – may be regarded also as 
a signal in the way that Dretske posits above. Dretske‘s ‗particular signal‘ is, on my information ontology, 
another source in a causally related set of sources. Dretske is cognisant of the consequences of his 
metaphysically attuned adaptation of Shannon‘s averaging mechanism: 
It should be emphasised (if only for the benefit of those who will accuse me of misrepresenting 
or misunderstanding communication theory) that the above formulas [elided] are now being 
assigned a significance, given an interpretation, that they do not have in standard applications 
of communication theory. They are now being used to define the amount of information 
associated with particular events and signals163 
If we treat this current sentence as a discrete text source, as I am apt to do on the proposed model and 
theory, then the Shannon information associated with the third word in it is a function of the number of 
possible words that could have been used in that place, and the statistical likelihood of that particular 
word occurring given the second word164. Ideally, the grammar and syntax of English also matter in the 
calculation. Especially if neologisms and other nuances (such as breaking from normal grammar) are 
allowed, the objective probability of a word decreases, and uncertainty (and therefore entropy) increases, 
dramatically in accordance with the very large number of possible word-symbols165. Especially if the 
neologisms and vocabularies of the sciences are included, the English language does not involve a lexicon 
of fixed magnitude anyway, being as it is constantly updated with new terms and words. Add to this the 
propensity for new technology and science to cause the propagation of new discourses and vocabularies 
associated with related techno-cultural enclaves such as cyber-culture. The SF mega-text itself feeds back 
into this lexical source set and the linguistic milieu associated therewith. Shannon overcame this for 
discrete sources of lexical symbols by assuming approximate finite lexicons and sets of symbols: relying 
on frequentist objective probabilities in tables derived from actual measurement of texts166. Tom Shippey‘s 
                                                 
159 Ibid. On my information ontology, a persisted repository is anything which records, remembers or persists information generated by a source. 
Books and databases are both persisted information repositories. Persisted repositories are also latent sources as defined here. 
160 What I refer to more technically as that source‘s configuration over time. 
161 Or, statistically speaking, blocks of selected messages 
162 —. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. London: Basil Blackwell, 1981., 52. (emphasis mine.) The selection of a word for inclusion in a 
sentence is an example of a given event. 
163 Ibid., 52. 
164 Technically, this digram probability can be extended to a trigram probability, and so on. 
165 There is a debate amoungst mathematicians and philosophers over the veracity of the idea of a truly objective probability measure in any 
case. 
166 Shannon, Op. cit., 6 (including footnote 5) Later examples can be found in Lyons, Op.cit., 92-4. 
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application of Shannon information to Suvin‘s novum is based on these objective probabilistic results and 
on the concomitant idea of the redundancy of a natural language, and would also seem to intrinsically 
require something like Dretske‘s adaptation for particular selection events and signals since a text is a 
message generated by sources involving processes. Redundancy is linked with the ratio of the information 
actually in a given specific text source of a certain number of symbols/words to the maximum amount of 
information which that text source could contain with the same number of words and using the same 
lexicon. Shannon explicates this idea quite succinctly: 
The ratio of the entropy of a source to the maximum value it could have while still restricted to 
the same symbols will be called its relative entropy…One minus the relative entropy is the 
redundancy. The redundancy of ordinary English, not considering statistical structure 
over greater distances than about eight letters, is roughly 50%. This means that when 
we write English half of what we write is determined by the structure of the language 
and half is chosen freely. The figure 50% was found by several independent methods which 
all gave results in this neighborhood. One is by calculation of the entropy of the 
approximations to English. A second method is to delete a certain fraction of the letters 
from a sample of English text and then let someone attempt to restore them. If they can 
be restored when 50% are deleted the redundancy must be greater than 50%. A third method 
depends on certain known results in cryptography.167 
This description also suggests that natural languages and subsets of the lexicons thereof can be regarded 
as kinds of latent source.  
LINGUISTIC INFORMATION REDUNDANCY AND THE NOVUM 
Shippey determines that the novum diminishes redundancy in a text168. If you add more symbols or words to 
the lexicon, you increase the number of possible choices, thereby increasing the uncertainty involved with each 
word choice or selection. This increases the surprisal or Shannon-information value of each selected word 
unit. This in turn increases the Shannon entropy of the text and source overall. If one then makes the 
words in the set all equally probable, resulting in a situation like a fair dice or coin in terms of possible 
outcomes of word selection, this results in the maximum possible surprisal value for that lexical set. In an 
actual natural language lexicon, this ideal scenario does not obtain. If you increase the number of low 
probability words in the genuine (not ideal) lexicon, say by including more novums, such that the 
probabilities of the words in the set both vary greatly and are distributed over a greater range of possible 
values, this reduces the actual information associated with the lexicon as a source. This will in turn result in 
an increase in relative entropy – the ratio of the ideal maximum possible entropy to the actual entropy. This 
in turn results in a decrease in redundancy (which is 1 minus the relative entropy.) An early coverage by 
linguist John Lyons explains how redundancy applies to individual words: 
Redundancy is therefore a matter of degree...In general, the more probable a unit is, the greater 
its degree of redundancy (and the lower its information content.)169 
Remember that for Shannon information, greater uncertainty in the selection of word accompanies a 
greater number of possible less probable word options, which results in what Shippey refers to as ‗high-
information‘: more Shannon information being associated with a given word. Novum neologisms and 
phrases are low probability messages and therefore have low redundancy and high information. If one 
removes a novum neologism from an SF text, it will be very difficult for a reader to determine it. Shippey 
illustrates this by comparing novums in SF texts to words in more normative texts like Orwell‘s 1984. 
Shannon performs a similar analysis in his 1948 paper: 
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Two extremes of redundancy in English prose are represented by Basic English and by James 
Joyce‘s book ―FinnegansWake‖. The Basic English vocabulary is limited to 850 words and the 
redundancy is very high. This is reflected in the expansion that occurs when a passage is 
translated into Basic English. Joyce on the other hand enlarges the vocabulary and is alleged to 
achieve a compression of semantic content.170 
Note that the reference to semantic content here is allusive, and does not indicate that Shannon 
considered his theory to be about meaning. The semantic content arises from the linguistic implications 
of the vocabulary associated with the symbol sequence or message selected by author James Joyce 
functioning as a source. In enlarging the vocabulary in his text, Joyce automatically decreases the 
probability assigned to each symbol in the lexical set, since probabilities always add to 1, and thus 
increases the uncertainty associated with each word, as well as the overall uncertainty of the text. 
Moreover, the vocabulary expansion Joyce implements presumably contains a lot of unlikely or surprising 
words, and correspondingly a greater range of word probabilities. This increases the relative entropy of 
his text, and decreases its redundancy. Joyce behaves as a high-uncertainty source of information in terms 
of the words he selects. Increasing vocabulary increases the overall uncertainty and entropy of a text as a 
message and as a source.  
Lyons understands and linguistically integrates the concepts of redundancy and the surprisal value of 
words (as leveraged by Shippey) for statistical language structure, but then goes on to attempt to reconcile 
and ultimately identify information with meaning by asserting that meaningfulness for words involves 
‗having meaning‘ and for phrases or sentences involves significance. ‗Having meaning‘ is asserted to be 
logically prior to the latter on the basis of the Shannon surprisal value of the lexeme in its syntagmatic 
context171. For Lyons, ―a linguistic unit of whatever level, has no meaning in a given context if it is 
completely predictable in that context172‖ and ―having no meaning is merely the limiting case of complete 
‗predictability‘.173‖ This assertion ultimately rests on the ―widely accepted principle that ‗meaningfulness 
implies choice.‘174‖ This somewhat circular maxim is petitio principii and is neither rigorous nor convincing 
as the foundation of a theoretical identity relation between lexical information and linguistic meaning. It 
does not convincingly follow that a lexeme is meaningless just because it conveys no information in the 
syntagmatic context in which it is used. The word it in the previous sentence is completely predictable, if 
only one word is allowed in its place, based on the flanking grammar and lexemes in syntagmatic context, 
and thus its Shannon surprisal is 0. However, it is hard to see it as meaningless, by an intuitive conception 
of meaning, on this basis. Moreover, the surprisal value of a symbol or message underlying the measure 
of Shannon information must be applicable to any sequence of symbols produced by a discrete 
information source – even nonsense or random strings such as !$4b%pH. In the context of an English 
language syntagm like ―it‘s really very !$4b%pH‖, the string !$4b%pH has a very high surprisal value. It is 
very unexpected in the context of an English syntagm relying on the English lexicon and English 
grammatical rules, and would be nearly impossible to predict if removed. However, it would be hard to 
defend the semantic value of !$4b%pH as involving the having of meaning. If one asserts that only words 
in the English lexicon count as valid for selection, as Lyons presumably does, then neologisms of the kind 
employed in SF texts and scientific theories become instantly problematic. Such words are very 
unexpected within their contexts, but have little meaning for the uninitiated reader if Lyons‘ meaning-
choice maxim is applied, since they are not available to be chosen from the formal English lexicon. The 
string ―it‘s really very fligglemorph‖ is perhaps more predictable than !$4b%pH since its construction obeys 
principles which guide phonological structure in English, but still it has a high Shannon information or 
surprisal value implying lots of statistical choice, whilst having no discernable meaning. It thus can‘t be 
the case that unpredictability is the key component of ‗having meaning,‘ since this would result in such 
gibberish inside and outside of language contexts having meaning. Moreover, source selection of words 
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and messages in the case of English utterances and sentences is presumably somehow influenced a-priori 
by their ‗having meaning.‘ ‗Having meaning‘ thus cannot be as simple as unpredictability in selection, 
since selection for a language user source seems to require something beyond statistical unpredictability 
based on statistical possibilities referred to as choice. Choice in Shannon‘s theory and in Bayesian statistics 
is simply a statistical synonym for the number of different possibilities in a set. No agency is inferred or 
required for this definition. 
As Shannon, Warren Weaver and philosopher Fred Dretske all emphasise, Shannon entropy is not 
intended to capture or convey any sense or meaning – only to provide a measure of a lexical or analogue 
‗message‘ via a physical signal. Because of his project of establishing an informational epistemology, 
Dretske must ensure clarity on this point: 
Shannon has said that the semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering 
problem. So they are... [Warren] Weaver warns the reader that in this theory the word 
―information‖ is used in a special sense which must not be confused with its ordinary usage. 
Other authors caution the reader not to confuse the sense of information appropriate to this 
theory with the value of the received information...The utterance ―There is a gnu in my 
backyard‖ does not have more meaning than ―There is a dog in my backyard‖ because the former 
is, statistically, less probable. It is not even clear that one can talk sensibly about ―amounts of 
meaning‖ in this way‖.175 
This is one reason why Dretske, pursuant to developing an informational externalist epistemology, first 
attempts to establish a semantic theory of information176. Meaning is not in the signal per se, nor the 
message conveyed using the signal. The signal in the case of SF texts, or any text for that matter, is 
constituted by a number of things including the physically inscribed text – the type on the page. The 
message or messages are those lexical patterns – letters, words, sentences, phrases etc. - which are 
grammatically, syntactically and linguistically encoded into the text by virtue of combination with 
information (at the agent-destination) from a variety of other internal (mental) and external sources, 
including those which encapsulate information about language and grammar. Dretske locates meaning at 
the conflux of the information in the signal from the source and the background knowledge of the receiving 
agent, and that agent‘s ability to somehow thereby recognise the information that is present at the 
source177. Thus, information on Dretske‘s model, and thus on Shannon‘s model, does have something to do 
with meaning – but not in the way that Lyons suggests. As I will explicate more fully later, what is 
important on my theory is that meaning, whether defined as reference, or in psychological terms, or some 
other way, supervenes on the structured information that is the text in a strong sense of supervenience: a 
change in the selected information – the selected symbols, graphemes, morphemes and phrases - will 
necessarily result in some change in the encoded meaning – whatever meaning is defined to be - even if 
the change is very trivial or subtle. Importantly, Dretske‘s amendments to Shannon‘s theory for semantics 
and epistemology implicitly acknowledge the critical place of a well thought-out metaphysics of 
information, due to the complexities of information exchange and flow in communication, but making 
the information at a source itself dependent on an independent receiving agent is problematic.  
CONCEPTS AND INFORMATION SYNTHESIS 
I think the reason Dretske develops a slightly metaphysically and logically convoluted model is because he 
adheres closely to Shannon‘s source-transmitter-channel-receiver-destination model for all information 
transfer cases, and is thus driven to reconcile it with the effect of shared background knowledge without 
recourse to information from other sources, including internal concept sources: 
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Information…is a relative quantity…For often enough, a known frame of reference is 
understood. Every relevant party knows the same thing about the possibilities existing at the 
source...a receiver‘s background knowledge is relevant to the information that he receives (both 
how much information and what information)178 
It think, however, that every relevant party – every reader, for example - does not necessarily possess the 
same information about the possibilities at the source. This frame of reference is an abstraction which I think, 
in the case of artefactual information and information theory, misleads. However, the receiver‘s 
background knowledge is relevant to the information which they combine with the information they 
receive, resulting in the synthesis of nascent information. Nothing in the agent-receiver-destination‘s head 
affects what happens at a remote external source – but the information synthesis that occurs in their head 
will involve different amounts of veridical information based on the agent‘s existing internal information. 
It‘s not that what a reader knows actually changes the information of a specific text – it‘s that there are 
multiple internal information sources generating information and contributing to information synthesis. Some 
of those internal sources are in turn informed by external sources of various types. 
Dretske‘s theory caters for the acquisition of natural information via digitalisation, to effect knowledge 
through perception. To this end, he posits that all knowledge depends on the digitalisation of information – 
the perceptual encoding of analogue information from continuous sources for human cognition. Dretske is 
referring primarily to information as extracted from an external material analogue source and rendered 
into internal semantic structures and ultimately cognitive structures - which he proposes are synonymous with 
concepts - through sense perception179. In Long[1], I suggest that such cognitive structures should be 
regarded as combinatory, and that they in fact constitute internal information sources of a certain highly 
organised type. The process involves a loss of external natural information180. This model of loss in 
conversion also applies to lexical artefactual information such as texts. These posits bring to mind Suvin‘s 
assertion that naturalistic fiction is marked by its tendency to textually represent the author‘s environment 
as experienced sensory-empirically181. Thus the process of digitalisation that an author performs against 
what Wolfgang Iser calls the referential field from which she is drawing her inspiration, facts and ideas for 
processing and decoding the text, means that the text is broadly produced by a lossy182 coded re-
representation of the information in her referential fields via what I refer to as the author‘s internal 
sources183. I do not subscribe to the idea that we are possessed of a ‗mentalese‘ – a lexical basis for thought 
(nor, I think, does Dretske.) However, language is the primary mechanism for outputting and encoding 
artefactual information in external sources like texts, and as such it clearly abstracts-out significant amounts 
of information about any real state of affairs.  
Numerous literary theorists have posited conceptions of synthesis and meaning construction in texts and 
text processing. Wolfgang Iser, in his The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response, ultimately proposes 
that it is a synthesis of knowledge that occurs during text processing. Australian theorist Richard Harland 
suggests that it is meaning that is synthesised syntagmatically through sentential atomic cohesion184. Neither 
suggestion is perhaps ultimately satisfying since neither theorist offers rigorous explication or elucidation 
of key theoretical terms: knowledge in Iser‘s case, and meaning for Barthes‘ and Harland‘s. SF author and 
self-taught literary theorist Samuel R Delany, in a feat of perspicacity perhaps twenty years ahead of its 
time which closely anticipates both Harland and Shippey‘s efforts of 27 and 38 years later respectively, 
isolates information as the central component of his syntagmatic sentential explanation of how meaning is 
estranged in science fiction, thus making science fiction unique on an informational basis or informationally. 
Although Delany seems to conflate information with the somewhat nebulous conception of content as 
popular with the new wave science fiction writers of the 1960s, his syntagmatic algorithm, as Broderick 
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describes it, largely holds together on my own analysis, and both superstructuralist Harland and neo-
structuralist Tom Shippey provide indirect inadvertent support for it in their much later theses185. 
At this point, the persistent and difficult question of what meaning explicitly is has still not really been 
satisfied. If meaning in a fiction (or non-fiction) text is defined as ultimately arising from some kind of 
ethereal transitory or persistent agglomeration of unidentifiable or undefinable components of an 
arbitrary socio-cultural, psycho-social, empirical and historical Zeitgeist, then any definition thereof 
becomes something largely inaccessible as either subjectively or objectively coherent in any intellectually 
satisfying way. If we regard such abstractions as Broderick‘s mega-text as non-analytic and ideally 
unquantifiable - which assertion would seem errant in the light of Broderick‘s analytic orientation - then a 
definition of meaning should remain immutably elusive. Let us posit that the definition of meaning 
should not only provide some kind of conceptual coherence and exactitude, but also allow us at 
minimum to speak sensibly of a text encoding or not encoding some particular atomic meaning: to be 
able to say that it does mean this but it does not mean that, even upon a relativist interpretation. If we 
define meaning as supervening upon the outcomes of information synthesis, meaning is then combinatorial, 
contingent and temporally determined. On the information synthesis thesis, meaning may be regarded as 
ideally and (in some cases) practically determinable.  
I suggest that meaning supervenes on internal information synthesis: upon the associative mentally mediated combination of 
information from multiple internal and external sources186. Textual meaning simply is the internal cognitive and 
epistemological effects or outcomes which arise or emerge during internal information synthesis of the kind which occurs 
when an actual text is read by an actual reader – what I will refer to as read-time synthesis. The real finite 
mechanisms of meaning encoding and decoding during write-time and read-time synthesis are abstracted out 
of my model: their investigation being the domain of neuroscience and cognitive science. The mechanism 
whereby meaning and narrative in a text supervene on the information of that text is subsumed to the 
principle of supervenience. Whatever exactly is going on at the neural and cognitive level during information 
synthesis when an actual reader reads a specific actual text - at read-time - is currently inaccessible even to 
neuroscience, but I am asserting that – whatever it is – it does involve information synthesis, and whatever 
meaning actually is, it does supervene upon the information thus synthesised.  
Thus if a certain meaning, or narrative, or whatever – call it encoding B - supervenes on the latent 
artefactual information source that is Heinlein‘s phrase ―everything that is of any importance is founded 
on mathematics187‖  - which phrase we will call ‗A‘ -  then any change in the phrase A will result in an 
encoding somehow different to encoding B. On this theory, even a transposed synonym will result in a 
difference in what is encoded into or by a message188, so that if phrase A was instead ―everything that is of 
any importance is based on mathematics‖ or even ―everything of any importance is founded on 
mathematics‖ then in each case whatever is encoded upon A – meaning, or narrative, or knowledge, or 
semantics - must be different in some way from B189. If phrase A is included in a larger message, then 
changing any other part of the selected message – any part of the artefactual information - will have the 
same effect on the supervening encoded meaning or narrative (or whatever) of the total message 
including A within it. If meaning arises from and supervenes on the synthesis of information due to the 
combination of internal and external information sources, as I think it does, then meaning will be 
determined by the set of sources providing information at the time of perception and interpretation: at 
the time of text processing in the case of reading. An author may encode a specific meaning during write-
time information synthesis, which meaning is thus encoded in the text produced, albeit with the effects of 
information loss. However, that same specific meaning will only be accessible/decodable at read-time if 
the reader synthesises a contributing information source set which significantly intersects with that of the 
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writer. This would seem to fit intuitively with Suvin‘s observation – with apparent disregard for Barthes‘ 
death of the author - that SF worlds seem to have different meanings based on the intention of the author190.  
An elegant upshot of this information synthesis model is that once the read-time cognitive response has 
occured, further cognitive and aesthetic effects can then arise from the further synthesis of the newly 
synthesised information, and the meaning which supervenes upon it, with other information in pre-
existing internal sources. This opens the way also for an informational explanation for the cognitive aesthetic, 
and also for the realisation of the aesthetic of complexity in SF, which I will expound upon in chapter four. 
The ambiguities and ―elements of indeterminacy which enable the text to ‗communicate‘ with the 
reader191‖ in such a way that the ―relative indeterminacy of the text allows a spectrum of actualisation‖ 
without complete arbitrariness of meaning, arise because of the indeterminacy of the contributing 
information source set in any given read-time or write-time synthesis. This indeterminacy does not make 
the source set any less materially real, but is simply a result of the finite mental capacities of the reader and 
author, and the information loss involved in write-time and read-time syntheses. 
The possibilities associated with any given lexical source and selections thereat are estimable or knowable 
for human languages like English. Shared background knowledge supervening on contributing source sets 
is generally practically unquantifiable, but information theory allows for external veridical sources to 
commonly inform the internal sources of many reader-perceivers. Reductively speaking, Broderick‘s 
mega-text operates in just this way: it exists as an external source set, the boundaries of which are abstract 
and the contents of which not readily or practically quantifiable, and which can inform the internal 
sources with variation in information content from individual to individual. Thus the mega-text is 
ultimately a source set which includes external and internal sources contributing arbitrarily to write-time 
and read-time synthesis. When any number of practised SF readers engage in processing an SF text, and 
when an author is selecting its constituent symbols in writing it, all agents have differing access to the SF 
mega-text as a set of external sources. They do not each possess information from the same subset of 
those SF mega-text sources, nor even the exact same information from any one shared source, nor are 
any of their internal novums or SF codon concept tokens exactly the same. However, all initiated readers 
share enough information distributed across internal concept sources to allow them to identify many of 
the SF codons they encounter, and to assess any novum in an informed way – since they have acquired or 
had transmitted to them similar or the same words or neologisms before in the context of information 
synthesis across a set of sources containing information associated with SF – SF texts, utterances from 
remembered SF conversations, and existing internal SF ideas. Moreover, if the author has written hard SF 
or SF proper, many of the terms selected by the author operating as a source will include those drawn from 
sources associated with science and scientific theory and discourse. 
So, at this juncture we have a definition for texts as discrete latent external information sources, and 
another for concepts as internal sources. The next salient information theoretic postulate is information 
typology, which is due neither to Dretske or Shannon, but is my own offering. Dretske deals 
informationally with concepts and what he proposes to be their informational and propositional contents, 
via digitalisation of external analogue information to produce internal cognitive digital information.  
VERIDICAL INFORMATION AND PSEUDO-INFORMATION IN SCIENCE FICTION TEXTS 
One of the most recondite theoretical undertakings that faced Dretske was determining how external 
analogue information sources inform the knowledge of intelligent agents with different background 
knowledge192. It is my conviction that this undertaking is far easier if one recognises not only Dretske‘s 
analogue and digital information kinds, and Shannon‘s continuous and discrete information, but also many 
other kinds or types of information, and a typology to accompany them. The objective basis for such a 
typology is that there exist ontologically fundamentally different types of source. The type of information is 
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determined by the type of source which encapsulates, emits or generates it193. Critically for the application 
to informationist SF theory, the typology of information is rooted in the relationship of the textual source 
to a veridical source of some kind – a source which involves materially, mathematically or logically 
verifiable actual objects or phenomena – a source with a configuration which is materially actual or 
corresponds to a real state of affairs, including those objects which are not physical but 
mathematically/logically veracious like the number 2. ‗2 + 2 = 4‘, for example, is an artefactual lexical 
information source the configuration of which encodes veridical information. An SF reader‘s physical 
body is a veridical information source of a different type, encapsulating a different type of veridical 
information. Briefly speaking, the information encapsulated within it is non-lexical, natural and incidental. 
Natural information can be veridical only: its source is necessarily something real. Artefactual information 
is not necessarily veridical. A lexical message which is selected on the basis of concepts of unreal things, or 
of counterfactuals, constitutes pseudo-information. Pseudo-information is necessarily artefactual information, 
and does entail the implications of encoded semantics. 
Artefactual lexical sources – texts for example – often encode information which is not correlated with 
nor was synthesised from any material source in the real world – no real or actual object or information 
source is associated with them. There are many material inscriptions of descriptions of unicorns – textual 
sources whose configurations encode the inscribed word ‗unicorn‘ in English or some other language – 
but there is no actual scientifically examinable material configuration in the real world which we could 
rationally map to the semantics encoded by the linguistic lexical artefact ‗unicorn‘. The information 
associated with such words and texts is what I refer to as pure pseudo-information194. It is to specific 
information types that we now turn to bring informationist SF theory to full fruition. 
I refer to information which is true, pace Dretske‘s axiom of necessary information-truth coupling, as 
veridical information. Such information can only come from a veridical source: something that corresponds 
with a material state of affairs or logically or empirically adducible fact or facts. Artefactual veridical 
information is necessarily true information about the actual world which has been produced by humans 
for the purpose of communication. However, for the purposes of analysing fictions and counterfactuals, I 
introduce the concept of artefactual pseudo-information. Information synthesis involves the combining of 
multiple types of information from multiple ontologically or semantically different types of sources to 
produce a new source of another type, such that novel information emerges. In the case of write-time and 
read-time synthesis of fiction texts, artefactual veridical information and artefactual pseudo-information are most 
often combined. 
Journalistic, historical and biographical writings and texts ideally attempt to represent factual information 
– what I refer to as veridical information195. Veridical information associated with such modes of writing 
corresponds and refers to actual verifiable material facts or states of affairs in the real world: human 
affairs, historical events, cultural movements, personal history, and so on. There are sub-types of the 
veridical information type. They involve information loss due to their dependence on artefactual sources. 
The problems of determining the facts of history, biographical or otherwise, are well understood. One 
can‘t prove (non-natural) history in the scientific sense, since historical artefacts and artefactual 
information are open to interpretation. This is precisely because human action and behaviour is rendered 
unpredictable by human intellect and volition, and is not nomologically predictable. People are cognisant 
of the arrow of time and can intentionally evidentially obfuscate or ‗rewrite‘ history, undermining the 
historian‘s ability to avoid uncertainty in many cases. Scientific theories and texts and the discourses that 
accompany them are centrally interested in the types of veridical information associated, not with human 
affairs or political events or sociological cause and effect, but with material physical states of affairs in nature 
and the physical world. Thus veridical information (materially, logically, or mathematically verifiable) is the 
type of information with which science is ideally ultimately centrally preoccupied, even if it is pursued via 
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defeasible scientific theorising established with abstract mathematics or the interpretation of experimental 
results. With the possible exceptions of abstract mathematics, the statistically based revelations of 
apparent indeterminism in quantum mechanics, and string theory in physics, science understands nature 
as involving complex and immutable patterns and laws which are best inscribed and interpreted 
mathematically or with rigorous, conceptually and symbolically consistent (but defeasible and revisable) 
methodological tools. The natural physical world is understood by scientists and many non-scientists alike 
to require a special kind of rigour and exactitude to be explored and understood adequately and 
convincingly, such that effective, falsifiable, verifiable and accurate concrete knowledge can be acquired 
about it. Fiction, of course, has no such demands upon it, which is indubitably why supernaturalist and 
mystical religious texts and dogmas resemble, exist as or incorporate, mythologising fiction - albeit 
admixed with historical, quasi-historical or material facts in some cases. Such texts encapsulate a different 
type of information altogether from the sciences: pure pseudo information196. I will refer to the pseudo-
information of mythological, fantasy, fairy tale and mystical texts as pure pseudo-information. Such 
information either comes from sources which are not veridical, or arises from the synthesis of information 
from sets of information-contributing sources such that the resulting synthesised information is not 
veridical because of the inclusion of non-veridical sources, or the confusion of veridical information from 
multiple veridical and non-veridical sources197. Veridical information comes from veridical sources: real 
sources involving possibilities and ontological configurations which are materially and physically 
falsifiable, empirically and materially verifiable, and/or mathematically or logically consistent and 
provable198.  
When a large proportion of the artefactual lexical information encapsulated within an artefactual lexical 
source such as a text does not in actuality trace back to material facts and states of affairs in the actual 
world as would be the case for a veridical information source, this is indicative that the textual/lexical source is 
fictive, and that the type of information therein is therefore largely pure pseudo-information, or possibly 
counterfactual pseudo-information. The source set which influences the selection of words to include in pure 
pseudo-informational artefactual lexical messages includes a large proportion of internal sources or other 
artefactual pseudo-information sources, such that no reliable synthesis of internal source information with 
external veridical source information is effected199.  This is because there is either no materially or 
mathematically real source (object or state of affairs) which informs the word selection at all, or if there is, 
then the information from such a source is so admixed with both pseudo-information and veridical 
information from other internal and external artefactual and natural sources that the resulting synthesised 
information is no longer veridical with respect to the original veridical source in question. The information 
from the other sources in the contributing set behaves as noise according to Shannon‘s model. This will be 
especially so if none of the sources in the contributing lexical artefactual source set – the set of texts which 
contribute information to the synthesised message or text – are veridical. In the case of pure pseudo-
information, neither do any of the linguistically encoded semantics supervening upon the information in the 
contributing lexical artefactual source set refer to any veridical source.  
Fred Dretske‘s digitalisation process necessarily involves information loss. Internal sources which contain 
veridical information are thus imperfect when compared with the external sources from which their 
information originated: my concept of my bicycle is quite informationally imperfect. It will be missing a 
lot of information which an actual bicycle encapsulates as a veridical information source200. The internal 
concept sources possessed by an author or speaker are themselves real and veridical, much like pseudo-
informational text sources are materially real and veridical as physical objects. However, information 
received, absorbed or acquired from external veridical information sources and then encoded and encapsulated 
within actual existing internal (concept) sources is always equivocal and lossy due to digitalisation. Internal 
sources (concepts) which encode and encapsulate pseudo-information have synthesised that information 
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from other internal sources with loss, and if there is any information encapsulated and encoded within 
them from external veridical sources, then the loss of information is so great that any information 
remaining is no longer veridical. Strictly interpreted on Shannon‟s model, other internal sources 
contributing to the information synthesis would constitute noise sources with respect to any external 
veridical source considered as the transmitting source.   
With words or terms associated with veridical lexical artefactual information (texts), there is always a veridical 
external source which has somehow contributed veridical information to the word selection/choice. There is at least one 
veridical external source included in the contributing information source set – a materially, empirically or 
mathematically verifiable object, event or state of affairs. The author of an SF novel may, or may not, 
have first-hand experience with a gas laser, a moon of Jupiter, a synaptic firing, the Riemann Zeta 
function, a fractal compression algorithm, or a space shuttle. However, if they are writing hard SF, then 
the information associated with the corresponding selection of scientific terms and scientific discourse in 
the text ultimately comes from actual existing veridical sources corresponding to these existent entities 
and states of affairs. The encoded semantics of the messages, and the words and terms that comprise 
them, will supervene on information originating with these objects and states of affairs regarded as 
sources. Simply put, there exist real gas lasers, moons of Jupiter, fractal compression algorithms and 
Space Shuttles, and instances of these, and the real states of affairs which such instances are part of, 
constitutes non-lexical veridical information sources in and of themselves. If such a source ultimately 
contributes veridical information to the lexical artefactual information of a text, the linguistically encoded 
narrative and semantics references the source faithfully. Genuine competent SF texts rely on source sets 
which include artefactual lexical sources such as scientific texts and theories, and natural and incidental 
sources such as materially and mathematically verifiable states of affairs and objects. Information from 
these sets is synthesised in such a way as to preserve and re-represent veridical information within the 
text, even if the text encodes a fiction overall, and is thus itself pseudo-information overall. 
Most fiction is encoded – written - not with any immutable mandate for the encapsulation and conveyance 
of facts, but for fictive narrative purposes: aesthetic, affective, metaphorical, allegorical, etc. Ontologically 
speaking, a text that lexically encodes pseudo-information is technically still a source of veridical information on a 
different level, since it exists physically as an inscribed lexically structured source. That is to say, an 
instance of the text is physically existent, and has grammatically and linguistically ordered symbols 
inscribed upon, or represented on, it. There is some significant measure of veridical information associated 
with such a source from an ontological and empirical perspective. An uninitiated intelligent alien being 
could feasibly gain from it veridical information associated with grammar, vocabulary, printing techniques, 
text formatting, human reading practices and so on. Moreover, as has already been demonstrated, fiction 
texts invariably include some veridical information in terms of what is lexically encoded within them, and 
embodied in the semantics grammatically and linguistically encoded by the text, because they include 
some references to real objects or states of affairs. If we consider an otherwise pseudo-informational 
textual source such as J.R.R. Tolkien‘s The Hobbit, any information therein putatively associated with 
Hobbits as an information source is pseudo-information, but that does not mean that to say the message 
―the text is about fictional characters called Hobbits‖ would involve pseudo-information. This would be 
instead true or veridical information, for which a material instance of the fictive text The Hobbit could itself 
be regarded as a veridical source. The selection of the message ―the text is about fictional characters called 
Hobbits‖ is informed by a large set of veridical information sources, including presumably the text itself, 
its location in the bookstore or library, the marketing text on its cover, the definition of fiction, texts on 
literary theory, reviews, encyclopaedias, and so on. A text can thus behave as a source of different types of 
information. A textual artefact can behave as more than one type of source. In terms of the information 
ontology being here utilised, this is not true of a non-lexical, natural, incidental material configuration like a 
moon or an atom, which is a veridical source only. Human-abstracted artefactual lexical information sources 
like texts are multiply realised. Because of encoding and synthesis, they can encapsulate multiple information 
types. You can get the veridical information corresponding to the artefactual lexical source-message ―the 
fictive text The Hobbit is about a fictive character called a Hobbit‖ from the text that is The Hobbit itself. So 
a physical sample of the text The Hobbit can also stand as a veridical source. However, none of the 
information upon which the encoded semantics about the actions and thoughts of Hobbits supervenes can be regarded as 
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veridical. For example, ―This Hobbit was a very well-to-do Hobbit, and his name was Baggins‖ encodes 
little or no meaning associated with or supervening upon external veridical information sources - this text 
message is thus pseudo-information201. Moreover, it encodes what I refer to as pure pseudo-information. 
Fantasy and myth texts as information sources are sources of pure pseudo information. SF texts contain in the 
main another kind of information altogether – counterfactual pseudo-information. 
Science fiction frequently involves the careful merging of veridical and pseudo-information effecting a 
synthesis of heterogeneous information types such that veridical information is preserved for cognition even in 
highly estranged counterfactual futurological settings. In Iain M. Banks‘ The Algebraist, the former science 
writer frequently engages veridical science and counterfactual estrangement simultaneously, stimulating 
the cognitive in the reader who must extrapolate from familiar veridical information – the known: 
The gascraft weighed next to nothing in the Third Fury‘s miniscule gravity,  but it massed over 
two tonnes and the laws regarding inertia and momentum still applied.202  
This is a rather obvious example of the outcomes of such write-time information synthesis, but is 
exemplary of this common informational marker of science fiction: counterfactual pseudo-information. 
Realist and naturalistic fictions set in the era of their authors, and historical novels, are the result of the 
write-time synthesis of information from veridical sources such as actual material objects, people, settings 
and events with pseudo-information from internal source synthesis. Overall, such texts as information 
sources are still not veridical by virtue of the fictive encoded semantic context. That is to say, even regarded 
in terms of the meaning semantically encoded upon the messages encoded within them, the overall 
information type of a realist or naturalistic fiction text, and even of a historical fiction text, is still pseudo-
information. The texts of SF, realist or naturalistic novels are still pseudo-information sources. Overall, they do 
not encode meaning referring to ontologically material or factual realities or states of affairs, nor 
synthesise information sourced from the same. Put another way, ontologically speaking such texts would 
only stand as veridical sources if the information linguistically and semantically encoded in their configurations – 
supervening on their constituent lexical information - was completely disregarded. Information 
theoretically, on the model I am using, this approach would be errant. All of the information acquired 
(with loss) from all of the information sources in the set which inform203 the text – not just its physical 
representation – contribute to the text‘s information synthesis. In terms of the ontology of information I am 
presenting, one must account for all of the information – and all of the different types of information – 
that is encapsulated within a given source and its configuration. No amount of internal information 
possessed by the reader – whether it is veridical or not – when combined with the pseudo-information in 
an external text source which encodes a fiction, can result in rendering the pseudo-information 
linguistically encoded in the text veridical. This may seem to be counter-intuitive. If one knows enough 
correct information, one can extrapolate from fictive texts and learn something factual. However, such an 
outcome, on this theory, is because of the other internal sources (concepts) called into service at read-
time: because of the reader‘s knowledge, which supervenes upon information. 
Here some examples should prove elucidatory. Suppose that I have a concept which stands as an internal 
information source, and the information encapsulated in the concept is veridical, say for example the 
information conveyed by the English lexical message: the Sun can warm my skin. Note that I have not used 
quotes, but am only interested in what some philosophers of language refer to as the propositional contents 
of, or associated with, the phrase ‗the Sun can warm my skin.‘ On Dretske‘s theory this proposition has 
associated with it informational content204. On my ontology this content is associated with the configuration of 
the source itself, which is influenced by the set of any sources that contribute information to it by influencing the word 
selection. The contributing sources need not be lexical, nor artefactual. The information as encoded 
textually in the linguistic sub clause ‗the Sun can warm my skin‘ is lexical, but it does not logically follow 
that the corresponding information in the internal concept – the internal source(s) that I possess - 
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supervenes lexically. An internal source is unlikely to be lexical in any way that resembles the source 
constituted by the text the Sun can warm my skin. I am proposing that concepts, as internal sources, are - 
following Stephen Pinker, at bottom not realised by a linguistic and lexical mentalese205. The information 
which subsists in internal sources, on the best cognitive science and informational epistemological 
theories, and on the most lucid reasoning, is non-linguistic206. The gaining of knowledge through the 
acquisition of information is not always associated with language alone, or in some cases at all, even if that 
knowledge is expressed linguistically. We may encode internal information using our linguistic-
grammatical tool set and internally stored language lexicon for the purposes of transmitting it phonetically 
or lexically as a message in an utterance or inscription. However, even though it may possibly have some 
kind of basic structure and thus possibly something roughly resembling a syntax207, internal information 
encapsulated in cognitive structure sources is probably not fundamentally linguistic or lexical. Like 
Dretske, I hesitate to be definitive due to the special technical complexity of the problem, but suggest that 
language – artefactual lexical information as conveyed linguistically - supervenes causally and structurally 
on complex internal structures constituted of more basic types of information acquired through sensory 
perception and internal information synthesis, not vice versa208. Returning to the example, that the Sun can 
warm my skin is an example of veridical information, the Sun and my skin are real objects – real veridical 
information sources – and the state of affairs matching the encoded semantics of this statement actually 
occurs when I stand exposed to energy from the Sun. This state of affairs is thus an external veridical 
source of information, its configuration roughly described by the previous sentence. Now – if I select and 
token (via inscription or utterance) the message ―Gandalf is a most magical wizard‖, then this lexical 
message, although a veridical source in terms of being a real inscribed grammatical entity, refers to no 
veridical information sources in its encoded semantics. Moreover, it doesn‘t matter how I combine the 
information encapsulated in the first message-source with the second, neither the thus synthesised lexical 
artefactual information source, nor the semantics supervening thereupon, will result in the realisation of 
either Gandalf, magic or wizards as external actual objects or states of affairs which can stand as veridical 
information sources. In fact, the combining of the two sources as one lexical artefactual source – one 
grammatical phrase – will always result in a less veridical lexical artefactual information source, even if 
correct grammar is employed. The only exception would be if the encoded semantics and grammar of the 
combined statements resulted in a true proposition , such as ―It is the case that the Sun can warm my 
skin, and in the story of The Lord of the Rings, the character Gandalf is a most magical wizard.‖ However, 
this requires the synthesis of veridical information from other sources: one‘s concept of The Lord of the 
Rings, one‘s concepts of fact and fiction, instances of the text of the actual book itself, and so on209. The 
messages constituted as the Sun can warm my skin and Gandalf is a most magical wizard; the Sun can warm my skin 
because Gandalf is a most magical wizard; Gandalf is a most magical wizard and the Sun can warm my skin are all 
proportionally less veridical in terms of their total information than the message the Sun can warm my skin. 
At this point, we should be able to exemplify the informational distinction between SF texts and 
fantasy/myth texts straightforwardly. In Tolkien‘s The Two Towers, the sorcerer Sauron‘s eye can perform 
feats of remote seeing through the palantír of Orthanc, an otherwise inert and amorphous crystal ball. The 
Hobbit Pippin asks for details about the stone. Gandalf describes their purpose, but their mechanism 
remains unimportant210: 
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 ‗What did the men of old use them for?‘ asked Pippin… 
‗To see far off, and to converse in thought with one another,‘ said Gandalf. ‗In that way they 
long guarded and united the realm of Gondor. They set up the stones at Minas Anor, and 
Minis Ithil, and at Orthanc in the ring of Isengard.‘211 
Aside perhaps from metaphoric references to juvenile psychology through the vehicle of fictional 
behavioural traits of Hobbits, basic insight into the benefits of long distance communications, and 
normative invocations of relational and personality dynamics, there is no veridical information associated 
– counterfactually or otherwise - with the episode involving the operation of the palantíri. The veridical 
information content of this text is too low for it to be called counterfactual pseudo-information. It is not 
a possible world but an alternative world. The stones function by mysterious supernatural power, 
presumably invested in them by the magic Elf Fëanor, who ‗wrought‘ them212. One of the quirks of such 
fictive magical devices and objects, and the supernaturalised narrative devices that accompany them, is 
that the physical and natural seem to arbitrarily restrain the otherwise unlimited supernatural. This has the 
permanent effect of requiring a sustained suspension of disbelief on the part of the reader, since even 
internal to the fictive context of the fantasy story and setting, the invocation of the supernatural imputes 
marked logical inconsistencies. In a fictive world permeated by and causally subsumed to the magical and 
the supernatural, impedances and limitations due to natural causal relations are barely tenable as plot 
interventions: 
Each palantír replied to each, but all those in Gondor were ever open to the view of Osgiliath. 
Now it appears that, as the rock of Orthanc has withstood the storms of time, so there the 
palantír of that tower has remained. But it could do nothing but see small images of things far 
off and days remote.213 
With such powers to completely subvert the natural, it is difficult to see why Sauron, or any other wizard 
or supernaturally inspired persona, needs a palantír, or any other magical or supernatural object (or spell, 
or incantation, or prayer) at all. The cognitive aesthetic of Lem is not the one invoked at read-time The 
Two Towers. In fact, there is an additional suspension required: that of cognition. Supernaturalism and 
magic facilitate causal circumvention: they short-circuit and render redundant natural material causality. 
None of this, of course, diminishes The Two Towers as a work of fiction from an aesthetic perspective. My 
intention here has been to attempt undo the conflation of SF, fantasy and mythology on an informational 
basis. The informational profile of Tolkien‘s text is quite different from that of Reynold‘s Revelation Space. 
In Reynold‘s text, the character of Ilya Volyova is preoccupied with learning as much as possible about 
the Resurgam system from her ship‘s databases and from a vast swarm of miniature information 
gathering sensors called pebbles, which race ahead of the ship and spread out over vast areas of space to 
capture as much information as possible before the ship‘s arrival: 
The pebble cloud had whipped past either side of Resurgam so there was data from both its 
day and night sides. Additionally, the pebble cloud had elongated itself in the line of flight until 
fifteen hours spaced the passage of its first and last unit through the system, enabling the entire 
surface of Resurgam to be glimpsed under both illumination and darkness.214 
The fictional pebble cloud is an informationist novum which employs highly extrapolative estrangement 
from known technology, but which is nonetheless informed by veridical information associated with real 
sensor arrays and actual sensor swarms of the kind used for meteorological research. It is not simply 
analogical, but involves counterfactual extrapolation from fact. The pebble cloud is defeasibly possible in 
reality, magical palantíri are not. Reynold‘s character casts this surveillance net into space, and the 
information it provides avails the author of a narrative device for validating further counterfactual 
invention: 
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The Resurgam system was a wide binary. Delta Pavonis was the life giving star, but – as she had 
known – it possessed a dead twin. The dark companion was a neutron star, separated by ten 
light hours from Pavonis, far enough for stable planetary orbits to be possible around both 
stars. And indeed, the neutron star had claimed a planet of its own. The fact of the planet‘s 
existence was known to her in advance of the information from the pebbles. All it warranted in 
the ship‘s database was a line of comment.215 
This excerpt contains an admixture of scientific and fictive language supervening on a synthesis of 
veridical and pseudo-information typical of SF in the sub mode of informationist space opera. Delta 
Pavonis is a real star identified by astronomers. It, and any real physical state of affairs in which it is 
causally involved, are natural veridical information sources. Any recorded scientific results, observations 
and calculations, database entries, textbook entries, empirically informed mathematical theories, 
encyclopedia entries and so forth, resulting from the detection of such natural veridical information 
sources, constitute veridical artefactual lexical information sources. Neutron stars and star pairs (binary 
systems) involving neutron stars are all real, materially verifiable astronomical entities216, real instances of 
which are veridical natural information sources. However, neither the binary system described in the 
passage nor the neutron star which it incorporates are existent objects and states of affairs constituting 
information sources. The structure and distances postulated for the fictional binary system are veridical – 
informed by veridical astronomical science. This indicates the significant presence of a special type of 
pseudo-information. It is not the pure pseudo-information of fantasy and myth texts. It is counterfactual 
pseudo information. I suggest that the discursive hybridisation associated with hard informationist SF, or any 
SF with hard scientific elements, whether it be futurological or not, is generally accompanied by and 
supervenes upon information synthesis which incorporates counterfactual pseudo-information associated 
with veridical scientific and technological sources. 
LINGUISTIC SUBJUNCTIVITY AND COUNTERFACTUAL PSEUDO-INFORMATION IN SCIENCE FICTION 
It is veridical information and counterfactual pseudo-information that marks the SF novum, and which 
distinguishes hard SF from fantasy and myth texts which encapsulate little or no veridical information or 
counterfactual pseudo-information – but instead largely or only pure pseudo-information. On the model of 
philosophers Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, a counterfactual involves a modal speculation about how 
the actual world – or a given situation in the actual world – might be logically and materially manifest if 
just one or a few facts about the actual world, and the given situation, were different than they actually 
are217.  Other philosophers and logicians, most notably David Lewis, allow for a much more 
metaphysically radical conception of a possible world – one which can not only deviate from the actual 
world multifariously and to the point of significant ontological distancing from actual norms and states of 
affairs218, but which is itself also given the status of actuality. Kripke famously rejects such models: 
All this talk seems to me to have taken the metaphor of possible worlds much too seriously in 
some way. It is as if a ‗possible world‘ were like a distant country...What it amounts to is the 
view that counterfactual situations have to be described purely qualitatively... this seems to me 
to be wrong.219 
 
                                                 
215 Ibid., 205. 
216 Substantiated by actual X-Ray and optical observations. 
217 Yagisawa, Takashi. ―Possible Objects‖ in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Published Fri Apr 15, 2005; substantive revision Thu Jul 21, 
2005. <16 September 2008> <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-objects/#5>, 2. Possible Worlds. 
218 Not some distance in space-time, but distance in the literary sense of the contrast 
219 Kripke, S. ―Naming and Necessity‖. Eds. Donald Davidson and Harman. G. Holland: Reidel, 1972, 147. 
CHAPTER 2 - INFORMATION THEORY AND THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE FICTION TEXTS 
49 
 
The inventor of modern modal logic, Kripke established a working systematic mathematical logic of 
modality related to subjunctive speech modes, general modal speech, and modal reasoning. Prior to 
Kripke‘s efforts220, logic had been confused, problematic and inelegantly described since Aristotle. Part of 
Kripke‘s system includes the accessibility relation: a logical operator which enforces the metaphysical 
principle that possible worlds so considered should be minimally different from the actual real world. 
Lewis was a modal realist, and his perspective on the ontological and logical status of possible worlds – 
whether or not they can be regarded as actual - differs from that of Kripke: 
There are so many ways that a world might be; and one of these many ways is the way the 
world is. Are there other worlds that are other ways? I say that there are. I advocate a thesis of 
plurality of worlds, or modal realism, which holds that our world is but one among many.221 
Modal logic starts, in very real sense, with language. Lewis identifies the connexion: 
A counterfactual (or ‗subjunctive‘) conditional is an invitation to consider what goes on in a 
selected ‗counterfactual situation‘; which is to say, at some other possible world.222 
This is the same linguistic subjunctivity Broderick, following Delany, identifies as special to SF texts as 
compared to other literary genres and modes of writing: 
Sf textuality is grounded in a distinctive subjunctivity (a useful borrowing from grammar by 
Samuel Delany). Briefly: ‗A distinct level of subjunctivity informs all of the words in an s-f story 
at a level that is different from that which informs naturalistic fiction, fantasy or reportage...‘ 223  
224 
Delany, a pioneer in informationist SF theory, identifies SF as marked by modal subjunctive language 
associated with possibilities extrapolated from facts, rather than with facts alone, as in reportage, or 
pervasively with impossibilities, as in the case of fantasy225. The upshot of this is that ―the particular 
subjunctive level of s-f continues to expand the freedom of the choice of words that can follow another 
group of words meaningfully.226‖ 
Delany stipulates the relative balance of indicative and subjunctive tensions in the words of each mode of 
writing. For a series of words in reportage, ―a blanket indicative tension informs the whole series: this 
happened.‖  Delany also cites the centrality of reference to the real in the discourse and textuality of 
reportage, asserting that in this mode ―every word, even the metaphorical ones, must go straight back to a 
real object, or a real thought on the part of the reporter.‖ It is probably not the case that every word 
would refer thus, since even reportage can include such things as aphorisms, jokes, inserted narrative and 
discourse, and allusive metaphors - not to mention straight errors based on information loss or the 
supplanting of veridical information with pseudo-information. Moreover, it is difficult to discern what 
Delany means by ‗real thought‘, since both by information ontology, information theory and cognitive 
science (both dualist and physicalist), all thoughts are regarded as real – things that really occur and either 
supervene somehow on mental processes or states, or are realised by some variety of ‗spooky stuff‘. If 
one has a thought, it is real – the thought has really occurred. To what extent the information content of 
the thought – what it is about – is veridical, is a separate question. One could interpret ‗real thought‘ as 
meaning that the thought must be of a real object – but then again this is problematic since thought is 
again vulnerable to error through information loss and noise. For naturalist or realist writing, Delany 
suggests that the subjunctive-injunctive balance is weighed in favour of the former, and that the 
―subjunctivity level for a series of words labelled naturalistic fiction is defined by: could have happened.227‖ 
This is closer to the subjunctivity level engaged in SF works such as Rudy Rucker‘s Mathematicians in Love, 
                                                 
220 At the tender age of 18 years. 
221 Lewis, D. On the Plurality of Worlds. Massachusetts: Blackwell, (1986,), 2. 
222 Ibid., 20. 
223 Delany, Samuel R. ―About 5,750 Words.‖ Delany, Samuel R. The Jewel-Hinged Jaw: Notes on the Language of Science Fiction. New York: Berkley 
Windhover, 1978, 31. 
224 Broderick, D. Reading By Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction. London: Routledge, 1995.57. 
225 Ibid., 32-3. 
226 Ibid., 32. 
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and the historically attuned Cryptonomicon of Neal Stephenson, which I suggest accords with: may have/could 
have happened thus. The information types associated with such SF are veridical and counterfactual-pseudo. 
In Cryptonomicon, when the character-narrator Alan Turing explicates, via narrative hypodiegesis, the basic 
semantic notions underpinning Kurt Gödel‘s incompleteness theorem, the text includes significant 
veridical information, since the explication is a notional expository summary of mathematically verifiable 
truths. As far as mathematicians can discern, the syntactic proof of Gödel‘s theorem renders it as true as 
the mathematical statement 2+2=4. It is interesting that this is one of the moments in Stephenson‘s text 
where mathematical discourse is inserted as mathematical notation proper: 
―But you can calculate the digits of pi, one at a time, by using certain formulas. And you can 
write down the formulas like so‖ 
𝜋 = 4  
(−1)𝑛
2𝑛 + 1
∞
𝑛=0
 
―I have used the Leibniz series to placate our friend. See Lawrence? It is a string of symbols‖ 
…Gödel said…‗Say!, if you buy into this business about mathematics being just strings of 
symbols…any string of symbols-such as this very formula, here – can be translated into 
integers... Formulas can act on numbers, right?...but if another mathematical formula, such as the 
one right here, for calculating pi, can be encoded as a number, then you can have another formula 
act on it...Then he showed…that if formulas really can refer to themselves, it‘s possible to write 
down one saying ‗this statement cannot be proved.‖228 
The situation described by the narrative supervening on the lexical information of the text is wholly 
counterfactual, but many of the details conveyed regarding the real Kurt Gödel and his real 
incompleteness theorems are accurate and supervene on veridical information. It involves the existence of 
people in another possible world who didn‘t exist in the actual world in association with the real Alan 
Turing: the fictive characters Lawrence and his companion Rudy. Stephenson even captures the 
important distinction between the semantic and syntactic aspects of a mathematical proof: this constitutes 
demonstrably verifiable veridical information. This passage involves an information synthesis, upon which 
supervenes a discursive hybridisation and synthesis, wherein the primary sources of veridical information 
synthesised into the whole are scientific and mathematical in nature: Gödel‘s incompleteness theorems, 
Leibniz formula, and so on. This expands the cognitive aesthetic of the text, and its informational 
complexity. The only SF element absent is the novum, since all of the scientific and mathematical veridical 
information is non-speculative. The narrative framework of the passage is subjunctive in mode and tone, 
but the encapsulated hypo-diegetic expository is indicative in tone, and involves mathematically verifiable 
veridical information. Crytonomicon also synthesises with pure pseudo-information of the impossible 
variety, bound up in the preternatural to supernatural character of Enoch Root, which synthesis imputes 
to the text a supernaturalistic aspect. In chapters three and four, I will argue that such manoeuvres 
normally result in an ideological subsumption of science to mysticism, which undermines the cognitive 
outcomes of the text‘s informational and discursive synthesis with science. In the case of Cryptonomicon, 
cognitive aesthetic outcomes at read-time synthesis are little diminished for passages such as the above. 
 Delany places fantasy at the non-SF extreme of his subjunctivity-injunctivity spectrum, asserting that 
―[f]antasy takes the subjunctivity of naturalistic fiction and throws it into reverse.229‖ He identifies the very 
crux of the linguistic, semantic and informational difference between fantasy and SF proper: 
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At the appearance of elves, witches or magic in a non metaphorical position, or at some 
correction of image too bizarre to be explained by other than the supernatural, the level of 
subjunctivity becomes: could not have happened. And immediately it informs all of the words in 
the series.230 
This correlates well with our definition of pure pseudo-information. Moreover, once pure pseudo-
informational words and terms become part of the text message which encodes the narrative and its 
semantics, they cause the entire narrative context to be thus informed. Interestingly, Delany here uses the 
strong original metaphysical Platonic sense of inform: the overall configuration of the information source 
is shaped by the type of information being employed for unreal objects and references – in this case an 
anti type, for pseudo-information is not real or veridical information any more than pseudocode is real 
computer program code, pseudoscience real science, or a pseudorandom number a truly random 
number231. None of these pseudo-objects does or is what their real correlates do or are. Textual/lexical 
artefactual pure pseudo-information looks a lot like veridical information but conveys nothing truly 
materially possible from any veridical source. It ceases even to be counterfactual on Kripke and Putnam‘s 
modal logic, and is only counterfactual at extreme removes with no regard for accessibility relations or 
closeness even on Lewis‘ model. It is, however, interesting that Kripke and Lewis as modal logicians both 
presumably allow for the existence of the supernatural. Lewis does so in a modal or counterfactual sense, 
and in so doing confirms his commitment to the actual existence of other possible worlds: 
The other worlds are of a kind with this world of ours. To be sure, there are differences of kind 
between things that are part of different worlds – one world has electrons and another has 
none, one has spirits and the other has none.232 
Presumably Kripke, being a devout theist, allows for the existence of the supernatural in the actual world 
to support his beliefs233. Ironically, perhaps, it would seem that in a sense the artisan Delany is more of a 
physicalist and thus more scientific than either logician, which perhaps fits with the former‘s professed 
Marxism under the rubric of dialectic materialism. 
Significantly, Lewis introduces the controversial theory of counterparts into his modal logic, wherein 
possible worlds contain actual duplicates of things in the actual world – counterpart objects - for the 
purposes of modal logic and reasoning234. This apparatus is needed to retain the consistency of his modal 
realist metaphysical picture of possible worlds. Of central importance to our thesis of the specialness of 
SF writing which engages with scientific discourses and theory (and the contingent defeasible facts) is 
Lewis‘ stated premise for modal realism: 
Why believe in a plurality of worlds? – Because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a 
reason to think that it is true. …I think it is clear that talk of possibilia that has clarified 
questions in many parts of the philosophy of logic, of mind, of language and of science – not to 
mention metaphysics itself.235 
The import of this for theories of SF as cognitively engaging is that on both the original metaphysically 
weaker conception of possible worlds adhered to by Kripke, and on the more radical modal realism 
embraced by Lewis, modal reasoning is pursued by philosophers, mathematicians and logicians because it is seen to be 
conducive to problem solving and clarification, and to be cognitively rewarding. Lewis sees it as productive of improved 
understanding in various applications of analytic philosophy, including those of language and the sciences. 
I think this lends significant credence to Suvin‘s conception of SF as embodying an aesthetic of cognitive 
estrangement. 
                                                 
230 Ibid., 32 (bold emphasis mine) 
231 Veridical information must be true by virtue coming from real material or actual sources. 
232 Lewis, D. On the Plurality of Worlds, Massachusetts: Blackwell, (1986,) 2001, 2. 
233 I think that this belief status is instrumental in the formation of Kripke‘s causal chain theory of reference for proper names and natural 
kind terms, since it seems apparent that there is necessarily a reification of kind of third observer abstracta required for the tenability of the 
theory – a ‗god perspective.‘ However, this is a subject for a different treatise 
234 Ibid, 8. 
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TRANSREALISM AND COUNTERFACTUAL PSEUDO-INFORMATION 
With respect to the ontological, logical, conceptual and subjunctive distance from the real world allowed for 
in possible worlds, both Lewis‘ and Kripke‘s models are represented in fiction generally, and especially in 
SF236. Space opera and utopian tales estrange the world enormously, and rely on analogical, extrapolated, 
metaphorical and discursive reference to the real, whereas the ‗transrealism‘ of Rudy Rucker, the historical 
SF of Neal Stephenson‘s Cryptonomicon, and realist hard SF of the contemporary or very near future 
setting, pinion themselves in the more ontologically proximate counterfactuals set up more in accordance 
with Kripke‘s alternative possible world-situation model with its logical accessibility relation. Rudy 
Rucker‘s Transrealist Manifesto is especially salient with respect to a general relationship between 
cognitively-aesthetically rewarding fiction and the closeness of counterfactual worlds to the actual world – 
as considered on Kripke‘s accessibility relation or Lewis‘ metaphysically and logically different similarity 
and closeness precepts: 
 The Transrealist writes about immediate perceptions in a fantastic way. Any literature which 
is not about actual reality is weak and enervated. But the genre of straight realism is all burnt 
out. Who needs more straight novels? The tools of fantasy and SF offer a means to thicken and 
intensify realistic fiction. By using fantastic devices it is actually possible to manipulate subtext. 
The familiar tools of SF — time travel, antigravity, alternate worlds, telepathy, etc. — are in fact 
symbolic of archetypal modes of perception…This is the ―Trans‖ aspect. The ―realism‖ 
aspect has to do with the fact that a valid work of art should deal with the world the way it 
actually is.237 
Although his statements regarding the cognitive utility of possible worlds is less exacting than that of the 
aforementioned modal logicians, the definition put forward by computer scientist and SF writer Rucker 
for transrealism reads much like Lewis‘ above quoted justification for modal realism, but with metaphoric 
allusions. Rucker‘s propensity to assign realism as the nomological determiner of valid art belies an 
ideologically and philosophically founded commitment to supervenience of the text on veridical 
information: a grounding in actual states of affairs. The explication of what the realist component of 
Rucker‘s neologism means is effectively an artistically motivated accessibility relation. Transrealism is, in 
effect, an approximation of the definition I will introduce in chapter four of what I call anti-simulacra: 
tropes and icons from the SF mega-text which are constructed like simulacra, but which point 
counterfactually to realities in the actual world, rather than obfuscating them. Rucker‘s definition 
apparently incorporates the mechanisms of metaphor and analogy for such ends. The transrealist 
manifesto would thus seem to exclude futurological possible worlds outside of the scope of actual 
experience. This is partly due to Rucker‘s empiricist emphasis on immediate perception, which fits with the 
empiricist scope of Fred Dretske‘s informational epistemology: 
A third way to deal with the problem…is to restrict one‘s theory of knowledge to perceptual 
knowledge or (more generally) to knowledge of contingent (empirical) fact.  Since a contingent 
fact is a fact for which there are possible alternatives, a fact that might not have been a fact, a 
fact that (because it has a probability less than one) generates information238 239. 
It is not clear that one cannot ‗deal with the world the way it actually is‘ at a counterfactual future close 
enough that the accessibility or closeness to the actual world is preserved. Dealing with the way the world 
will actually be in the very near future would not seem to be any less a close counterfactual than dealing 
with the way the world actually is with fictive narratives and no futurological setting. If real knowledge 
supervenes only on empirically accessible existent veridical information sources, it is perhaps not 
                                                 
236 Lewis‘ modal realist possible worlds model is still not strong enough to give counterfactual objects and states of affairs described in fictions 
the status of veridical information sources, because such sources need to ultimately materially contribute to influencing the selection of 
words in a text. Lewis‘ model does not substantiate any actual transference of information from the distant actual possible world to our 
actual world. 
237 Rucker, R. A Transrealist  Manifesto, <www.rudyrucker.com>, < http://www.cs.sjsu.edu/faculty/rucker/transrealistmanifesto.pdf> 
accessed 14th November 2008., 1. (emphasis mine.) 
238 This is a direct unambiguous reference to Shannon information. 
239 Dretske, F. ―Epistemology and Information.‖ Adriaan, P. in Philosophy of Information (Handbook of the Philosophy of Science,). Ed. Johan F.A.K 
van Benthem. Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., 2008. 
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immediately clear how it is that we can gain knowledge and learn from counterfactual pseudo-information 
sources like SF fictions about concurrent or futurological possible worlds. The reason is that this would 
be the wrong question to ask. Counterfactual information sources are not materially real. They are implied 
and constructed by the semantics and narrative encoded upon the text conveying novum concepts: 
concepts of counterfactual possibilia. Counterfactual sources are ultimately concepts which emerge from 
the selection of words in the SF text as influenced by synthesis of information from sets of veridical 
information sources including internal concept sources – cognitive structures – at write-time. 
Counterfactual sources cannot themselves contribute any veridical information to anything, since they are 
simply not, in and of themselves, real. 
FUTUROLOGICAL COUNTERFACTUAL PSEUDO-INFORMATION 
Many counterfactuals in SF, and especially information technology focussed informationist SF, involve 
speculation about the future: logically and cognitively considering or speculating about how an actual thing 
might look or exist in the near or distant future, or about what things might exist in the future based on the 
evidence of actual things that exist and facts that obtain at write-time. I will refer to this kind of counterfactual as a 
futurological counterfactual involving a futurological possible world. In order for speculation about the future to be 
regarded as involving counterfactual pseudo-information and not pure pseudo-information, I require that 
it be rooted in actual veridical information sources existing in the actual world in the present – for ―in SF there can be 
no inexplicable marvels, no transcendences, no devils or demons--and the pattern of occurrences must be 
verisimilar.240‖ There must be some logical accessibility from material truths – veridical information - to the 
future counterfactual novum or speculation. This corresponds in a futurological sense with the 
accessibility relation for possible worlds of Kripke and the closeness or similarity principle which Lewis 
logically problematises thus: 
Partly, the world in question is specified by the antecedent of the conditional: ‗If kangaroos had 
no tails...‘ Partly it is specified by a permanent understanding that there is to be no gratuitous 
departure from the background of fact: ignore worlds where kangaroos float around like 
balloons, since the kangaroos of our world are much too heavy for that. Partly, it is specified by 
temporary contextual influences that indicate what sorts of departures would be especially 
gratuitous; for instance, facts just mentioned may have a special claim to be held fixed. Partly, it 
is not specified at all: no telling whether the kangaroos have stumps where their tails should 
be. 241 
Speculations that a giant supernaturally-supervening magic demon will descend from space and rule the 
Earth, or that the universe will turn into five kinds of marshmallow due to a witch‘s curse: such are not 
validly future counterfactuals with respect to the actual world by Kripke‘s accessibility relation or operating 
out of a scientific worldview242, nor of the characteristically SF subjunctive mode by Delany‘s definition, 
nor the definition of cognitive estrangement propounded by Suvin. Such worlds would be doubly 
counterfactual – future counterfactuals only to possible worlds considered (f)actual on Lewis‘ radical 
modal realist metaphysics. Such counterfactuals are at such a subjunctive, metaphysical, material and logical 
distance from our actual world that they ultimately converge on pure pseudo-information.  
An ontologically radically different world setting with super advanced technology which still retains 
human familiars but does not imply the actual world as fictively historical – temporally preceding – isn‘t 
necessarily a futurological possible world. This is the kind of ontologically estranged counterfactual mise en scène 
frequently encountered in space opera. Such a world is not necessarily counterfactual in the sense that the 
setting is an intentional futurological extrapolation from the actual world, but may be estranged and 
counterfactual in a larger speculative sense: Kripke‘s accessibility relation for possible worlds is all but 
ignored, whilst simultaneously a naturalistic and scientific précis suggests the possible rather than the purely 
fantastic and impossible. The result is a possible world setting which fits somewhere between the modal 
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logic of Kripke and Lewis. The world of Neal Stephenson‘s informationist cyberpunk Snow Crash is 
futurologically counterfactual, estranged and extrapolated (if quite radically) at a certain projected but 
relatively close historical distance from the actual world at write-time. Contrastingly, although Banks‘ The 
Algebraist and Vernor Vinge‘s A Fire Upon the Deep each retain the Earth, its solar system, the human 
species and our galaxy in the narrative, the counterfactual estrangement of setting in these space operas is 
dramatically increased. Thus in each fictive case the Earth itself is only mentioned in the narrative as 
vastly temporally and spatially distant and has no role as a setting for action. In both Bank‘s Algebraist and 
Delany‘s Stars In My Pocket Like Grains of Sand, actual Earth as known to the author at write-time becomes 
‗Old Earth‘ in the context of the narrative encoded upon the text. Thus science fiction demonstrates its 
location in the multivariate nexus: humanity and human settings are commonly retained as somehow 
central in hard SF and even in much informationist space opera. Delany‘s Babel 17 has an Earth-centric 
setting, and Reynold‘s Revelation Space again reinforces the ‗Old Earth‘ SF mega-text codon.  
The classificatory and definitional boundaries of counterfactual pseudo-information seem to become 
slippery here, and the threshold between futurological counterfactual pseudo-information and pure 
pseudo-information unclear. However, one simply needs to remember that it is the presence or absence 
of the supervenience base of veridical information in synthesis which delineates the two pseudo-
information types. Moreover, such fiction as includes pure pseudo-information can still effect synthesis 
with information from veridical scientific information sources and the discourses and theoretical 
semantics supervening thereupon by representing scientifically underpinned veridical information in 
novum, or by representing information from veridical sources with high informational fidelity, as we saw 
in the case of Cryptonomicon. Space opera which elides any reference to the actual world known to the 
author in the narrative or setting is not necessarily pure pseudo-informational fantasy, since such fictions 
can include numerous scientifically inspired novums and other codons extrapolated from scientific fact 
and material realities revealed by science. Nevertheless, supernatural super-demons and magically invoked 
marshmallow universes are radical pure pseudo-informational counterfactuals which require the setting to 
be so ontologically and logically radically different from our actual world that the only representations of 
information from veridical sources encoded therein exist as ad hoc metaphor – symbolic and semantic 
pattern representations involving arbitrary or estranged convolutions of vehicle and tenor. Metaphor is an 
interesting case of semantics supervening on or encoded as information which involves significant 
information loss and large contributions of information from the internal sources – the cognitive 
structures - of the reader-agent processing the text.  
Text message-sources that encode stories with ontologically radical counterfactual settings which are in 
no way even defeasible from a veridical informational standpoint involve pure pseudo-information, and 
their encoded fictions are tantamount to fantasy. Material possibility is the delineator. Lewis‘ floating 
kangaroos would involve counterfactual pseudo-information if wrought by genetic engineering or 
cybernetics, since there is a materially possible (if unlikely) path from veridical information about genetic 
engineering, DNA science and machine augmentation of macro-organisms to floating kangaroos243. 
However, artefactual informational text messages or latent sources encoding narrative and semantics 
involving floating kangaroos wrought by black magic incantations or Elven prayers would be pure 
pseudo-information, since neither black magic nor Elves are associated with any veridical information in 
the actual world. Such imaginary causes are not associated with any actual veridical information sources 
aside from the pseudo-informational concepts – the imaginary ideas - of the mind which evokes them. 
Discourses predominantly supervening on, or encoded upon, such extreme counterfactual and pure 
pseudo-information, are largely fantastical from an informational standpoint.  
By way of contrast, the informational specialness of SF is pinioned by veridical information associated 
with scientific commitments to materialism and naturalism, even for counterfactuals associated with 
possible worlds. In a scientific text, the combination of the veridical information therein with further 
internal veridical information possessed by the knowledgeable reader results, not only in counterfactual 
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information, but further veridical information, depending on the veracity and accuracy of the source text 
message – the fidelity of the signal-source. The primary objective of the sciences is to discern the truths of 
the actual material world with as much detail and reliability as is physically and lexically possible: science is 
ideally about veridical information only. On the ontological model on which I rely, information from a 
source – veridical or otherwise - is conveyed or transmitted by a message encoded as a text when some 
aspect or aspects of the mappable material, nomological and/or logical244 configuration of that source at a 
given point in time is reproduced in a lossy way by information type conversion to artefactual lexical 
message-based text. One might think, then, that the kind of futurological counterfactual speculation 
present in so many SF stories would preclude any possibility of proper engagement with the discourses of 
the science of the actual world. Put in terms of Shannon‘s original conception of the information/entropy 
measure at a source and Fred Dretske‘s adaptation of Shannon information for the individual signal as 
representative of the individual message selection event resulting in a specific message: there is nothing 
existing – no veridical source from which to select any veridical information. It appears to be the same 
situation as for fantasy.  Future information sources are themselves speculative and counterfactual and, 
unlike a naturalist fiction, all of the sources implied in the actual narrative are such. There is no certainty 
that any material or other type of veridical sources existing in the present will persist in the future. 
However, the situation is not the same as for fantasy and mythology. Delany, again using his thesis of SF 
subjunctivity, approaches futurological counterfactual fiction thus: 
But when spaceships, ray guns, or more accurately any correction of images that indicates the 
future appear in a series of words and mark it as s-f, the subjunctivity level is changed once 
more. These objects, these convocations of objects into situations and events, are blanketly 
defined by: have not happened. Events that have not happened are very different from ... fictional 
events that could have happened, or the fantastic events that could not have happened.245 
In accordance with the definitions in the previous section, I would prefer the definition, if it can be so 
named, to be: are materially and defeasibly really possible, or not impossible, based on veridical scientific, 
mathematical and empirical information sources existent in the actual world, and might thus possibly 
happen contingent upon the right material circumstances or facts. I will refer to this as the future 
counterfactual principle. The future counterfactual principle incorporates relevant principles from 
information ontology, and also contracts and subsumes Delany‘s subjunctive hierarchy falling under events 
that have not happened: 
Events that have not happened include several subcategories. These subcategories describe the 
subcategories of s-f. Events that have not happened include those events that might happen: these 
are your technological and sociological predictive tales. Another category includes events that will 
not happen: these are your science fantasy stories.246 
Lexically encoded narrative and semantics describing the latter subcategory - events that will not happen - 
are displaced on my theory into the category which supervenes on pure pseudo-information247. Delany 
adds other subcategories, the first of which, logically speaking, should collapse into its parent category and 
fall under the same revision, since no one can speak sensibly temporally of ―events that have not happened 
yet‖ without a modal qualifier such as may or might, or without acknowledging contingency as in the future 
counterfactual principle above: 
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They include events that have not happened yet...cautionary dystopias, Brave New World and 1984. 
Were English a language with a more detailed tense system, it would be easier to see that events 
which have not happened include past events as well as future ones. Events that have not happened in the 
past compose that s-f speciality the parallel-world story, whose outstanding example is Philip K. 
Dick‘s The Man in the High Castle. 248 
Delany‘s master stroke is to associate his different levels of subjunctivity with different cognitively and 
aesthetically meaningful choices of words in a text. For aesthetic outcomes, he sees style and content as 
generally being intrinsically coupled and that ―[p]ut in opposition to style, there is no such thing as 
content249‖ where content is tantamount to information. Delany engages here with a central question of 
language, semantics, texts and information theory, that of the status of information as meaning. I am not 
comfortable with the equating, albeit transitively, of information with meaning, but for Delany: 
The words content, meaning and information are all metaphors for an abstract quality of a word or 
group of words. The one I would like to concentrate on is: information.250 
Metaphysically, this is the best definition of these terms he makes available: synonymous metaphors for 
an abstract quality of what, on Shannon‘s theory, are textual messages.  This abstract quality is the 
progressive development of ideation and mental images evoked by the syntagm in the reading of a text, 
Delany‘s ―series of corrected images.251‖ It is notably a prefiguring of reader response theory, and of my 
own conception of information synthesis: 
In naturalistic fiction our corrections in our images must be made in accordance with what we 
know of the personally observable – this includes our own observations of others that have 
been reported to us at the subjunctive level of journalism…The subjunctive level of s-f says 
that we must make our corrections process in accord with what we know of the physically 
explainable universe.252 
Broderick questions the veracity of the details of Delany‘s read-time text corrective processing 
mechanism on conceptual, theoretic and representational grounds, stating that ―its assumption that to 
understand spoken language we use a serial, additive algorithm flies in the face of contemporary 
linguistics and semiotics253‖ In chapter notes he cites linguists Bronowski and Bruner as asserting that it is 
the entire message which is central to animal and human communication254. However, Given Delany‘s 
preoccupation with information in About 5,750 Words I suspect his account is less motivated by semiotics 
than it is by Shannon‘s theory – either directly or perhaps through the work of linguist contemporaries. 
On information theoretic terms, the boundaries of a message are not necessarily determined semantically. 
Information theoretically speaking, messages are produced (or selected) transmitted, and received and 
decoded serially, and it is difficult to see how the semiotic syntagm can function otherwise at read-time. 
Moreover, as was alluded to in chapter one, semiotics and information theory have a notoriously uneasy 
partnership, and this becomes more tenuous if one‘s ontology of information is not logocentric, since the 
lexical symbol then becomes secondary (at best) in information theory255. Delany‘s thesis not only 
anticipates Tom Shippey‘s treatment of the novum as high information based on word selection or choice 
more than thirty years in advance of Shippey‘s essay, but it fits amicably with Shannon‘s statistical 
explication of the association between word choice in a text, its linguistic redundancy and its semantics. 
Delany‘s syntagmatic256 algorithm accords with Shannon‘s definition of sequential algorithmic message 
selection or formation at a discrete (lexical) information source. It also anticipates significant aspects of 
reader reception. As I will argue below, semiotic theory of the kind propounded by Saussure is 
problematic and explanatorily lacking in terms of the representation and processing of information, 
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according to the best available information theories and to sound information ontology. In an echo of the 
syntagmatic aspect of Delany‘s approach, Australian theorist Richard Harland posits an almost identical 
mechanism of sentence-driven ideation as central to literature and text-processing in general. Although, 
like Wolfgang Iser, Harland refers to the textually guided production of mental images and imaginary 
objects with reference to Sarte and the Gestalt school, the mechanism of synthesis described by Harland 
applies only to linguistic and textual synthesis in the sentential syntagm, and is thus logocentric and overall 
not the same as the sense of general informational synthesis which I propose. Delany‘s approach is more 
properly informationist, since it is ideally info-centric, not logocentric. 
Information represented in the context of counterfactual semantics encoded into a source text is pseudo-
informational because no real material or actual veridical sources are involved: only counterfactuals and 
possibilia. However, such information is not pure pseudo-information, because the encoded semantics 
counterfactually imply information associated with actual veridical information sources. Counterfactual 
pseudo-information is the primary information type involved in the write-time and read-time information 
synthesis associated with Rucker‘s transrealism and Delany‘s SF subjunctivity. Each involves the 
representation or re-representation of veridical information via counterfactual semantics supervening on 
counterfactual sources associated with the possible world encoded in the actual SF source text-message. 
Counterfactual possible world speculation which retains some sense of Kripke‘s logical accessibility 
relation and Lewis‘ general similarity or closeness, whether futurological or not, involves the imagining of 
information sources (objects, states of affairs) the ontological configurations of which are partly informed 
by actual veridical information sources in the actual world. Frequently such imagined sources are not only 
fictively semantically associated with and modelled on veridical sources, but significant veridical 
information is also associated with their construction. In SF proper, this veridical information is empirical 
and scientific in origin – it comes from science, its materially veracious theories and associated discourses. 
The resulting information synthesis, and the discursive and semantic synthesis which supervenes upon it, 
is effectively what I define SF to be – a special heterogeneous informational and discursive synthesis 
effected in a mode of fiction writing. Delany poetically alludes to the role of what I have called 
counterfactual pseudo-information in SF thus: 
But anyone who reads or writes s-f seriously knows that its particular excellence is…in all the 
brouhaha clanging about these unreal worlds, chords are sounded in total sympathy with the 
real.257 
THE NOVUM AS COUNTERFACTUAL PSEUDO-INFORMATION 
Novum terms have high Shannon information, or a high surprisal value258. The interesting thing to note 
here is that this analysis does not just apply to individual novums, but to the concepts encoded into them. 
The concept which the reader synthesises at read-time, or develops in response to processing the text, will 
differ to the extent that it is something for which they have an informative context through possession of 
internal cognitive sources and access to common external referenceable sources (information common 
with the author). If the conceptual information associated with the text as a source implies many possible 
alternatives, then it will be high information, and require the reader to do more work – to generate more 
information from a larger range of speculative possibilities. Not only is a novum neologism a high-
information word, but it is correspondingly a source of information. A novum is an information source 
which combines different types of information, from different types of source. Looking at texts and at the 
novum and novum neologisms in this way avails us of an important insight. Scientific texts also include 
special neologisms and such scientific neologisms are also high-information. The distinction rests in the 
type of information involved: SF novums entail high veridical information, but generally they also entail 
high counterfactual pseudo-information. Scientific neologisms and new scientific concepts as represented 
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textually in scientific texts generally encapsulate and entail high veridical information, with very little if any 
counterfactual information. Neologisms in both SF texts and scientific texts require elevated cognition in 
decoding. 
Tom Shippey suggests that SF texts also encapsulate what he refers to as degraded information. This is 
presumably an allusion to information loss as defined by Shannon, but like the idea that novums constitute 
‗high information‘, the inference is both insightful and problematic. The stipulation that ‗degraded 
information‘ accompanies what he refers to as ―the closed universe story‖ is probably strained if one 
takes into account external information sources associated with the SF mega-text. On Shippey‘s account, 
the degraded information does not seem to be based on the normative idea of the surprisal value of 
words selected for the text as it is with his conception of high information, but on the restricted setting of 
the fictive universe: 
The classic subgenre to illustrate this is the ―enclosed universe‖ story, whose paradigmatic 
example is H.G. Wells‘ 1904 novella, ―The Country of the Blind.‖…a basic feature inherited 
from Wells is that the cosmology of the enclosed universe – which we, the readers, are quite 
sure is false, information seriously degraded – has to be made to seem reasonable, plausible, 
indeed (given the evidence available) inescapable…[F]or a truly closed system based on 
degraded information…must have its own methods of ensuring that correct information is not 
received.259 
Shippey seems to have two conceptions of information, and on the terms of the first definition – that 
associated with novum neologisms – the description of degraded information seems largely untenable. A 
closed-universe story is informed by the external lexical artefactual information sources which comprise 
the SF mega-text and involves just as large a set of artefactually inscribed and internal sources at write-
time and read-time as stories without such closed universe constraints. It is hard to see that any significant 
reduction in either the set of sources influencing word selection, or any significant reduction of choice at 
such sources, would result from having a closed universe implemented in the encoded narrative 
semantically encoded upon the information of the text. It seems likely that the common confusion 
involving the conflation of information with meaning is partly responsible for this difficulty.  
I think that distinguishing information types, especially counterfactual pseudo-information, is required to 
make the degraded information postulate tenable. Shippey refers to correct information and this intuition 
accords with my conception of veridical information. Firstly, as discussed in the previous sections, 
information associated with the fictional sources in the context of an SF narrative is in fact not 
comprehensively from real sources or veridical at all260. The novum as described by Shippey has either 
limited or indirect referential relation to reality – to the real world or real objects or states of affairs261 
therein – by virtue of information synthesis. However, novum referents are not like those of the word 
‗unicorn‘, of which Bertrand Russell said, regarding its use in a description: 
‖A Unicorn‖ is an indefinite description which describes nothing. It is not an indefinite 
description which describes something unreal.262 
In his essay On Denoting, Russell makes similar assertions about the denotation of the proposition ‗The 
present King of France.263‘: 
But this phrase, though it has a meaning provided ‗the King of England‘ has a meaning, has 
certainly no denotation, at least in any obvious sense.264 
In the context of the ontology of information which I am presenting, the propositions, descriptive terms, 
names and phrases included in ―A unicorn‖ and ‗the present King of France‘ constitute artefactual lexical 
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information sources. Their configurations encode information as well as semantics. However, as already 
mentioned, information and meaning are not the same thing on Shannon‘s model, and the textual encoding 
of information in a message/source265 is only part of the encoding of semantics.  
Fred Dretske‘s conception of true information prefigures, but subtly differs from, the definition of veridical 
information. It makes the role of the perceiving agent central in the delineation of true information, based 
on the premise that this is the only information which can produce real knowledge: 
Information is what is capable of yielding knowledge, and since knowledge requires truth, 
information requires it also266. 
Veridical information is likewise productive of knowledge if synthesised by an intelligent agent, but its 
veridicality conditions can obtain without any intelligent agency and a-priori knowledge conditions. 
Knowledge requires truth in the sense of correspondence to facts or real states of affairs, but whether 
reading artefactual lexical information in a fiction text secures it is largely subjectively dependent on read-
time information synthesis. Russell cited logician Gottlob Frege‘s theory of sense and reference as 
distinguishing reference from meaning, but Frege‘s theory defines sense as an objective ―mode of 
representation267‖. Mental entities, like images, cognitive structures or concepts, such as are embraced by 
later theorists like Wolgang Iser and Samuel R Delany, and by philosophers like Fred Dretske, are rejected 
as subjective. However, as Laurence and Margolis point out, this objective sense argument against mental 
entities and representations ―isn‘t the least bit convincing268‖: 
To see why, one has to be careful about several distinctions that can get lumped together as a 
single contrast between the subjective and the objective. One of these concerns the difference 
between mental representations, thoughts, and experiences, on the one hand, and extra mental 
entities on the other. In this sense, a stone is objective, but a mental representation of a stone is 
subjective; it‘s subjective simply because it‘s mental. Notice, however, that subjectivity of this 
kind does not preclude the sharing of a mental representation. What isn‘t possible is for two 
people to have the very same token representation…Mental representations are subjective in 
that their tokens are uniquely possessed: they belong to one and only one subject. Their being 
subjective in this sense, however, doesn‘t preclude their being shareable in the relevant sense, 
since, again, two people can have the same representation by each having tokens of the same 
type. When someone says that two people have the same concept, there is no need to suppose 
that she is saying that they both possess the same token concept.269 
Subjective token representations on my theory correspond to concepts as internal sources. Extra-mental 
entities are external information sources like texts. I would strengthen the statements about shared 
concepts. I think it unlikely that two readers can ever have exactly the same concept token. The set of 
contributing sources for its synthesis or formation will be at least subtly different for every individual, and 
probably substantially different. Thus ‗shareable in the relevant sense‘ for tokens of concepts involves 
instances of internal sources which have significant common informational content, but it is probably 
extremely unlikely that they will be exactly the same.  
The set of contributing sources for any information synthesis in or associated with SF texts includes the 
SF mega-text, various artefactually informed internal sources and any number of practically unquantifiable 
external sources including artefactual lexical and natural incidental types. When linguists and philosophers 
of language talk about context, or objective reference, or langue and parole, or collective intelligence, or 
speech communities, or social language and semantics, or causal reference chains, the delineation of the 
                                                 
265 A message, even on Shannon‘s definition, can be regarded as a source also. A message from a source can itself stand as a source on the 
ontological model being presented. 
266 Dretske, F. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. London: Basil Blackwell, 1981, 45. 
267 Frege, G. ―On Sense and Reference.‖ Sullivan , Arthur. in Logicism and the Philosophy of Language. Toronto: Broadview, 2003. 175-193, 180. 
268 Laurence, S. and Eric Margolis, ―Concepts and Cognitive Science‖ in Concepts: Core Readings, Ed. Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, 
Cambridge: MIT/Bradford, 1999., 7. 
269 Ibid. 
CHAPTER 2 - INFORMATION THEORY AND THE LANGUAGE OF SCIENCE FICTION TEXTS 
60 
 
external and internal and the subjective-objective distinction are often confused or not well captured by 
the theoretical framework. 
The most that can be said for veridical information in internal sources is that separate readers with 
concepts informed by the same veridical sources have at least instances of those contributing sources in 
common270. When the reader of an SF text has internal concepts (sources) which are informed by external 
veridical sources associated with the sciences and the discourses thereof, then the synthesis of those 
sources with counterfactual pseudo information sources in the SF text, coupled with the similar synthesis 
implemented intertextually and otherwise by the author at the time of writing, results in a greater 
proportion of pseudo-information which is counterfactual, rather than pure. This is what differentiates the 
information synthesis of SF proper from that of even normative realist and naturalist fiction: scientific 
theory and discourse has a practical commitment to ensuring high levels of veridical information. When 
SF texts synthesise scientific discourse and information, the number of contributing veridical sources, and 
the variety of their veridical information subtypes (mathematical, logical, materially verifiable and so on), 
is increased in proportion to the overall information in the text. Informationist SF such as Cryptonomicon 
and Revelation Space, with their discursive hybridisation and synthesis with physics, mathematics, logic and 
the machine implemented logic of computer science and information technology, achieves a synthesis 
which relies on a large proportion of mathematically veridical information, and veridical information 
associated with real practical computing systems which demonstrably work because of mathematical and 
logical truths.  
I suggest that much of the cognitive aesthetic value of SF on these terms comes from the individual 
reader‘s subjective experience of synthesising their own internal information with that of the text. The 
failure on the part of the reader to distinguish veridical information types results in equivocating on SF 
proper and fantasy modes of fiction writing. This conflation and confusion of information types results 
partly from the kinds of logically errant linguistic acculturation which so irked a realist Russell: 
But it is of the very essence of fiction that only the thoughts, feelings etc., in Shakespeare and 
his readers are real, and that there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet...If no one 
thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing left of him; if no one had thought of Napoleon, 
he would have soon seen to it that someone did. The sense of reality is vital in logic...A robust 
sense of reality is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of propositions about unicorn‘s, 
golden mountains, round squares, and other such pseudo-objects.271 
The type of information encoded in the selected message ―there was a unicorn‖, upon which the linguistically 
encoded meaning associated with the linguistic phrase supervenes, is what I call pure pseudo-information. 
Any linguistic definition of unicorn presumably ultimately involves a synthesis of information from 
veridical sources such as instances of horses and instances of horns. However, there is no real state of affairs 
standing as a veridical information source in the source set which influences the selection of the message. There 
is no truth encapsulated within the message ―there was a unicorn‖ – no material veridical source of 
information that is a unicorn, or even the bodily combination of a horse and a horn. Critically, such a 
combination is not possible in the present or past, nor contingent, nor defeasibly so, in the actual 
world272. The statement ―there was a horned horse‖ is likewise pure pseudo information, since although 
the message is informed by a set of veridical sources including horse instances and horn instances, the 
state of affairs where they are combined is impossible in the past tense: the synthesis of information from 
veridical sources gives rise to pure pseudo information. It isn‘t just that no-one has ever seen a horned 
horse that we know of. A horse with a horn is demonstrably proscribed by horse fossil morphology, and 
especially by the genetic code of horses – the DNA and gene sequence of that species - which is known to 
be that which determines what body parts a horse can have, and what body parts they have had in the past.  
Moreover, the normative definition of a Unicorn arguably intrinsically involves not only the conception 
of a horned horse, but also the conception that such a creature is intrinsically only mythical. ‗Unicorn‘, 
according to its normative definition, is simply not a natural kind term, in past or present tense. There is 
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no actual, incidental, material, mereologically bounded, natural information source which will give us 
information that can be mapped to the artefactual textual lexical message-source ‗there was a unicorn‘ in 
terms of information source influence over word selection, and in terms of synthesis with information 
sources which are associated with correct grammar and English language rules – those which implement 
the supervening linguistic semantics, effected through synthesis with internal sources containing 
information about grammar and language. In terms of information ontology, the set of all veridical 
unicorn instance sources will be empty. If we speak in terms of information flow, as does philosopher Fred 
Dretske, then none of ‗upstream‘ information flow in the textual artefactual lexical source ‗A unicorn‘ has 
flown from a veridical source configuration at any remove in the real world that would make this set non-
empty– there is not now, nor has there ever been, a real unicorn in our actual world. ‗There was a unicorn‘ 
could be considered a counterfactual – something possible in another world - on Lewis‘ modal realism, 
but the phrase ‗there was a unicorn‘ would still constitute pure pseudo-information, because there is no 
real information flow between the perpetually separate possible worlds and the actual worlds on Lewis‘ 
model. ‗There was a unicorn‘ is a source of pure pseudo-information because, although arguably informed 
by the veridical source that is minimally one instance of a real horse, and other veridical sources such as 
instances of real horns, the selected message itself does not contain true information sourced from the 
actual world 273. 
The informational status of the unicorn might change with a futurological possible world, as long as the 
mythological or magical component of the definition of ‗unicorn‘ was elided. The novum associated with 
the selected message-source ―In the year 2021, genetic scientists created a unicorn‖, is still pure pseudo-
information, because of the mythological and supernaturalistic denotations of unicorn. It only becomes a 
future counterfactual involving counterfactual pseudo-information, if we combine scientific defeasibility, and 
material contingency due to real possibility274.  A transgenic horse with a horn that looks like a unicorn is 
now defeasibly theoretically possible: the truth of its existence will be contingent on what trans-geneticists 
do. The mythological element of the definition of unicorn, which requires supervenience upon magic or 
supernatural causes, would not be brought any nearer to fact if this transgenic horned-horse novum was 
ultimately realised in fact. In order to be counterfactual pseudo-information, the message would have to be 
selected as something like ―In the year 2021, genetic scientists created an animal that looked like the 
unicorn described in myth texts‖ or simply ―in the year 2021, genetic scientists created a transgenic 
horned horse.‖ 
Novum neologisms and terms do not simply denote reified fantastic objects or phenomena on the 
Meinongian understanding of real – because they denote something real indirectly - but their referents 
proper in the counterfactual world setting are of course counterfactual, and to that extent they are imaginary. 
Ergo they still involve pseudo-information. They map directly to counterfactual objects, and indirectly to real 
objects, because counterfactual pseudo-information relies on a synthesis with veridical information 
traceable to a real information source. They thus involve indirect counterfactual reference to real 
things/events/phenomena acting as sources of veridical information. This brings us to the following 
maxim for SF theory: the greater the counterfactual distance from reality, and the more information sources in the set that 
informs synthesis, the more estranged the novum. A similar outcome is achieved by metaphor – the mainstay of 
poetry - but metaphor has no referential veridicality condition, and the lexical message selection upon 
which metaphor supervenes semantically involves potentially very low fidelity and high information loss. 
The reader must be very familiar with the sources associated with the vehicle of a metaphor and know 
enough about the tenor to make a connection – to associate and synthesise the requisite information 
sources. No veridical information source need be represented in the encoded text of the metaphor itself. 
A metaphor vehicle can operate through implementing a pattern of mimicry or parallel by which the reader 
can identify the metaphor with something else (its tenor), but with no linguistic or informationally encoded 
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reference, directly or otherwise, to the real world. The vehicle‘s association with the tenor depends upon 
the internal information sources of the reader and the knowledge which supervenes thereupon.  
Indeed, metaphors can happily implicate imaginary things or fictional situations. There is no material, 
cognitive or scientific defeasibility with respect to the real world required for metaphor. Puff the Magic 
Dragon may be a working metaphor in fictional context, but none of the meaning or aesthetic qualities of 
the metaphor depend on defeasibility. The sources associated with scientific discourse need not be 
referenced for the application of the metaphor.  Though perfectly rational, it would be pointless and 
frivolous, beyond a basic statement of intended mythological and magical fictive status, to argue that Puff 
The Magic Dragon could never be real. The informational loss involved in such metaphors explains why 
they are widely misinterpreted or multiply interpreted – hence the long running debate about whether the 
song Puff the Magic Dragon is about illicit drug use, or simply about adults being less innocent and 
imaginative than children – or somehow both. Arthur C. Clarke‘s space elevator, Neal Stephenson‘s 
metaverse, or Vernor Vinge‘s group-thinking Tines, on the other hand, both invite, and rely on for their 
aesthetic appeal, considerations of their specifically scientific and ontological contingency and defeasibility 
by the reader as they process the text. If straight description and naming involve reference, and metaphor 
involves allusion through a vehicle, then the novum involves the combining of reference with 
counterfactual extrapolation, and sometimes with allusion, but even estranged novums involving 
counterfactual pseudo-information must be materially and defeasibly contingently possible. Novums are 
uncertain, but necessarily defeasibly materially possible. 
Shippey is right about the information density of SF on the basis of novum and novum neologisms, but 
the lack of any mechanism to distinguish what I have called information types275 in his analysis, and the 
failure to distinguish between informational and semantic encoding, renders the strategy less satisfying than 
it might perhaps otherwise be. However, the measure of information thus attained is probabilistic and not 
ontologically or semantically informed: just because the lexical symbol sequence that is a novum word is 
more uncertain and unpredictable with respect to the natural language lexicon, it does not logically follow 
that its intension or semantic content is even cogent – let alone somehow conducive to greater knowledge 
or understanding. A random, meaningless string would also be high information on the standard 
interpretation. The standard information theoretic analysis as applied by Shannon and Shippey obscures 
the fact that what I refer to as pseudo-information is not necessarily wholly fantastical. There is an 
ontological distinction between pure pseudo-information and counterfactual pseudo-information. This 
distinction is based on a simple bivalence: either pseudo-information is sourced from or makes some 
reference to a veridical information source – or it doesn‘t. If it doesn‘t, then it is pure pseudo-information. 
Novums, as Suvin ideally wants them to be understood, potentially have the quality of feasibly being true 
under some counterfactual material circumstance – they involve, and their neologisms encapsulate 
counterfactual pseudo-information. Fantasy and fantastic ideas – such as magical or supernatural story elements 
– do not have any possibility of feasibly being true under any real circumstances and are thus pure pseudo-
information, not counterfactual pseudo-information. Novums necessarily include an aspect of scientific 
defeasibility. Pure pseudo-information is not scientifically or materially defeasible. It is not even 
meaningful to ask whether pure pseudo-information is defeasibly associated with veridical information 
sources, or if potentially falsifiable on the basis of veridical information. Put simply, there is no cognitive-
aesthetic narrative value to be derived from asking whether Puff the Magic Dragon could really exist or if 
Gandalf‘s magic is scientifically tenable. This distinction is important in setting apart science fantasy from 
science fiction as a mode of writing, or mythology from counterfactual speculation. They embody 
different kinds of authorial purpose and ideology, and combine differently with internal reader sources 
and external sources of veridical information. Once pure pseudo-information becomes predominant, any speculative 
ideological and direct or indirect referential cognitive engagement (metaphorical or otherwise) with real scientific discourse has 
ceased.
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C h a p t e r  3  -  T h e  F i c t i o n  o f  V e r i d i c a l ,  C o u n t e r f a c t u a l  a n d  
H e t e r o g e n e o u s  I n f o r m a t i o n  
Darkko Suvin has called SF the literature of cognitive estrangement. I would like to give the mode 
another attribution: the fiction of veridical, counterfactual, and heterogeneous information synthesis.  On my theory, 
information synthesis is the combining of numerous types of information from different types of 
information sources, both internal and external. I suggest that SF texts exhibit the outcomes of write-time 
information synthesis to an elevated extent, resulting in multiple aesthetic, cognitive and epistemological 
outcomes for readers at read-time. The actualisation of synthesis is thus dynamic. Static synthesised 
information is exhibited in texts in that they constitute latent sources which contain messages that are 
output from processes of information synthesis, and which thus constitute and contain synthesised 
information. Dynamic information synthesis is that which occurs when the writer writes a text, and when 
the reader processes a text in reading. When writing the author combines information from a set of 
internal mental information sources and a set of external non-mental information sources constituting a 
total source set. This is what I call the write-time synthesis. When reading, an actual reader performs read-
time synthesis, again combining information from internal mental sources and external sources, the latter 
including the text produced by the author‘s write-time synthesis. We must continue to remember to eschew 
logocentrism and remain mindful of the temporal aspects of information processing when approaching 
fiction texts informationally. In order to better understand the informational, aesthetic and 
epistemological outcomes of both write-time and read-time synthesis involving SF texts, we will turn now 
to some post-structuralist and informationist literary theorists‘ conceptions of synthesis in science and 
literature. Some of these approximately anticipate some aspects of the information theoretic approach I 
am espousing for analysing SF texts, having attempted to explain the nature of literary texts and text 
production and processing from an informational or quasi-informational standpoint. Contemporary 
informationist SF theory276 in turn provides an antidote for theoretic aporia and limitations in some of 
these theories.  
INFORMATION SYNTHESIS AT READ-TIME 
Paulson presents an informationist literary and cultural theory which draws on theories of self 
organisation and systemic autonomy in theoretical biology and cybernetics. He regards reader-response 
theory as ―quite advanced on its own terms, without recourse to disciplines such as cybernetics or 
theoretical biology‖ and argues that ―drawing attention to the similarities between theories of reader 
response and those of self-organisation could be of considerable cultural and intellectual import.277‖ I 
redefine what Paulson calls ―the reader‘s assimilation of a text,‖ and what reader-response theorist 
Wolfgang Iser refers to as simply text processing, as read-time information synthesis. When Iser speaks of 
syntheses in the acts of reading and writing, he gives no clear and consistent definition of exactly what is 
being synthesised. Ultimately Iser settles on knowledge. He suggests that the text-processing involves an 
externalist epistemological mechanism, in contrast to the subjectivist empiricism of philosopher John 
Locke278. Fred Dretske makes a strong externalist case for knowledge as belief validated by information279, 
and concepts as specially structured information: semantic and cognitive structures. On his thesis, and 
mine, knowledge is not information: knowledge supervenes on information. I see read-time synthesis as based on 
the combination of heterogeneous information types from heterogeneous internal and external 
information sources280. This model provides consistent general terms for negotiating the question of 
complexity in a text, without the need to engage with questions of ‗multiple levels of meaning,‘ ‗multiple 
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levels of structure‘, or ‗interconnecting subsystems‘ as does Paulson, or with ‗social norms‘, ‗referential 
fields‘ or ‗literary allusions,‘ as does Iser281.  
Following Juri Lotman‘s conception of information productive noise in art, Paulson holds that the 
inexactness of language and communication in literary texts constitutes information loss and noise which 
is conducive to the production of new information and meaning on a subjective basis:282 
[L]iterary language, by its very failure as a system for the communication of pre-existent 
information, becomes a vehicle for the production for new information.283 
On Paulson‘s theory, ambiguity, aporia and undecidability (pace Derrida and Paul De Man) correspond to 
the noise in a text which results in the production of new information during reader text processing: 
The theory of self-organisation from noise suggests that this ambiguity…can be converted into 
information…by a reader 284 
Whilst I think that this assessment has significant merit, I feel it is only part of a larger reality which I have 
referred to as read-time information synthesis. Paulson‘s assertions about literary texts as correspondingly 
self-organising systems is perhaps less convincing, and somewhat at odds with his own assertions about the 
ontology of a text and the extent to which it is autonomously dynamic: 
Self organisation from noise is more than a mechanism for explaining gains, as opposed to 
losses, of information: it implies the existence of a system that effectively organises itself.285 
However, I agree that fiction texts are complex assemblies of what I call artefactual information, and that 
this complexity can cause the reader to generate new information when reading a text - during what I 
have called read-time synthesis: 
The disorder, the noise of literary language can become information for us, can bring us to 
more subtle forms of understanding, because it is the unexpected, the radically different to 
which we can respond only because we are complex beings capable of yet more complexity.286 
In considering the larger picture of what happens in the formation of a text at what I call write-time 
synthesis, Paulson asserts that: 
In its production, the literary text is formed by the intersecting action of several systems, which 
may themselves be autonomous: its author‘s mind, its language, its society, culture, and genre 
traditions287 
In this he virtually echoes Iser‘s formulation of the repertoire of a text 288. Paulson‘s view of the production 
of meaning is also very close to Iser‘s. In regarding literary texts as noisy and inexact in their conveyance 
of information – as noisy messages which cannot reliably convey immutable information or knowledge 
from an author - Paulson concomitantly ascribes to them not epistemological vacuity, but the ability to 
contribute to meaning production, such that ―what emerges is not so much the loss of authorial meaning 
as the production of new meaning by readers.289‖ In preparing the conceptual ground for the 
establishment of his theory of aesthetic response, Wolfgang Iser posits that: 
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[I]t is only by elucidating the processes of meaning production that one can come to 
understand how meaning can take on so many different forms. Furthermore, such an analysis 
may lay the foundations for an understanding, and indeed, even a theory of how aesthetic 
effects are actually processed.290 
Importantly, neither theorist defines meaning, resulting in significant theoretic aporia and circularity. 
However, Iser goes on to implement a reader-centric theory for textual meaning and aesthetic response, 
wherein he eschews logocentricism and linguistic-grammatical approaches in establishing the importance 
of the mental image developed by the reader in response to processing a text.  For Iser, the critic ―fails-
the work does not offer him a detachable message; meaning cannot be reduced to a ‗thing‘,291‖ and 
meaning and aesthetic outcomes are not encapsulated within the text, but are mental effects of the act of 
text processing. Iser eschews both subjectivism, with its relativistic emphasis on the receiver of a text as 
the seat of meaning, and objectivism, with its commitment to the meaning-determining text, in favour of 
seeing meaning and the aesthetic outcomes of a work as effects of reader response in text processing, 
such that ―[t]he effectiveness of the work depends on the participation of the reader292.‖ This ―new reality 
brought into being by the fictional text293‖ does not necessarily correspond or refer to anything external to 
text processing. On my theory, it may result in the synthesis of pure pseudo-information. 
INFORMATIONIST LITERARY THEORY: A FLAWED HYBRIDISATION 
The contributing information source-set abstraction is a reductive and superior alternative to Iser‘s 
repertoire. Both in the conception of a repertoire as realised on the basis of the selection of certain 
components of reality external to a text, and through numerous references to communication theory,  
Iser comes tantalisingly close to an elegant and terminologically stable information-theoretic explanation 
for the dynamics of reader response. He quotes Juri Lotman‘s observations that: 
Apart from its ability to concentrate an enormous amount of information within the ‗space‘ of 
a short text...the literary text…delivers different information to different readers-each in 
accordance with the capacity of his comprehension; furthermore, it also gives the reader the 
language to help appropriate the next portion of the data as he reads on.294 
Iser then goes on to hybridise the discourse and concepts of communication theory and semiotics, 
asserting that:  
The relation between text and reader as a kind of self-regulating system, we can define the text 
itself as an array of sign impulses (signifiers) which are received by the reader. As he reads, 
there is a constant ‗feedback‘ of ‗information‘ already received.295 
This conception of the text as a self regulating informational system prefigures the analysis of self-
reflexivity in Pynchon‘s texts as presented by Porush, and my own conception of meta-informational 
writing and read-time information synthesis296. Iser‘s basis for this dynamic is a hybridisation of 
information theory and semiotics. Unfortunately, Iser‘s definitions, ontology and nomenclature 
subsequently become somewhat baroque and prone to category errors.  I think Iser was partly thwarted in 
his attempt to satisfyingly validate his conception of repertoire by the inevitable difficulties associated 
with misappropriating Shannon‘s mathematical communication theoretic principles and terms for semi-
rigorous application, resulting in a vicious circle of definitional and semantic slippage which undermines 
the very theoretic terms from which his theory is supposed to derive authority. Primarily, however, it is 
the lack of availability of ontologically cogent definition of information297, and of a cohesive information 
typology, which prevents the necessary analytically satisfying definition of repertoire, and thus of meaning 
and aesthetics in the literary text. The primitive Iser needs to flatten out his model is information, and an 
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ontologically unambiguous definition thereof. The distinction between veridical information and 
counterfactual pseudo-information which I have presented, and the conception of information as the 
common, uniform substrate upon which all language, perception, communication and knowledge 
supervenes, eliminate the need for the kind of terminological involutions that arise in the explication of 
the repertoire, and for arbitrary abstractions like the implied reader.  
In non-information theoretic language, Iser asserts that ―there is no doubt that processing a text results in 
changes in the recipient, and these changes are not a matter of grammatical rules, but of experience.298‖ 
This is because what is produced in the reader during text processing is a part linguistic, or even a non-
linguistic image: 
The instructions provided [in the text] stimulate mental images, which animate what is 
linguistically implied, though not said. A sequence of mental images is bound to arise during the 
reading process, as new instructions have continually to be accommodated, resulting not only 
in the placement of images formed but also in a shifting position of the vantage point, which 
differentiates the attitudes to be adopted in the process of image building.299 
Note the similarity of the above description to Delany‘s earlier analysis of the corrective syntagmatic 
processing of SF texts300. Again, however, Iser‘s terminology and expression are convoluted and 
ambiguous. It is indiscernible what exactly is meant by the second half of the last sentence: ―placement of 
images‖, ―shifting position of the vantage point‖ and ―differentiates the attitudes‖ are all obscure.  Iser 
was of course aware at least of the terminology of Shannon‘s theory, even if his use of its nomenclature is 
typically appropriative and given over to shifting signification.  
This drifting signification and nomenclatural-semantic slippage which occurs when rigorous scientific 
theoretic terms are appropriated by literary theorists and passed from one to the other in the manner 
resembling artistic intertext rather than science, is itself an example of the synthesis of pseudo-
information and veridical information with information loss, which results in pseudo-information where 
there should be veridical information. In attempting explication of strategies in a text, Iser chooses to draw 
on terminologies and models from various psychological, aesthetic and literary theories and theorists. One 
of Iser‘s theoretical objectives is to identify the dynamic interaction between text and reader at text 
processing time as the genus of the work and its meaning301. Thus the concretisation of the work ―cannot 
be reduced to the reality of the text or to the subjectivity of the reader.302‖ In explicating the need to 
identify structures in the text which will activate reader responses during text processing, Iser asserts of text 
and reader that: 
[S]eparate analysis would only be conclusive if the relationship were that of transmitter and 
receiver, for this would presuppose a common code, ensuring accurate communication, since the 
message would only be travelling one way. In literary works, however, the message is transmitted 
in two ways, in that the reader receives it by ‗composing‘ it. There is no common code-at best 
one could say that a common code may arise in the course of the process.303 
Describing a text as simultaneously a message and a transmitter is problematic, especially given the nature 
and function of a real transmitter in mathematical communication theory. Iser is ultimately relying on 
Shannon‘s theory to provide authority for his model. Thus it behoves him to interpret the abstracta and 
other elements of the theory correctly. Describing the reader as a receiver is less irksome and matches 
Dretske‘s adaptation. Iser refers to Posner‘s formulation of the text as a first code and the ―aesthetic 
object as the second code, which the reader himself must produce,304‖ which provides an example of the 
semantic confusion or alteration of the term code when this rigorous mathematical concept is loosely or 
analogically applied but with only the pretence of an appeal to rigour. Shannon‘s transmitter and receiver 
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are machine devices for which coding and decoding are defined consistently according to fixed mathematical 
rules. When Iser suggests that ―there is no common code between the transmitter and receiver governing 
the way in which the text is to be processed,‖ he uses these terms in a far looser sense than either 
Shannon, Dretske or Moles intended, but his insight is principally sound. However, Iser then subtly alters 
the conception of code such that ―at best such a code is to be established in the reading process itself,‖ 
suggesting that it is in fact a quasi-stable set of rules for interpretation that he is referring to, and that 
importantly the reader may alter the code itself during reading. Problematically for this interpretation, 
there must obviously always be a common linguistic code between the author, text and reader. I prefer 
recourse instead to information synthesis, wherein the code itself is regarded as a source of information, 
whether incipient at read-time, or a-priori.  
Nevertheless, Iser demonstrates theoretical prescience in that he posits that there are structures in the text 
which give rise to the reader‘s internal images and which ―must be complex in nature, for although they 
are contained in the text, they do not fulfil their function until they have affected the reader.305‖ Iser 
clearly demonstrates an understanding, or at least intuition, that information plays a significant role in the 
entire reader-response process. He provides a near perfect approximation of read-time information 
synthesis using informationist terms: 
In literature, where the reader is constantly feeding back reactions as he obtains new information, 
there is…a continual process of realisation, and so reading itself ‗happens‘ like an event…306 
Incidentally, it is information synthesis itself, and the inability, in most cases, to quantify and enumerate – 
or even empirically identify - all contributing information sources in a read-time or write-time synthesis 
event, which ensures the aesthetic qualities of the SF text. Interestingly, Iser‘s theses of progressive 
temporally sequential reader-enacted composition, concretisation during text processing and consistency 
building in novel reading, which I see as corresponding to dynamic read-time information synthesis, again 
parallels semiotician Delany‘s much earlier progressive syntagmatic algorithmic analysis of sentential 
information building during reading. 
WORDS FAIL: CATEGORY ERRORS, EQUIVOCATION, AND GENERAL NOUNS 
Approaches like those of Iser and Paulson must identify arbitrary boundaries of, and causes for, the 
different structural and semantic levels postulated, different contributing or associated disciplines in 
Paulson‘s case307.  Iser‘s strategies in particular are numerously ascribed with various psychological, 
structural and aesthetic effects and outcomes, but are never really defined: Iser never says exactly what a 
strategy is or what it consists of. Strategies can apparently be ―discerned through the techniques employed 
in the text,‖ including narrative and poetic techniques. However, the ―concern is not with the techniques, 
but with the structure underlying them.308‖ They are said to be structures which ―organise the references 
of the repertoire, together with the possibilities of their comprehension‖, which assertion is of limited use 
when the definition of the repertoire itself, as I have suggested, is unstable. In explicating strategies, Iser 
makes reference to communication theory by emphasising the role of selection in determining the 
experience of the reader and the ―emergence of the aesthetic object.309‖ Again, however, it is persistently 
unclear just what is being selected from what, and how. Such approaches also lead to ontological 
confusion between dynamic information processes and static persisted information repositories, and a 
reliance on unstable terms such as meaning.  
Henri Atlan, from whose work Paulson adopts his view of a text as a self-organising system, seems to conflate 
time-based communication systems with relationships between static texts or messages. In his library 
analogy, cited by Paulson, Atlan speaks of ―information…which is transmitted from one book to another, 
in the form of diverse forms of citation, from literal quotation to summary allusion.310‖ With 
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intertextuality and citation, it is the case that information has been transmitted between one book and 
another – from one latent source to another during write-time processing - but this is not a process that a 
reader can observe. The reader can only process and synthesise information from the latent sources that are 
the persisted repositories of artefectual lexical information – the texts – in the library. Such texts are latent 
sources: they will not emit or transmit any information until such time as they are read. Any intersection 
between the information contained in each text is the result of prior transmission where one of the texts 
has been a contributing source and the other the destination or output message, or because both texts 
share another text as a common source in their respective contributing source sets. Paulson reflects on 
the error of regarding texts in isolation as somehow dynamic in the sense of a process, considering the 
Romantics on poetic text: 
Poems are relational structures with words, but poems do not make the words. Nothing really 
justifies calling the text a living organism, though perhaps Varela‘s very choice of the term 
autopoiesis gives us an idea why the metaphor has been so seductive and powerful: it seemed 
intuitively fitting to the romantics to identify the autonomy of literary works with their 
production or creation, their poeisis. But to call the text an organism is based on a category 
mistake…The literary text would appear to be an autonomous object whose specificity arises 
out of the use it makes of its medium, language, insofar as the latter is also an autonomous 
system.311 
It is not that, as Paulson himself then inconsistently has it, a text ―creates its own codes beyond all other 
codes,312‖ but that when a text is read (the process of read-time information synthesis) new codes emerge.  
Paulson concludes, via reader response theory, that ―to be considered a possible autonomous system, the 
text must be understood dynamically and not statically.313‖ He decides, correctly in my estimation, that the 
text only exhibits the behaviour of an autonomous system when it is being written or read: the point at 
which what I refer to as synthesis – the process of information synthesis – occurs. It is also at this point in his 
theory, however, that Paulson himself falls victim to another far more subtle logical and category error 
common to literary theory – that of equivocating the abstract general conception of a text and the general 
idea of its assimilation by anyone, with the hypothetical conception of a specific instance of an actual text 
as being read by some real reader: 
When it is coming into being in a dynamic interaction of the author, language and tradition, 
when it is being assimilated by the mind of its reader or by the collective mind of its culture, then the 
literary text is a possible autonomous system.314 
Firstly, ―assimilated by the mind of its reader‖ is analytically unambiguous, but only if it is a text, and not 
‗the text‘, being so assimilated315. To achieve consistency, one must read both the pronoun it and the 
nouns author, mind and reader in the above passage all as general nouns. This propensity for massing 
general nouns in place of countable nouns in explication is typical of literary theory and cultural studies, 
and it undermines the clarity of dealing with ideal specific, isolable, quantifiable and individual entities. It 
leaves the way open for loose quasi-explicative metaphor, which is also prolific in such theorising. Simply 
put, it serves to promote pretentious generalisation over disambiguation. Another associated habit in 
literary theory is that of using the definite article with a general sense of the noun text. This is not 
grammatically impermissible, but Paulson is undeniably trying to articulate a mapping of concepts and 
principles from scientific theories316, where a duality of general and specific noun with a specific predicate 
is frequently problematic and gives rise to ontological confusion, the latter being largely incompatible with 
the aims of science. The rather nebulous conception of culture and the artificial, tenuous, and perhaps 
vacuous abstraction that is cultural collective mind exacerbates this problem in explication. If this phrase is 
intended to be metaphorically synonymous with something like ―all readers (from a given culture) who 
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process a particular text‖, then it is analytically consistent, otherwise the collective mind of culture is a very 
queer and ambiguous object, and unsuited to analytic predication with explicit scientific descriptors such 
as ‗autonomous system‘.   The two conceptions of a text here – the general abstractive and the abstract 
individual – are combined in such an arbitrary and equivocal way as to make it impossible to discern what 
exactly is supposed to be attributed the analytic property of being an autonomous system. Given that 
Paulson‘s thesis assertively relies for its cogency and intellectual authority on the scientifically underwritten 
rigorously ontologically explicit conception of an autonomous system, this polysemy by equivocation is 
deleterious. It is thus no intellectual out to fall back on the fact that such theorising is aimed at literature, 
does not claim to be scientific and eschews reductive approaches317. This is a similar problem as that 
exhibited in the writings of Barthes and Derrida, as discussed in chapter one318. The indefinite article 
denoting a specific example of a specific type is the logically consistent approach in the context. Why 
―pursue the idea that the literary text may have formal characteristics in some way comparable to those of 
living organisms319‖ when what is required is to apply this idea, not to the ambiguous ‗the literary text‘, 
but to arbitrarily selected but real instances of literary texts such that literary texts maps to living organisms? 
The former usage opens the way for a further confusion, whereby the term literature is treated as a partial 
synonym of literary text operating as a general noun, such that literature is then similarly specifically and 
analytically predicated.  
The information theoretic view I am presenting regards each and every material and mental instantiation 
of any text as a separate source of artefactual or incidental information320 according to an ontologically 
motivated typology. There is no use for or valid mapping from the abstract conception of a text as an 
abstract shared and distributed entity, and the idea of a source, except that the reader‘s community could 
certainly be regarded as a heterogeneous compound source made up of many other individual sources or sub 
sources321. 
INFORMATIONIST SCIENCE FICTION THEORY, TEXTS, AND THE MEGA-TEXT 
Paulson, citing Richard Rorty‘s scepticism about attempts to formulate systematic terminologies for 
dealing with literature, asserts that any attempt to develop a formulaic or scientific approach to literary 
texts will falter, since:  
[T]he literary text cannot be described at a single level; it can be reduced neither to linguistic 
phenomena nor to rhetorical figures nor to global structures … Attempts to make such 
reductions, to account for the whole in terms of a single set of parts or a single procedure for 
organising the parts, have never obtained general assent, precisely because they are always 
incomplete. Nor is such a reductive understanding what we really want out of literature322. 
We may not want a reductive understanding from literature or literary texts, but the best way to understand 
fiction texts and their read-time cognitive and aesthetic outcomes may well be reductive. I suggest that 
this is precisely why theorists like Iser, Barthes and Paulson have constantly deferred to Shannon‘s theory 
for authority. Moreover, it is difficult not to regard Paulson‘s own approach, on his own terms, as being 
of this systematic and analytic variety, which requires some sense of reduction to ontologically 
unambiguous terms both terminologically and theoretically: 
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Lotman‘s use of information theoretic concepts should not mask the fact that he is producing a 
formalist projection of the romantic divinization of literature as literary form, that he is 
describing how this cultural concept of the work of art actually operates as an organisational 
principle of reading. The same must be said a-forteriori of my own argument…I have 
proposed the formalism of self organisation from noise as an explanation for the 
production of meaning out of the polysystemic complexity of the text.323 
Paulson and Iser both pursue a formalist and analytic description of texts and their properties, but then 
contradict and undermine these evident analytic objectives by conflation and equivocation with nebulous, 
loosely defined concepts of culture, values, literature, the ideal or abstract reader and text, and such 
arbitraries as social norms.  
Paulson encounters further ontological equivocations when he comes to analyse the degree to which a 
text can be considered an autonomous system and ―entirely self determined, turned back on itself so as to 
take up and assume within its autonomous organisation any initial, allonomous intention of meaning.324‖ 
He concludes that ―it is most unlikely that this process ever attains organisational closure, unlikely that the 
composition of a text can ever be determined entirely by the laws arising within its own composition.325‖ 
In turning to his assertion that the ―literary text is a locus of self organisation from noise,‖ he then 
oscillates between references to what is ambiguously either a specific or general conception of ‗the text‘ 
and ambiguous generalisations of culture and literature: 
The initial shift…was not directly toward consideration of the text as autonomous object, but 
rather toward taking the text, with its unreliable transmission of information, to be a 
component of a larger system, that of cultural circulation…In this sense we are still considering 
literature as a transmission channel and thus as an allonomous system326 
„Text‟ can feasibly be read as a general noun here, but ‗culture‟ and ‗literature‟ cannot, given the use of 
transmission channel. It is never clear in Paulson‘s theory how literature can be considered to be something 
so specific as a communications channel, an unexpected aporia in the light of his assertions of formalism, 
and no less so by virtue of his disclaimer against reductionism. This random interlacing of metaphoric 
allusions to the principles and schemata of communication and information theory with direct reference 
to the same in the exposition of theory is not cognitively and logically innocuous. It rests upon 
ontological confusion and category errors, and results in obfuscation. ‗Literature‘ is itself a polysemous 
and semantically slippery term, and can be taken to refer to an arbitrary body of written texts, or to 
writing conceived generally as praxis, or to an abstract conception of the output of that praxis, or be some 
combination of these. Other definitions exist, all of which would be hard to invalidate on ontological, 
logical or semantic grounds.   
Iser rejects the notion of the informed reader as posited by Stanley Fish, since it relies on a logocentric 
generative-transformational grammatical model which renders the effect of the text on the reader only a 
linguistic metaphor327. He refers to the superreader of theorist and linguist Michael Riffaterre, which term 
denotes an abstraction for a kind of democratic agreement between an abstract ―group of informants‖ 
(readers) as demonstrative that ―stylistic fact can only be discerned by a perceiving subject.328‖   Iser‘s 
careful comparison of the various abstract reader type constructs in these various theoretical models 
reveals his commitment to avoiding logocentricism in theorising about meaning and aesthetics: he 
concludes that ―we can see even more clearly from the concept of the informed reader than from that of 
the superreader that an analysis of text processing requires more than just a linguistic model.329‖ Iser is in 
interdisciplinary company, for philosopher Michael Devitt joins naturalist-philosopher Stephen Stich in 
the assertion that ontology cannot be explained by theories of linguistic reference, and admonishes 
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philosophers to ―put metaphysics first.330‖ Nevertheless, in identifying the importance of the actual or 
‗contemporary‘ reader, Iser devises the implied reader as a theoretic abstraction. He struggles with the 
consistency and coherence of that abstraction. He claims that the ―concept of the implied reader is 
therefore a textual structure anticipating the presence of a recipient without defining him331‖ and yet that 
―the ideal reader, unlike the contemporary reader, is a purely fictional being; he has no basis in reality.332‖ 
Even in identifying the work as a virtual upshot of the dynamic interaction between the reader and the 
text, and even whilst establishing the abstract nature of the implied reader, Iser gravitates to the necessity 
of identifying the implied reader in the context of structures in the form, which framework was a 
mainstay of structuralist theory. Iser is perhaps simply unable to be radical enough in his re-assessment 
out of his historical and theoretical context. My standpoint, some 31 years later and on the other side of 
the postmodernist revolution, is perhaps a somewhat easier place from which to re-formulate or radicalise 
such frameworks. I think that the various competing abstract representations of the reader arose in the 
late structuralist period precisely because such a construct is ultimately inadequate to capture the dynamics 
of meaning production or for understanding the respective contributions of the text and reader to the 
realisation of meaning. I suggest that it is not in fact the reader that is the requisite central abstraction, but 
the information source.  
Readers are clearly important to the production of meaning during text-processing. However, no 
abstraction which bottoms out in some kind of unreality is going to help any analytic theorist to establish 
a cogent basis for a theoretical framework. If we supplant the implied reader and other manifestations of 
the abstract reader with abstractions which are firmly rooted in reality and not anthropocentric – namely 
the contributing information source set and read-time synthesis – then the ontological and conceptual 
difficulties associated with trying to determine the role and parameters of the former are eliminated. The 
information source set is a mathematical abstraction of a similar functional profile to the universal 
quantifier of classical logic: it refers to something real in a readily conceivable and conceptually cogent 
way, even if what is referred to is not quantifiable or practically enumerable, it is denumerable. The set 
theoretic universal and existential quantifiers of classical logic are perfectly analytically cogent. No logician 
of merit ever expects anyone to ever actually enumerate all of the hydrogen atoms in the universe, but the 
set of all hydrogen atoms at time t is perfectly real. Likewise, one need not be able to identify and 
enumerate (nor, in most cases, could one) all of the contributing information sources in a given read-time 
or write-time synthesis event, in order to make mathematical sense of such a conception. In contrast, it is 
impossible to give the same analytic credence to an abstraction like the implied reader, which construct is 
multifariously definable at best. Biologists and other scientists may employ description, metaphor and 
analogy in explication, but the referents are always discrete or determinable material objects, systemic 
actualities, or reproducible mathematically, experimentally, or methodologically determined results which 
are ontologically unambiguous. They may counterfactually estrange known facts by analogy and 
extrapolation, but in each case the information being attenuated or synthesised with noise is veridical 
information. Incompleteness in a reductive theory is problematic, but linguistic and ontological incoherence in any 
theory is more so.  
Information theoretic terms like communication channel simply don‘t apply to such loosely defined terms as 
literature. This analogical mapping incurs an ontological category error which does matter. It is difficult to 
avoid a parallel with Broderick‘s critique of Derridean deconstruction‘s appropriation of the term 
undecidability from Godel‘s incompleteness theorems, where ―it is arguable that to step out of the purely 
formal is to turn undecidability from a well defined phenomenon into a sloppy figure of speech.333‖ 
Regarding ontological confusion due to appropriated terminology, Broderick makes the following deft 
observation: 
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This is not to scorn Derridean attacks upon the corrosive of certain phallogocentric and 
essentialist practices, though we should note that these excel in revealing the contrary effect: 
namely: rhetorical figures falsely construed as well-defined phenomena. It is to point out 
that significant aspects of the deconstructive programme seem to be based on a poorly 
understood set of analogies drawn…from meta-mathematical discoveries…And if this critical 
remark in turn is thought vulnerable to a deconstructive decentring of ‘expert 
opinion’…it must be asked why numerology…or lunatic word-play are not used as a 
basis instead for transgressive theory.334 
From the perspective of ontological clarity and consistency, a far better approach overall to information 
theoretically inspired analysis of fiction texts is accessible through a reductive-abstractive adaptation of 
Broderick‘s constructs for science fiction, wherein the collection of SF texts which contain instances and 
tokens of various SF novums and icons is referred to as the mega-text335. I will regard the concept of the 
mega-text, by the terms of the information theoretic SF theory that I am presenting, as simply an example 
of an information source set – an ideally quantifiable but practically inaccessible real set of actual sources 
which contribute information into the process of information synthesis which occurs at both read-time 
and write-time, resulting in an agglomeration of messages - an incipient persisted repository of information. 
This synthesised latent or static artefactual information source is a new text. Note that all of the terms of this 
vocabulary, if somewhat reductive, are systematic and consistently defined. Artefactual information is 
simply that which is produced by intelligent agents for the purpose of communication. A source we have 
already defined rigorously, and a latent source is simply a persisted repository of information such as a 
message or text which will yield some proportion of its information for synthesis at read-time: when read 
by a human reader. A persisted repository is simply any repository of information produced by some 
source and captured such that it effectively stores or persists information for later potential synthesis, 
transmission or consumption. Synthesis is explicitly the combining of information from one or more 
sources, which sources may have produced information of different types.  
For all fiction texts, the author‘s write-time information synthesis is arguably more cognitively demanding 
than the reader‘s read-time synthesis, since the latter does not need to rigorously configure a new message 
– a newly synthesised latent source. However, science fiction proper requires of the reader that they 
interpret the ontologically estranged and complex references encoded into the text during write-time 
synthesis. Informationist science fiction texts may elevate the reader‘s experience of aesthetic and cognitive 
outcome in read-time synthesis, by requiring that the reader does this and simultaneously discerns the 
meta-informational components of the text and its encoded narrative. I use the term encoded here in the 
very specific sense described in chapter two. The mechanism of semantic, affective and aesthetic 
encoding – of how meaning or narrative comes to supervene on the artefactual information that is the 
text – is abstracted out. What matters is that there is a strong supervenience relationship between whatever is held 
to be encoded in a persisted repository such as a text and the information of that text. It is information 
types which play a significant role in semantic outcomes at read-time synthesis. 
INFORMATION TYPES, SYNTHESIS, AND THE NOVUM 
In challenging the explanatory sufficiency and veracity of the computational regime336 - which is how she 
refers to the computationalist world view - and that of digital philosophy in general, literary critic Hayles 
investigates the interplay between digital and analogue information in spoken, written, and computer-
mediated human discourse and language. We have met this information type distinction, and the 
conception of a conversion between one type and the other, in Fred Dretske‘s digitalisation thesis. Hayles 
suggests that the locus of complexity of the world and human affairs involves a combination of digital 
and analogue information, and an interplay and feedback between natural and artificial information, the 
latter supervening on what she refers to as code337. This dynamic, which she refers to as intermediation, is 
motivated by what she perceives as the ―urgent task to understand in nuanced and theoretically 
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sophisticated…interactions between code and language.338‖ In Hayles‘ thesis, the usage of this word 
encapsulates the meaning familiar to software developers and computer scientists, and refers generally to 
all of the program code associated with a computer and the software on it. Although she does not fully 
develop an accompanying ontological framework, Hayles views speech, writing and computer code as 
three different “systems for creating signification339.‖ This indicates an intuitive tendency to an almost 
typological view of information, whilst intermediation would rely on what I refer to as information synthesis. 
Perhaps less than convincing are Hayles‘ assertions that Saussure‘s conception of signifier and signified 
apply to the relationship between binary code and the higher level lexical codes which supervene upon it, 
and that the Saussurean conception of difference of signifiers applies to bit values340. I think that the latter 
is demonstrably more akin to logical bivalence. The appropriate distinction is perhaps that it is function that 
is associated with bit values, rather than difference and meaning341.  
Hayles goes on to address the insertion of mathematical and computational language, signifiers and 
symbols – especially with regard to computer program code - into fiction texts342. In an investigation of 
the motif of figurative language ―as the dialectic complement of‖ performative code in Neal Stephenson‘s 
Cryptonomicon,  Hayles paraphrases reader-response principles in terms of reader-computer and text-code 
analogies which are present throughout the narrative of Cryptonomicon, thereby echoing Porush‘s analysis 
of Pynchon‘s V. as imbued with self-reflexive cybernetic metaphor: 
In this context, the reader‘s activity is implicitly imagined as burying the memory of one section 
in order to cope with new information offered by the next plot thread; later when the thread 
resurfaces again, the reader must disinter that information and link it with the new 
developments…In effect then, the reader functions like a digital computer…343.  
On my information typology, program code and natural language are both lexical artefactual information. 
These meta-informational motifs in Cryptonomicon, which Hayles identifies as the ―interpenetration of 
technology and text‖, and the use of information technology discourse in the fiction text, both exemplify 
the kind of information synthesis which I propose is a mark of information age informationist science fiction. 
The outcome of write-time synthesis of science and technology discourse with fictional narrative 
discourse involves the synthesis of different types of artefactual information. 
Broderick introduces a cognitive and computational conception of discursive and epistemological 
synthesis in scientific and literary texts and writing. He concludes that scientists combine and present 
findings and data based on ―esoteric but starkly elementary models far removed from the domain we 
inhabit,‖ with various figurative, analogical, metaphorical and literary devices and in conjunction with 
metaphysical intuitions that circumvent methodological rigour. For Broderick, this is an upshot of the 
way in which the human brain copes with the chaos of the world and the various imponderable and 
―defiantly unknown or uninscribable‖ facts therein344. As we saw in chapter one, although Broderick 
defines aspects of cognition semiotically, giving an impression of logocentricity pertaining to a kind of 
mentalese, it seems he is nevertheless interested in what I refer to as internal information synthesis at read-time 
and write-time. Notwithstanding the echo of Locke‘s archaic associative model for ideation, the strength 
of Broderick‘s view is that it recognises significance in the heterogeneity of the ‗content‘ assembled during 
reader cognition345. In Reading By Starlight, Broderick notes that some criticisms of Suvin‘s thesis, which 
involve the application of the meaning by difference principle of semiotic theory, fail on the basis of 
ignoring the subtleties of Suvin‘s reference to the novum as different and differentiated in terms of its 
narrative world, and that it is the way that novum terms differ from other signs that makes them 
interesting346. The way that novum terms differ as signifiers can be investigated on the basis of the types of 
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information involved; and the extent to which the attenuation or degradation of any messages in the text 
affects their read-time outcome for the reader will depend on the amount of information lost in textual 
transmission as well as the ‗noise‘ imposed by the reader‘s internal information sources. 
INFORMATIONIST SF THEORY AND SEMIOTICS 
Broderick is one of numerous theorists who have attempted combining semiotics and information theory, 
resulting in an interesting if problematic information synthesis in theory: information theory vis-à-vis 
communication theory is rigorous mathematical science, whilst semiotics is not347. The central postulates 
of the ―coherent deformation‖ of the ―data of the world‖ as giving rise to meaning - which Iser borrows 
from Merleau Ponty - and the former theorist‘s reformulation thereof as a system of equivalences in the 
repertoire which are supposedly ―identical to…aesthetic value‖, which ―initiates the process whereby the 
reader assembles the meaning of the text348‖ through the ―recodification of familiar norms349‖  all of these 
are inferentially putatively underpinned by communication theory in that ―[t]his whole process is 
governed along the lines of all forms of communication.‖ The lines of governance Iser cites are based on 
a hybridisation of semiotic theory and communication theory provided by Moles: 
The basic process of communication between a sender and a recipient…consists…of the 
following: taking recognisable signs from the repertoire of the sender, putting them together, 
and transmitting them along a channel of communication; the recipient then has to identify the 
signs received with those which he has stored in his own repertoire. Ideas can only be 
communicated in so far as both repertoires have elements in common…But to the extent to 
which such a process takes place within systems equipped, like human intelligence, with 
memory and statistical perception…the observation of similar signs gradually alters the 
recipient‘s repertoire and leads ultimately to a complete fusion with that of the sender…Thus 
acts of communication, in their totality 350 
The critical distinction upon my theory is that there isn‘t really any signification occurring in the sense of the 
instantiation of common signifieds or referents at write-time and read-time. Whatever is signified to the 
reader at read-time will emerge only through read-time synthesis of the information of the text with the 
information available in the reader‘s internal information sources: these are the ‗elements in common‘, not 
lexical signs. It is synthesis, not signification, which is occurring. The only way to strictly determine whether any of 
the information the reader synthesises at read time refers in the same way as that synthesised by the 
author at write-time would be to bring the two agents together to make an internal comparison. 
Hayles‘ asserts that Shannon‘s scientific information theory, Saussurean semiotics, and Derridean 
deconstruction are linked by common theoretic concepts and principles, and that each is based on a 
similar conception of difference: the difference between symbols or ensembles (continuous) in Shannon‘s 
theory, and difference between signifiers in semiotics351. For Shannon‘s theory in its intended application, 
meaning is irrelevant to message and in semiotics and deconstruction the signifier is divorced from the 
signified such that meaning arises from chains of the former only. However, it is not clear that Shannon‘s 
system is centrally concerned with difference, or with any conception of difference at all. Hayles cites 
Norman Abramson‘s introductory text Information Theory and Coding in asserting that Shannon information 
is determined by a series of differences between the selected symbols or messages (or the ensemble of 
functions in the continuous case) at the source352. However it is not difference that forms the basis of 
Shannon‘s theory (nor does Abramson say as much) but the probability that one symbol will be selected 
after another, whether different or not: this is the principle of the Markov chain for determining 
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informational entropy.  A sense of difference is only important in Shannon‘s theory in terms of the 
equivocation, which is a measure of the mismatch between the message produced by selection at the source 
to be sent, and that same message assembled for the destination by the receiver. This equivocation is 
about loss of information and the fidelity of the channel: it does not determine anything about the 
meaning of either the source-selected message or the received message, and nor does it reflect that ―the 
information content of a message can be calculated only with reference to the ensemble from which the 
message elements are drawn, that is not absolutely but through a series of differences.353‖ Difference on 
Saussure‘s theory involves signifieds and meaning. Shannon‘s theory is not about meaning at all. Shannon 
was interested in the maximal fidelity of the message received at the destination as compared to that which 
was produced at the source.  
In his essay Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs, C.S. Peirce does not define information explicitly, but his 
definitions relating to signs reveal that he regards information as conveyed by combinations of what I 
have been referring to as natural and artefactual information, and in so doing he not only anticipates 
structural elements of Shannon‘s theory, but also anticipates and foreshadows work done on natural and 
non-natural meaning by philosophers Grice and Dretske as much as a century later354. There is also a 
striking and important parallel between Peirce‘s description of sentences as information carrying and 
Shannon‘s conception of a message355. Peirce anticipates Dretske‘s much later postulate that the 
knowledge gained by a human agent receiving information in a message depends upon the information 
already available to that agent356. Peirce‘s trichotomic typology of signs is also an anticipation of Grice‘s 
conception of natural meaning, and in some sense parallels the typology which I have developed for 
information. For Broderick, semiotics provides an insight into how SF texts achieve cognitive and 
aesthetic innovation: 
Above all, science fiction textuality escapes the truly formulaic in its capacity – indeed, its 
dynamic need – for linguistic play and innovation. Agenot stresses that sf’s lexicon 
constitutes a body of novel signifiers lacking actual signifieds outside their intertextual 
‘absent paradigms.’ Sf uses ‗fictive words‘…using paradigm here in the linguistic rather than 
the Khunian history-of-science sense to mean a list of interchangeable words with a common 
real world reference.357 
If we regard these novel signifiers with absent paradigms as exemplified by novum terms with 
counterfactual pseudo-informational ‗referents‘ in possible worlds, then a meaningful link between 
semiotics and information theory becomes apparent for SF theory. 
Ferdinand de Saussure‘s logocentric semiotic model operates at a lexical and semantic level insofar as its 
central syntagmatic and paradigmatic chaining relationships exist between lexemes and what he describes 
as their (mental) meanings, and the role of what I am referring to as non-lexical information is minimised. 
Saussure has no real concept correlating to Peirce‘s empirical dicent signisign, and focuses 
comprehensively on lexemes and symbols and their internal mental-ideational correlates: 
[T]here is no linguistic entity possible which would be directly accessible through the senses, 
because none exists apart from the idea which can be attached to it.358 
On Saussure‘s model, the meaning of a lexical sign is determined through difference established in a chain 
of signifiers - which by information ontology constitute a chain of artefactual lexical information sources. 
Moreover, Saussure makes very limited mention of information. For Saussure, sensory perception plays a 
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role in – else the sign could not be perceived – but I suggest the ‗linguistic entity‘ on Saussure‘s thesis 
really requires information synthesised from multiple internal and external information sources of 
different types, upon which information the semantic codes supervene. A lexical signifier is an artefactual 
lexical information source. It corresponds itself to an arbitrary selection event on Shannon‘s theory, and 
picks out or selects a particular signified – an object which is also a source of information. It is an 
information source by Shannon‘s statistical definition in so far as it represents the outcome of a selection 
from many possibilities at a given point in the text. The ‗message‘ encoded therein on this entropy 
definition of information is just the lexical symbol itself. The meaning encoded in/by the message that is 
the symbol/signifier is not captured by Shannon‘s model.  However, Delany‘s and Iser‘s emphasis on the 
formation of non-lexical mental images must be accommodated. Saussure himself emphasised that there 
was no linguistic conceptually atomic simple available for language theorising: 
...there is no linguistic entity available to us which is simple, since even when reduced to its 
simplest expression it requires that account be taken simultaneously of sign and meaning…359 
The only components addressed in Saussure‘s model are external physical realities, external grammatical 
and symbolic representation, internal representation and the meaning intrinsic to the latter: he fails to 
acknowledge a role for information360. In this I think Saussure missed the subtlety which Peirce, before him, 
captures by allowing information an intuitive and substantive place in semiotic pre-theory and theory. The 
combinatorial synthesis of information underpins both the process described as the instancing of an 
interpretant by Peirce‘s theory and that of the realisation of a mental sign-meaning by Saussure‘s lights361.  
SF texts employ a wider range of lexical signs in terms of the heterogeneity of their corresponding 
contributing information source types, and involve more cognitively demanding veridical information 
synthesis through synthesis of information from scientific information sources which refer to 
ontologically complex objects. The ratio of signs in an SF text informed by veridical information is also 
significantly increased. The cognitive aesthetic of Lem and Suvin, and the aesthetic of complexity, both 
correlate with increased veridically informed sign-sources which select informationally complex signifieds 
by synthesis. 
Using the strong sense of supervenience, signification supervenes upon synthesis. Read-time information 
synthesis is what makes the signifier ‗slippery‘. Any change to the contributing source set will alter the 
outcome of synthesis in some way. The only way to strictly determine whether any of the information a 
reader synthesises at read time matches that synthesised by an author at write-time would be to bring the 
two agents together to make an ideal comparison. An intersection of the set of the identifiable contributing 
sources of the author and the reader should indicate some conjunction. However, determining the degree 
to which what Delany and Iser refer to as the mental images formed during read-time and write-time are in 
any way similar between percipients would be, in accordance with John Locke‘s theory of mind, 
impossible – until perhaps neuroscience provides a solution.  
INFORMATIONAL HETEROGENEITY: THE HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION PROFILE 
Read-time synthesis gives rise to incipient and potentially highly unpredictable information: what Iser 
referred to under the rubric of ‗new codes‘. Thus, when the text of Banks‘ informationist space opera The 
Algebraist presents scientific veridical information synthesised with futurological counterfactual pseudo-
information including novum and mega-text codons, the reader must respond cognitively - ideating and 
extrapolating from whatever information and knowledge they may internally possess which seems 
relevant - to accommodate both terminological and ontological estrangement: 
                                                 
359 Saussure, F. ―Writings in General Linguistics.‖ Ed. Simon Bouquet and Rudolf Engler. Trans. Carol Sanders and Matthew Pires. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006, 6. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Peirce, C. S. ―Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs.‖ in The Philosophical Writings of Peirce Ed. Justus Buchler. New York: Dover, 1955, 100. 
CHAPTER 3 - THE FICTION OF VERIDICAL, COUNTERFACTUAL AND HETEROGENEOUS INFORMATION 
77 
 
We Dwellers…encompass as much of the spectrum of chronosense as we are able, covering 
most of it. I exclude the machine-Quick.362 
When the ontologically estranged counterfactual character that is the Dweller sage Jundriance discusses 
the attributes of his species, the reader must employ extrapolative reasoning from knowledge supervening 
on existing veridical information (internal veridical sources) to understand the diegesis and attain the 
available cognitive and aesthetic effects. ‗Chronosense‘ is a superb scientific neologism (from biological 
science) for use in an SF  text, because even if the reader is unaware of its scientific usage – involving the 
way that the human metabolism and certain computerised sensor-based systems respond to the stimulus 
of natural light - then if they have some knowledge of the more commonly encountered morphemes 
‗chrono‘ and ‗sense‘, they can still attempt to perform a satisfying cognitively enacted internal synthesis of 
information . The information profile of Banks‘ informationist space opera thus involves a certain 
combination of information types in what, I suggest, may be demonstrably statistically typical ratios and 
proportions .  Different SF sub modes evidently do employ subtly or distinctively different information 
type combinations. 
What is generally referred to as Hard SF is regarded by theorists like Suvin as possessed of an aesthetic 
arising from the cognitive-imaginative application and effort involved in encoding and decoding novum 
centred around both possibilia and what Suvin himself calls extrapolative cognitive estrangement:  
The consistency of extrapolation, precision of analogy, and width of reference in such a 
cognitive discussion turn into aesthetic factors...Once the elastic criteria of literary structure 
have been met, a cognitive - in most cases strictly scientific -  element becomes a measure of 
aesthetic quality, of the specific pleasure to be sought in SF. In other words, the cognitive 
nucleus of the plot codetermines the fictional estrangement itself.363 
Thus a primary component of SF‘s aesthetic appeal resides in counterfactually extending known material, 
technological or scientific facts to anticipate or speculate about new possibilities.  
The text of astrophysicist Fred Hoyle‘s speculative hard-SF classic The Black Cloud exhibits counterfactual 
pseudo-information synthesised with scientific veridical information: 
―…But look at the heliocentric distance, 21.3 astronomical units, only 21.3 times the Earth‘s 
distance from the Sun. It‘s impossible.‖ 
―I don‘t see why.‖ 
―At that distance it must be easily visible to the naked eye…‖364‖ 
At read-time, this text builds narrative suspense as the fictional astronomer Kingsley is expressing doubt 
about the fictional data relating to the distance to the fictional black cloud with the fictional astronomer 
royal. The setting is counterfactual, but not futurological. The narrative is first person memoir. The 
dialogue employs correct astronomical terminology and the reader‘s read–time processing can further 
synthesise the scientific veridical information encoded into the text at write-time synthesis. The setting is 
counterfactual by minimal ontological estrangement (the cloud.) The characters and events are, of course, 
counterfactuals. There is no futurological counterfactual pseudo-information in the excerpt from Hoyle‘s 
text, but the proportion of veridical information is quite high in both of the above excerpts, each of 
which is both a message and a latent source. Significantly, it is Banks‘ space opera which employs a 
greater range of information types by including veridical information, futurological counterfactual 
pseudo-information and pure pseudo-information synthesised with counterfactual pseudo-information 
(the Dweller.) Its informational heterogeneity is greater. Notably absent from the excerpt from The Black Cloud 
are any novum neologisms, although the black cloud is itself certainly a variation on existing mega-text 
icons and a novum in its own right. Read-time synthesis of what has been encoded into Hoyle‘s text 
during write-time synthesis does not require the reader to consider as many naturalistic estranged 
ontological possibilities to understand the narrative. It would seem that greater ontological estrangement in 
a counterfactual sense (rather than a purely fantastical sense,) as with the novum, involves a higher 
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surprisal value: it is accompanied by greater informational entropy across different information types. 
This fits with our conception of the novum, whereby it is often intrinsically ontologically estranging: SF 
novums usually involve the naturalistic counterfactual extrapolative or augmentative alteration of some 
material reality, natural kind or real object. 
The high counterfactual pseudo-information value of the novum is conducive to cognitive aesthetic outcomes at 
read-time. I propose that SF is not only a special discursive synthesis, which uniquely combines scientific, 
humanistic and philosophical discourse(s) via Suvin‘s centrally cognitive estrangement, but that it 
simultaneously involves a heterogeneous information synthesis by virtue of the range of information types with 
which it engages, and especially a high degree of veridical information because of the key role played by natural 
and especially scientific veridical information in write-time and read-time synthesis. This characteristic of 
information type synthesis, resulting in a typologically heterogeneous information is an indicator of SF‘s 
situ at the multivariate nexus. Importantly, the primary indicator of a text‘s status as SF, and the primary 
marker of SF texts, is in fact evidenced by a combination of a wider range of lexically and textually 
implemented information types than is typical of other modes of fiction. The novum indicates the 
presence of counterfactual pseudo-information, and future possible-worlds codons indicate futurological 
counterfactual information. 
INFORMATIONIST SPACE OPERA 
Space opera has been traditionally regarded as the poor cousin to hard SF, and historically has commonly 
suffered pulp-fictional categorisation. However, when information age SF writers like Ian M Banks and 
Venor Vinge write, the quasi-normative, fuzzy-logical365 distinction between Hard SF and Space Opera as 
sub modes becomes significantly blurred. Jonathan Strahan and Gardner Dozois observe that, sometime 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s, space opera began a metamorphosis from its traditional adventure 
thematic and aesthetic  oeuvre involving astronomically large-scale settings, into a darker, more serious 
and more sophisticated mode of SF still incorporating these traits, but with a broader intertextual base 
and wider ranging cognitive and scientific commitments366. In their brief history of the space opera, 
Strahan and Dozois cite the rise and influence of hard SF, new wave and cyberpunk, respectively, with 
periodic marked lulls in enthusiasm for adventure-based space opera, culminating in declarations of its 
expiration as an SF  sub genre or form367. However, space opera survived through the absorption of 
aspects of each one of these sub modes by intertextual ‗genetic‘ borrowing and adaptation. The 1980s saw 
the determined emergence of the new space opera, and by the early 1990s space opera had acquired the 
gritty anti-authoritarian ideological and socio-political mood and posthuman characterisation of 
cyberpunk, as well as the scientifically astute and sometimes technocratic informationism embedded in 
information age hard SF. New space opera texts are generally more philosophically astute, scientifically 
informed, and aesthetically clever than their forerunners. 
Informationist space opera texts provide some of the most striking examples of both heterogeneous 
discursive and informational synthesis, as well as starkly contrasting authorial ideologies and knowledge, 
in any SF mode to date. Many writers of information-age space opera - like Vinge, Egan, Reynolds and 
Benford - come from mathematical or computer scientific backgrounds, whilst others like Dan Simmons, 
Stephen R. Donaldson, Greg Bear and Gwyneth Jones are trained solely (professionally) in literature or 
the humanities. Authors of space opera from professional arts backgrounds often do significant scientific 
research to produce SF texts: Greg Bear, whose earned his BA from San Diego State University, has 
worked with the FBI in a serious capacity consulting on homeland security, an upshot of which was his 
recent techno-thriller Quantico, which Bear asserts contains the fruit of serious scientific research into the 
genetic engineering of viruses for bio-warfare368. This curious role wherein SF authors influence reality in 
a practical forum was originally primarily within the purview of hard SF. Under the Reagan 
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administration, a group of writers including Isaac Asimov, Arthur C. Clarke, Gregory Benford, and 
Robert Heinlen were assembled as a serious team consulting on the ‗Star Wars‘ Strategic Defence 
Initiative369. Scientifically trained authors like Vernor Vinge and Benford write works which often exhibit 
highly unusual narrative structures and superior style and construction of character and mise en scène. 
Vinge worked as a computer science lecturer during the writing of his first few novels, and at the time of 
this writing, Benford is still a tenured professor of physics at The University of California Irvine and 
publishes physics papers regularly. Australian Greg Egan, author of perhaps the best known Australian 
example of informationist SF, Permutation City, still works as a computer programmer and mathematician. 
The text of Vernor Vinge‘s A Fire Upon the Deep is dense with naturalistic, scientific and technology 
object-centric ontological estrangement. It is even evident in the ontology of the identities of most of the 
characters. Some have physical forms which make of them meta-informational metaphors for 
information systems: biological counterfactual character-novum370. They are at once object and subject. 
Other characters are meta-informational devices due to their explicit understanding and use of what are 
often very extrapolated counterfactual communications and computing science technologies, which exist 
in the fictive settings encoded by the text as synthesised counterfactual pseudo-information. The inclusion 
of information that is sourced from science and scientific discourses as sources makes the SF text itself a 
different kind of persisted information repository and source from a fantasy or myth text which is largely or 
homogeneously pure pseudo-information with respect to scientific discourse and information. Fantasy and 
myth texts might certainly carry extensive analogical references to the habitus of the author and reader, 
but few or none that are scientifically inspired and few if any engage and synthesise with the veridical 
information and discourses of modern science proper.  
Vinge‘s inclusion of information theoretical precepts and principles and other related textbook tenets of 
communications and computing science are often not metaphorically or analogically rendered, but 
injected into the text of the narrative in accordance with the SF codon of the didactic and expositive 
narrative agent, if more subtly so than in the pulp SF of the 1930s. Frequently, lay-friendly re-statements 
of real scientific information theory find their way into the counterfactual context of the narrative with 
limited or obvious extrapolative enhancements, or no fictive extrapolation at all. In A Fire Upon the Deep, 
when technician-heroin Ravna reads an intergalactic email post on a forum on the galactic Known Net, she 
observes loosely, but in accordance with actual real-world communication theory, that the original 
intended message sent by a very alien being with difficult to translate language is badly obscured by 
textual noise, and that a lot of bandwidth was expended ineffectually in its transmission: 
In this part of the galaxy, a significant fraction of all message traffic belonged to the news 
group. More bits were sent analysing poor Ovn Nilsndot‘s mouthing than had been in the 
original. Judging from the flames and contradictions, the signal to noise ratio was very low.371 
This elegant interleaving of narrative and world construction with meta-fictional meta-informational 
counterfactual pseudo-informational reference to veridical information sources is executed throughout 
the text. The increased heterogeneity of information types introduced by futurological and ontological 
counterfactual estrangement differentiates informationist space opera texts from fantasy texts cognitively 
and aesthetically. The presence of ontologically estranged and counterfactual veridical information about 
scientific, technological and natural objects further differentiates SF from thoroughgoing fantasy, and 
diminishes within it what Suvin calls mythologisation. This latter attribute is effectively the basis of anti-
simulacra in informationist SF, which I will discuss in the final chapter. 
ONTOLOGICALLY OBJECT-CENTRIC MATERIALIST FICTIONALITY 
The informational profile of SF texts means that read-time processing of such texts is cognitively 
stimulating in the aesthetically pleasing manner in which numerous theorists from Suvin and Lem to 
Delany and Broderick have observed. I doubt that this is a theoretical chimera. As science has 
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demonstrated, thinking about the natural world and trying to understand and interpret it can be a 
recondite process full of material obstacles. There is supreme cognitive effort involved in comprehending 
the ontology and physical dynamics of physical systems and phenomena. Modelling them with axiomatic 
mathematical systems requires intellectual and mental application that is largely absent in an undertaking 
such as fictive storytelling. I submit that modern neuroscience currently bears out that mental tasks such 
as reading and mathematics require different degrees and types of neurological functions and responses372. 
However, the real differentiator is that science and mathematics necessarily require rigorous attention to 
finite detail and the necessity of exacting consistency across wide ranging ontological variable data and 
findings using sophisticated rigorous methods and systems for cross-checking and correlating evidence. 
Inconsistencies and aporia matter a great deal and must be eliminated through axiomatic proofs, 
falsifiability and repeatability: not something that is true of storytelling or fictionalisation. Linguistic play 
and narrative of the kind encountered in most fiction texts – even those considered technically superb on 
literary terms – may require internal narrative consistency and cohesion, but there are no rigorous 
demands of ontological consistency, mathematical accuracy or correspondence to fact. Joyce‘s Finnegan‟s 
Wake and Pynchon‘s The Crying of Lot 49 are elaborate and linguistically complex – but there is no real 
penalty if they fail heuristically or ontologically in terms of denoting material realities, and all metaphor is 
intrinsically ambiguous. It is arguably for this reason that mythology has always been with us, whilst the 
scientific revolution came so late in human history – so long after the great observationally and 
geometrically inspired thought of Aristarchus of Stamos, Archimedes and Pythagoras. With deference to 
Dawkins‘ meme theory, there is simply far more work required to attain a reward in terms of survival 
benefit from science than from mythology373. Compared to competent scientific theories, religious 
narrative and mythology are comparatively effortless to produce, and are simultaneously obscure and 
determinedly arcane, or – like metaphor - at least ambiguous enough by virtue of the slipperiness of 
logocentric signification to elide any veridical information.  
Peter Lamarque‘s assertion of literary value as necessarily partly underwritten by what he refers to as moral 
seriousness marks his short treatise on the aesthetics in literature as strongly influenced by moral criticism. 
Science fiction authors such as Banks, Gibson and Delany, as well as many non-SF writers, frequently 
engage with or allude to one or another flavour of relativistic moral non-cognitivism or objectivist moral 
anti-realism, and I feel that this reflects the destabilising of the moral seriousness claim for the 
classification of literature on the basis of the open question argument, Nietzsche‘s nihilism and Russell‘s 
qualms about moral claims - at minimum. That literature is necessarily underpinned by some pursuit of an 
objective moral realism is clearly contentious, but I will not pursue this point further here.  However, the 
prevalence of estranged and normative veridical scientific information in much SF indicates that most 
competent SF writers are unlikely to be nihilists about truth, and are interested in a scientific materialist 
definition of truth as correlated with veridical material facts. SF texts can be postmodern and morally 
ambiguous in the conventional sense, but not when it comes to a materialist-naturalist worldview. Of 
more interest in Lamarque‘s essay is his attempt at a distinction between literature and fiction: not because 
of the classification of the former term, but for the properties he ascribes to the latter. He asserts that the 
―concepts of literature and fiction are not identical‖ and that, for many ―the imaginative component of 
literature…implies fictionality.374‖ Like Iser, Lamarque has no non-linguistic or non-logocentric terms 
upon which to base his analyses. Posing the question of whether literary works are thus essentially fictional, 
Lamarque notes that: 
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 No satisfactory answer can be given without an adequate conception of fiction, yet that 
concept has proved remarkably elusive to definition. It can mean ‗false,‖ or ‗unreal,‘ or 
‗invented,‘ or product of the imagination.375 
Turning to psychologism and cognitivist epistemology, he implicates Nelson Goodman‘s thesis of 
aesthetics as cognitively delineated, since ―works of fiction encourage a certain kind of ‗cognitive 
detachment‘, in the sense that readers are invited not to believe in the literal truth of what they read, but 
only to ‗make-believe‘.376‖ Again fiction is said to have something to do with cognitive outcomes at read-
time which involve imaginative production. 
Ignoring the question of the literariness of science fiction, and focussing on the aesthetic and cognitive 
qualities associated with its fictionality, I suggest that fictionality in SF texts and writing generally is 
definable on a reductive non-logocentric informationist basis: the unreality and falseness of fiction writing 
supervene upon the synthesis of artefactual counterfactual and pure pseudo-information. It is important to 
emphasise that this is not intended as a nominalist relabelling of linguistically inscribed conceptions of 
meaning and truth, but relies on the novel typologically imbued ontology of information which I have 
presented to provide an alternative and completely different metaphysical and reductive basis for the 
discussion of fiction texts and writing. Information types are the best delineator of fictionality, and 
information synthesis involving counterfactual pseudo-information the hallmark of fiction texts. 
According to Delany and Iser, it is the production of incipient information – of new codes - that is 
essential to fiction. Broderick cites Beer in support of a view that: 
What links both scientific and fictional writing…is more important than what separates them. 
Both prize information, formal elegance, and surprise.377 
SF texts and writing stand apart as that mode of fiction which implements significant synthesis of both 
types of pseudo-information with scientific veridical information, the latter being specifically associated 
with naturalistic and physicalist scientific endeavour, its methodology, discipline, and purpose. 
Informationist science fiction exhibits the aforementioned quality and specifically engages thus with 
information science and technology, mathematics and the computational sciences.  
Paulson notes Michael Serres‘ interpretation of a heuristic shift in French philosophy from the nineteenth 
to twentieth centuries: 
[C]an be understood as a displacement of the second law of thermodynamics form physical to 
informational systems – the shift, one might say, from Boltzmann to Shannon. Bergson‘s 
philosophical system…is one of heat engines, of reservoirs, differences, circulation of energy. If 
one replaces energy reservoirs by informational reservoirs, this system can be translated into 
one of textual dissemination378 
I suggest that a similar shift is a major marker of the inception of informationist science fiction. The 
simultaneous application of information theory to literary theory and linguistics from the early 1950s 
onwards meant that texts by polymath authors such as Delany engaged intertextually and thematically 
with information theoretic concepts across multiple disciplines from the sciences to the humanities. The 
multiple informationist themes and icons of novels such as Babel 17 and Stars In My Pocket demonstrate 
this broad disciplinarily heterogeneous engagement with information theory and information science, and 
I suggest that the stylistic and aesthetic superiority of such works are largely due to the aesthetic and 
affective outcomes associated with the resulting informational heterogeneity. In these two novels, Delany 
merges computational themes with informational character ontologies so that the cognitive estrangement 
experienced by the reader becomes tangibly self-reflexive with respect to the text: it can be negotiated on 
informational terms, reflecting what is depicted in the narrative. 
The inclusion of such scientifically underwritten veridical information is, like the natural sciences, 
necessarily always materialistic. Scientifically speaking, information always supervenes on the physical. 
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There exists artefactual information, but there is no such thing as supernatural information: such would be a 
complete anathema to science379. Thus science fiction texts which exhibit such synthesis must necessarily 
inherit this materialism at least to the extent that this synthesis ensures it. On this basis, informationist science 
fiction theory partly supports Suvin‘s assertions that competent science fiction is unavoidably materialistic 
and anti-supernaturalistic380. However, the strongest informationist proposition that one can make about 
science fiction is that at minimum it must engage with the materialist principles and determinations of 
science through synthesis of some established or verifiable veridical scientific information. This engagement can be in 
the form of novums constructed around counterfactual pseudo-information and futurological 
counterfactual pseudo-information. The informational delineation is of a different form than Suvin‘s, but 
is not necessarily ideologically weaker in the positive sense. His (original) requirement is that texts and 
their encoded narratives belong to the literature of cognitive estrangement only when wholly ideologically 
committed to materialism in a holistic and thoroughgoing way. My classification of science fiction on the 
basis of the necessary inclusion in SF texts of synthesis with scientifically secured veridical information can 
in fact support this strong position. A text which exhibits the requisite scientific veridical information 
synthesis may also exhibit a significant amount of pure pseudo-information. If said pure pseudo-
information encodes the semantics of supernaturalism or implements what Suvin refers to as 
mythologisation, then one should question the status of the text as science fiction proper. I will argue this 
point further in the next section. Informationist SF theory also delivers a strong negative assertion: a text 
which exhibits no or negligible engagement with science and scientific discourse, such that there is 
negligible synthesis of scientifically validated veridical information – even in futurological counterfactuals 
and novums - is probably not SF proper on an informational basis. A text which exhibits only in small part 
synthesis with scientifically verified veridical information, in the absence of SF icons and the scientistic 
novum, is one which has science fictive elements. A stronger statement about what constitutes SF proper 
requires information-theoretically addressing the distinction between two mutually exclusive worldviews. 
INFORMATION AND THE OPEN-SYSTEM MISE EN SCÈNE 
I suggest that many difficulties in establishing a characteristic definition of SF as a mode of writing and a 
set of texts arise largely due to SF‘s place at the multivariate nexus, and especially the nexus of science and 
fiction, and precisely because this situ ultimately places it also at the nexus of two ontologically mutually 
exclusive and oppositional sets of world views: the supernaturalist and the materialist. The materialist view 
holds that reality and the universe are encapsulated within a comprehensively physical closed system. 
Supernaturalism regards the universe as an open system where the supernatural and supernatural causality 
(and, in some fiction, magic and magical causality) are also somehow actual. The tension arising from this 
opposition – which I will refer to here as the ontology-causality opposition - is reflected in or influences 
almost all SF writing and criticism to varying degrees. I think that to a large extent, the impact of this 
worldview dichotomy or binary on SF is resistant to deconstruction because of the essential ideological 
commitments of science and the scientific discourses with which SF engages and which it often exploits 
in synthesis. Moreover, it is arguable that deconstructive theory, with its core of logocentric idealism, 
depends itself upon this ontology-causality opposition for its effectiveness.  Amoung other things, 
deconstruction seeks to challenge and potentially undermine the Aristotelian law of non-contradiction, 
primarily in its doxastic and semantic versions wherein conflicting beliefs or linguistic statements are of 
concern, and to destabilise or invalidate the binary opposition of putative essential properties: 
male/female, acceptable/unacceptable, good/evil, normal/abnormal. However, the deconstructive 
approach breaks down for the open system versus closed system ontology-causality opposition, because the 
materialist closed system alternative is explicitly defined with the unreality of supernaturalism as its 
contingent assumption.  
Firstly, the law of non-contradiction at work here is the ontological version: either the supernatural is real 
and supernatural things are real or it is not and they are not. If the materialist closed system view turns 
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out somehow to be contingently false, then it will simply cease to exist as a worldview, and 
supernaturalism will be the only game in town, because the exclusion of the latter is part of the necessary 
normative propositional basis of the former. Put simply, one can suggest that something may be both 
good and evil or that the distinction is meaningless, or that normal and abnormal are only linguistic-
semantic constructs; but if the supernaturalist open system is actual, then materialism cannot be true at all, 
and vice versa. It is an ontological and epistemological question – not a linguistic or doxastic one. Even if 
one maintains a belief in the magical or supernatural and also that science has access to the material 
mechanisms of cause and effect, materialism on its scientific definition would not be true, because 
ultimate causality would be efficient and final and supernatural teleology, and its associated unlimited causal 
potential, would be the reality. The simultaneous co-existence of both closed and open systems with some 
kind of perpetual separation of concerns and ontologies doesn‘t logically work either, because science 
necessarily assumes the universal uniformity of a materialist reality. Modern pure and applied sciences rely on the 
assumption of a closed system for their explanatory power and exigency: science is foundationally 
materialistic, because the supernatural has never been scientifically provable or demonstrable.  
Another reason for this necessary wholesale contingent trumping of one system by the other is that 
supernatural and magical causes are theoretically limitless in their causal scope and power: by their very 
definition they effectively completely circumvent and nullify any and all material limits and impedances. 
The counterfactual pseudo-informational novum is meaningless and cognitively uninspiring in such a 
setting. Scientific explanations in an open system reality would be nothing more than descriptions of 
mechanism, and frequently unreliable descriptions at that, since all processes and systems in nature would 
be subject to unpredictable and inconsistent causal impetus vis-à-vis David Hume‘s scepticism regarding 
cause and effect381. From a cognitive perspective, and thus from a cognitive aesthetic and counterfactual 
standpoint, there is no point engaging with scientific discourse if The White Wizard can simply yammer 
‗abracadabra‘ and render scientific postulation and inquiry moot. The sciences, properly materialistically 
defined, and by extension the heroic physicalist scientist, are necessarily an anathema to the mythologising 
and supernaturalist worldview.  
Some authors and critics, such as Stephen R. L. Clark, designate SF as a primarily mythologising mode with 
centrally religious motivations and outcomes382. I suggest that informationist SF theory reveals this 
assertion to be errant by the arguments above. SF sometimes subversively engages pseudo-mythemes but is 
generally inspired by or engages with science and scientific precepts:  closed system materialism, 
theoretical defeasibility and scientific methodology. The presence of counterfactuals and metaphor is only 
to be expected of a fictional text. There is no immutable or inviolable mandate or imperative for a writer 
of even realist fiction to obey any worldly norm, nor to observe naturalism or indeed to respect normality 
in any fixed fashion, let alone adhere to anything so restrictive as falsifiability or materialism, with which it 
is difficult to see how the allegorical could function meaningfully. Ergo the existence of magic-realism as a 
much loved literary genre, and the popularity of what is commonly referred to as science-fantasy. In 
novelistic fiction generally, there is no meaningful, nor even desirable, proscription of the fantastic, the 
mythological, the supernatural or the surreal – just to name a few prospective common departures from 
naturalism. One can‘t have the novelistic enterprise, with its expressive power and authenticity rooted in 
polyphony, allegory and intertext, without having a truly open form and mode. SF itself relies on the 
novelistic admission of imaginative and truly alien discourses which are only related to human discourses 
by allegory or extrapolation, and which accompany estranged and counterfactual alien or estranged 
character ontology. However, if the ontologically attuned object-centric synthesis of scientific veridical 
information from scientific and material sources is, as I have argued, a necessary minimal component of 
SF texts, and if the ontology-causality opposition is substantive (and I don‘t see how it cannot be,) then it 
is difficult to see how Clark‘s dictum succeeds. It simply does not logically follow that necessarily SF is 
religious and mythologising just because some SF texts engage with supernaturalist themes allegorically or 
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otherwise, although such engagement is likely to increase the influence of the closed-system worldview 
resulting in increased pure pseudo-information. 
Metaphysical dualist critics and philosophers like Clark, who subscribe to the open-system model of 
reality tend to use conflation, co-option and equivocation to attempt to undermine naturalist and 
materialist definitions of SF. Since SF engages with science, the logical problem with what I will call the 
open-system model for SF is that it relies on an ontological contradiction. H.G. Wells may have classified 
his own writings as scientific romance, but he was a committed socialist with Marxist-materialist leanings 
in life and in his writings. The conflation of romance with dualistic and supernaturalist themes is a natural 
upshot of its association with the magical and supernaturalist heritage that many classic romance texts 
engage. Csicsery-Ronay Jr. reflects on the tension in historical terms: 
The Wellsian model of scientific romance enjoyed great success. For the literary establishment, 
it represented a new poetry that fused knowledge of science and character. It brought the 
undisciplined fantasy of popular adventure fiction under control by grounding it in the useful 
and realistic scientific worldview…Conservatives believed that science fatally narrowed the 
scope of the fiction…scientific enlighteners objected to the way romance elements corrupted 
the truth of facts into pseudoscience.383 
However, as Fred Botting explains, although SF resembles gothic fiction through frequent engagement 
with the monstrous and with horror elements and because of its persistent partial status as romance, the 
distinguishing property of SF is embodied in H.G. Well‘s War of the Worlds, wherein the basis for horror 
becomes ―not metaphysics, but physics.384‖ A closed-system setting enforces Clarke‘s third law which 
ensures ―gods and demons alike turn out to be no more than alien intelligences385‖. Co-opting SF to 
romance and fantasy on the basis of similar motifs relies on equivocation. Informationally speaking, the 
open system is corrosive to SF‘s informational heterogeneity and scientific veridical synthesis. As soon as 
it is invoked, and the unlimited causal power of supernatural agents or forces are released into the 
counterfactual mise en scène, and the novum and the veridical and counterfactual information synthesis 
upon which it relies are markedly eroded or nullified commensurate with the presence of open-system 
semantics. Informational heterogeneity is reduced in the text, because veridical information is diminished 
and counterfactual pseudo-information tends to be supplanted by pure pseudo-information. This 
mitigation of counterfactual pseudo-information in fantasy arguably corresponds to a more ideologically 
conservative setting, whereas SF, as Edward James suggests, embraces dynamism and change in the 
relationship of persons to their world386. Supernaturalism and the ‗open system‘ world view ultimately 
undermine the cognitive aesthetic associated with SF novum and megatext icons and motifs because the 
latter rely on mechanism and naturalism, which are cognitively uninteresting and diminished in a 
supernaturalistically inspired mise en scène. 
Information age writers of science fiction often seemingly exhibit the open-system equivocation on SF 
and religion. The prolific and mystical Philip K. Dick regarded SF not only as escapist and fantastic – but 
as magical: 
I was twelve…when I read my first sf magazine ... I was most amazed. Stories about science? 
At once I recognized the magic which I had found, in earlier times, in the Oz books - this 
magic now coupled not with magic wands but with science…In any case my view became 
magic equals science…and science (of the future) equals magic.387 
However, Dick uses the term magic as an expression for his enthusiasm for the mode, and thus defers to 
Arthur C. Clarke‘s dictum that ―[a]ny sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic388. 
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Lutin has it that the early Dick (1968, ―Self Portrait‖) was apparently convinced of the anti-realist quality 
of science fiction: 
I want to write about people I love, and put them into a fictional world spun out of my own 
mind, not the world we actually have, because the world we actually have does not meet my 
standards...I have never yielded to reality. That's what SF is all about…This is why I love 
SF….The SF writer sees not just possibilities but wild possibilities.389 
It seems apparent from the last sentence, however, that Dick‘s apparent commitments to unreality can 
probably be accounted for on the basis of a predilection for counterfactual estrangement, which can be 
achieved with a materialist closed-system narrative setting. He mentions wild possibilities, not impossibilities. 
Many of his journal entries are crammed with copious references to religious icons. However, they are 
also replete with references to analytic philosophical metaphysical concepts including determinism and 
teleology, and Dick believed himself committed to investigating truth and reality in his works on a 
perceptive and cognitive basis: 
I am a fictionalizing philosopher, not a novelist; my novel & story-writing ability is employed as 
a means to formulate my perception. The core of my writing is not art but truth. Thus what I 
tell is the truth, yet I can do nothing to alleviate it, either by deed or explanation... my corpus is 
one long ratiocination regarding…inexplicable reality…390 
Although his works contain quasi-mystical (or perhaps pseudo-mystical) motifs, like many hard SF 
writers, Dick seems committed to what I will refer to in the final chapter as anti-simulacra. 
ARTEFACTUAL SYNTHESIS: THE DISCOURSES AND NOTATIONS OF THE SCIENCES IN SF 
Hard science fiction authors cannot assume the desire nor the ability of the reader to execute the 
conceptual and cognitive fulfilments required by actual scientific writing, nor would a reader of hard SF 
necessarily want to interrupt the flow of reading with research. However, as Broderick aptly suggests, SF 
can facilitate the enjoyment of a reader and stimulate their interest even if they are not well versed with 
the veridical scientific discourse and signifiers included in the fictive text391. A reader not possessed of an 
internal source containing the requisite veridical information will not necessarily be deterred, so long as 
they are able to grasp the story and gain some insight from the contextual placement of the unfamiliar 
content within the SF text. In fact, as Suvin suggested, there is a cognitively centred aesthetic involved in 
the reader‘s personal extrapolation or speculation regarding the unfamiliar component392. They may not 
have an internal source which can provide veridical information to support their access to the semantics 
erncoded upon the veridical information synthesised into the unfamiliar textual source from write-time, 
but they may be able to discern something of the veridical information involved by reference to the 
information with which it has been synthesised, or for which they may have a related internal veridical 
source (concept.) This is what delivers the cognitive aesthetic outcome intrinsic to read-time synthesis 
associated with a novum. Speculation about whether fairies might exist in an alternative universe involves 
pure pseudo-information, but speculation that makes the alternative universe – the counterfactual world 
or world situation - accessible from the real world, adds an aesthetic which is bound up in possibility and 
cognition. This manoeuvre integrates into the experience of an SF  reader the read-time outcome of 
ontologically orientated conceptual and ideational pioneering and invention. It requires write-time 
encapsulation of a large specialised and complex scientific discursive field within a much more general 
and less technically specific fictive one. Novum neologisms and SF mega-text codons both help to 
achieve this, as does the synthesis of heterogeneous artefactual information, the combining of scientific 
notations and diagrams with prose. 
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Science needs more than prose with which to encode its outcomes and theories. Mathematical and 
diagrammatic languages are critical in the sciences and engineering to provide a greater set of tools for 
abstraction and the symbolic conveyance of material facts. Broderick is simultaneously perspicacious on 
two key ontologically grounded points: that the knowledge of scientists is not just linguistic or textual, and 
correspondingly, that scientific language and discourse are informed by the material natural world 
empirically through interactions other than the linguistic and textual alone393. He recognises that when 
scientists use narrative, metaphor and discourse in ideating about and linguistically expressing theories of 
the material world, they are using such literary devices fundamentally differently to fiction writers: with 
common veridical referents in mind and on the basis of the assumption of shared professional scientific 
understanding of those referents and pursuant to the development of systematic definitions de rigueur394.  
SF texts mimic this in their references to the SF mega-text, and gravitate towards scientific writing in that 
they tend to exhibit heterogeneous information synthesis with a greater proportion of sources in the contributing 
source set supplying scientific veridical information. Broderick also sees that Snow‘s conception of two cultures 
is a journalistic simplification of reality395. Of all modes of fiction writing, competent SF texts best engage 
with that reality, as evidenced by these same informational properties. 
Science and engineering engage the physical through semi-linguistic and super-linguistic tools like 
mathematics, spatial and diagrammatic nomological representations396, special notations, nuanced 
technologically and experimentally-driven methodological expression and exposition. Such tools and 
techniques, and the super-lexical or mathematical notations associated with them, are hallmarks of 
theoretical and applied science, where they arise out of the need to represent as rigorously and accurately 
as possible – with high informational fidelity – the ontology and facts of material and natural states of affairs 
and processes. Diagrammatic depictions, mathematical notations, and hybridisations of the two, are an 
indication in a text of its mandate to engage with scientific veridical information sources. Such source types – 
which include the kind of biological and/or physical natural objects and processes which are the focus of 
hard scientific study - are frequently complex and not easily accessible to human intuition, perception or 
common understanding. Natural language alone is not adequate to their analysis and interpretation. 
Hence the need for complex mathematical and visual abstractions in scientific and mathematical 
theorising. Nobel Laureate and physicist Richard P. Feynman is famous for promoting the use of 
diagrams as an alternative to pure mathematics in explicating quantum physics and relativity theory, and 
his Feynman diagrams revolutionised the field in the late twentieth century397. One sometimes encounters 
directed graphs or tables in literary theoretic treatises398. Certainly node graphs and special ontologically 
informed lexical notations are plentiful in linguistics, where phonemes must be symbolised, anthropology 
accounted for, and physical mouth parts depicted, but then linguistics, like psychology, often aspires to 
the status of a hard science. When veridical information must be captured and represented for scientific 
purposes, natural language is either heavily augmented by other notational techniques, or becomes 
adjunct to the latter, as a labelling system or for augmentative natural language explication. 
The discourse in most genres of adult fictional texts hardly ever admits mathematical or diagrammatic 
notations, although there are historical and contemporary exceptions. Exceptions are mostly found in 
SF399. However, an approximation of the practice, and perhaps its fictive origins, are evident in fantasy 
writing and other older literary forms. Novels from realist, romantic and historical generic traditions 
sometimes incorporate diagrammatic or diagram-like objects within their texts, although they are generally 
closer to artistic illustration than scientific or mathematical explication. It is hard to see how Tolkien‘s - 
albeit rather more artistic than cartographic - fantastical maps of Middle Earth, are not diagrammatic. 
Such are not lexical, although typically annotated. Robert Louis Stevenson‘s Treasure Island includes a 
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map400, although Defoe‘s 1779 Robinson Crusoe had no map added until its fourth edition. A much later 
Ursula K. Le Guin, following Tolkien in the fantasy mode, includes five maps, four interlinear, in A 
Wizard of Earthsea (1968.401) Henry Rider Haggard included a stylised fictive map intra-text in King 
Solomon‟s Mines (1885.) John Rieder sees Haggard‘s map as inspired by Stevenson‘s example and expounds 
at length on its political, cultural, sexual, colonial and social signification402. These greater fictive signifieds, 
rooted in the context of the author‘s episteme and habitus, are exemplary of alternative semantic and 
informational encodings. Rieder cites the illustration of a central fictive object in Haggard‘s She (1887), a 
pottery fragment depicted with Uncial Greek inscriptions called the ―sherd of Amenartas‖, as exemplary 
of the text‘s fictive engagement with the sciences of anthropology and linguistics403. These early examples 
of novels which engage with alternative non-lexical artefactual information types, to the extent that some 
small part of their informational content is non-lexical404, and yet not manifest as simply artistic illustration, 
but formed and encoded according to nomologically attuned depictive and representational rules drawn 
from the sciences associated with navigation and geography405. They are exemplary of the aesthetic appeal 
of information heterogeneity over and above discursive genre insertion. 
To the extent that they are not required to obey grammatical rules, nor reflect linguistic dynamics, maps 
and diagrams are very uncertain representations. In terms of Shannon-entropy and the ontology of 
artefactual information types, as symbolic depictions they are very high information sources. They are more 
uncertain if fictive – because they need not reflect the veridical information of any real world information 
source configuration. Such pseudo-informational representations have no intended direct real-world 
reference, and thus the possibilities for their configuration are not restricted by real contingencies or 
nomological limitations. Included in a fictive text, they constitute very high counterfactual or pure 
pseudo-information. This same technique of employing maps for world construction and narrative 
authenticity is rarely employed in information age and informationist SF. Of the map-bearing texts cited 
in the previous paragraph, only Le Guin‘s is information age. A notable exception is Vernor Vinge‘s A 
Fire Upon the Deep, which includes a stylised fictive cosmological map of the galaxy complete with light 
year scale, exploded region and two perspective views by faux orthographic projection.  
The inclusion of actual mathematical notation or formulas in SF is not common, even in information age 
SF, but texts of the SF mode arguably include this type of information more than those of any non-SF 
mode. Mathematics has a natural language discourse associated with it, but discourse on Bakhtin‘s model 
of speech genres is centrally something social and uttered using natural language, or derived from the 
same406. Mathematical notations are perhaps as discursive as they are utterable. Neal Stephenson and 
Vernor Vinge often insert technological and especially information-technological language or 
‗computerese‘ within their SF texts as inserted discursive genres, for narrative aesthetic effect and fictive 
authenticity. A pioneer of this approach is Fred Hoyle: The Black Cloud includes numerous examples of 
both artefactual veridical information and artefactual counterfactual pseudo-information in the form of 
mathematical notation and diagrams407.  Vinge‘s A Fire Upon the Deep includes numerous examples of 
inserted techno-epistolary. Stephenson‘s novels exhibit a predilection for pedagogical explication in narrative 
which invests his Snow Crash with frequent intertextual forays into topics as diverse as ancient Sumerian 
mythology and contemporary computing programming practice. Cryptonomicon is perhaps the most 
striking example of well written informationist SF to date. As such, it engages heavily with scientific 
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discourse, and, moreover, it is replete with both scientific diagrams and computing notation. It is one of 
the few SF texts aside from The Black Cloud to include non-discursive mathematical notation intra-linearly. 
Arthur C. Clarke‘s Space Trilogy has no such inclusions. A few pages into chapter 1 of Cryptonomicon, the 
text includes the complex Reimann Zeta function: 
―This fellow was trying to build…a machine to calculate certain values of the Riemann Zeta 
function 
𝜁 𝑠 =  
1
𝑛𝑠
∞
𝑛=1
= 1 +
1
2𝑠
+
1
3𝑠
+ ⋯ 
where s is a complex number.408‖ 
The fictive context is the development of the eccentric savant character Lawrence Pritchard Waterhouse, 
and the aesthetic upshot involves cognition and complexity pursuant to fictive authenticity. The text of 
Cryptonomicon is dense with heteroglossia: authorial, narrative, character, epistemic, scientific and cultural 
voices clamour for reception and recognition therein. The insertion of mathematical notation, carefully 
placed for cognitive effect and narrative authenticity, adds entirely new voices which are raw and 
informational – voices that break from discursive normality and by doing so effect estrangement and yet 
enhance authenticity. The Shannon entropy of the text as a source of information increases with the 
inclusion of mathematical notation, which move expands dramatically the set of word-symbols and other 
symbols which are available for selection. Joyce increased the information in Finnegan‟s Wake by using a 
dramatically inflated English vocabulary. Haggard, Tolkien and Le Guin increase information by including 
non-lexical encodings of information and meaning, and, in Tolkien‘s case, an entirely new fictive 
language. Stephenson combines most of these with technological discourse, scientific and mathematical 
diagrams and mathematical notation, and realist historical fictive elements. The informational profile of 
Crytonomicon correspondingly exhibits hight levels of counterfactual pseudo-information and veridical 
information, and is very informationally heterogenous.  
It is not only non-lexical diagrams and non-linguistic notations, but also comprehensive neologising which 
stands out as a distinguishing characteristic of scientific and SF texts, and the practice of neologising in SF 
is mimetic on that which occurs in science. The information age has only seen an increase in the strain 
that the sciences place on natural language vocabularies. There are now myriad new computer software 
applications for scientific and mathematical analysis, modelling, data collection, real time processing and 
computer control of experimental processes. In addition to the iconic and symbolic lexicons associated 
with the diagrammatic and mathematical notations they are designed to support, such software 
applications are themselves frequently associated with their own vocabulary of technical terms which 
augment and hybridise the scientific and technical vocabulary of the underlying scientific discipline, and 
result in a further conflux of the terminology of that discipline with the language of information science 
and technology. Importantly, there is a parallel between what occurs terminologically in science in the 
form of scientific neologising, and the SF practice of generating novel terms and novums. Suvin 
acknowledges his adaptation of the concept of the novum from Enrst Bloch‘s original conception in 
poetics, augmenting it based upon its narrative consequences being in accordance with Bertolt Brecht‘s 
concept of estrangement:409 
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Or perhaps-since, as differentiated from fantasy tale or mythological tale, SF does not posit 
another superordinated and ―more real‖ reality but a alternative on the same ontological level as 
the author‘s empirical reality…an alternate reality. The new reality overtly or tacitly presupposes 
the existence of the author‘s empirical reality…[SFs] specific modality of existence is is a 
feedback oscilation that moves now from the author‘s and implied reader‘s norm of reality to 
the narratively actualised novum…This oscillation, called estrangement by Shklovsky and 
Brecht, is no doubt a consequence of very poetic, dramatic, scientific, in brief semantic 
novum.410 
However, Suvin‘s neologistic adaptation also owes something to the scientific practice of developing new 
technical terms to empower the scientist descriptively and avail them of an adequately powerful 
nomenclature for theorising and experimentation. The novum is thus central to Suvin‘s project of seeing 
SF as especially cognitively orientated: 
My axiomatic premise...is that SF is distinguished by the narrative dominance or hegemony of a 
fictional "novum" (novelty, innovation) validated by cognitive logic.411 
Novums (or the novum as singular in Suvin‘s terms) instantiate a conceptual newness or estrangement, 
pursuant to cognitive synthesis and anticipation at read-time, via what I have called counterfactual 
pseudo-information. The practice of novum neologising is founded on and influenced by a well known 
practise of terminological hybridisation and neologising in the sciences: a practice which centres on what I 
have called veridical information. Computerised scientific tools are full of hybrid terminology which 
facilitates the labelling and understanding of aspects of the computerisation of experimental techniques 
and analytic processes. Information theory and mathematical sciences like physics, which deal with 
copious abstract concepts, are especially prone to generate new scientific theoretical and natural kind 
terms, many of which eventually fall into common usage. Such scientific neologisms are not intended to 
estrange, but to assist the reader in cognising new facts and incipient scientific principles and objects. All 
of the information encapsulated in the various scientific neologisms and incipient natural kind terms is of 
the veridical type, because the sources of the information are factual and material or at least mathematically 
verifiable or scientifically-theoretically defeasible.  
If we follow Shippey‘s terminological application of probabilistic Shannon entropy and describe a novum 
neologism as ‗high information‘, then it is, according to my ontology of information, high counterfactual 
pseudo-information only. Scientific neologisms which require the reader to combine referents and semantics 
associated with actual material and theoretic (scientific) facts yield, if we apply and embellish Shippey‘s 
approach again, encapsulations of high veridical information. Neologisms in fantasy and mythology that have 
no grounding in verifiable material or theoretic fact – wherein there is no factual state of affairs involved 
in the information source – employ or encapsulate only pure pseudo-information. No amount of pure-pseudo 
information adds up to any veridical information, unless metaphor or allegory is thereby instantiated to 
reference actual non-fictive facts, and thence the synthesis of the information involves indirection and is 
unpredictable in terms of a veridical outcome. In this case, the textual/lexical pseudo-information source 
(the fantasy or myth text) requires the veridical information being indirectly referenced to obtain/subsist 
in an internal source, a concept possessed by a reader. The outcome depends on the veridicality of a 
reader‘s internal source, and is thus accidental to read-time synthesis. There is still only pure pseudo 
information encoded upon the fantasy or mythologising text itself as a source. If the reader cannot grasp 
the allegory or metaphor no veridical information has been synthesised. When SF writers like Arthur C. 
Clarke and Isaac Asimov engage with the themes of science and technology, the novums that they 
implement textually and fictively involve counterfactual possibilia and extrapolative and analogical 
estrangement with a basis in scientific fact and theory. Even if the reader does not know enough science – 
does not possess internally a source of requisite veridical information embodied in concepts – the 
information encoded in the texts of these writers is still counterfactual pseudo-information, but it is simply 
lost. It does not become pure pseudo-information just because it is not understood in the absence of 
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internal supporting sources of veridical information, although the information synthesised by the reader at 
read-time will be pseudo-information due to the loss. 
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C h a p t e r  4 - I n f o r m a t i o n i s t  S c i e n c e  F i c t i o n  A e s t h e t i c s  a n d  
M o t i f s  
Any aesthetic outcome or affect associated with read-time synthesis of SF texts is arguably largely due to 
the well executed implementation and stylisation of cognitive estrangement therein, and to well 
implemented novums, SF icons and futurological counterfactuals. I have argued that these fictive devices 
supervene on texts which contain elevated information type heterogeneity and elevated veridical 
information from write-time synthesis. Components such as ontologically estranged characters and mise en 
scène, the subjugation of the subject to the object and the hybridisation of the two through estranged 
character ontologies, and meta-informational writing: all of these contribute to cognitive and affective 
read-time outcomes. For Delany, who is one of the pre-eminent SF aestheticians writing today, such 
informationally heightened writing must be accompanied by superior style and authorial competency to 
sustain aesthetic palatability. Delany was the first theorist to specifically associate what Suvin later termed 
novum with increased information412.  A novum thus evinces a heightened read-time experience of what 
Suvin called cognitive estrangement. Tom Shippey explicitly identifies the novum words as informationally 
unique, echoing assertions of an informational cognitive aesthetic. The novum and all of the SF codons 
mentioned contribute to the informational complexity of the text and its encoded fiction. Because they 
are located at the multivariate-multifaceted nexus, and exhibit counterfactual admixture of scientific fact 
and discourse with fictive narrative, information synthesis in science fiction texts and in the processing 
thereof results in a heightened cognitive estrangement as well as an aesthetic of complexity. 
THE COGNITIVE AESTHETIC AND THE INFORMATIONAL AESTHETIC OF COMPLEXITY 
Katherine Hayles asserts that Shannon‘s central distinction between information and noise was that the 
former was useful and the latter not so. Shannon does make this distinction, but it is the achievement of 
fidelity between the message at the source and the message at the receiver for the purposes of minimising 
information loss in the channel which is the crux of his theory and its application. This dynamic is more 
akin to what David Davies, drawing on information theoretic terminology for literary studies, calls the 
fidelity constraint: the rigidly purposed observance of which indicates that a writer intends a narrative not to 
be considered fictional, as it is intended to be the faithful representation of actual material events or facts 
and their temporal sequence in a text narrative413. This corresponds to using artefactual information to 
represent veridical information from a real world veridical information source, whilst minimising noise 
and information loss due to information type conversion. SF stands apart from fiction in general, because 
the cognitive detachment required for normative fictionality – which Davies refers to in terms of the 
author‘s intention that the reader make believe rather than believe – is mitigated by the cognitive response 
associated with ontological estrangement and novum at read-time414. Lem sees make-believe as based on 
―a convention, a tacit agreement between writer and reader-in a word, the specific rule of literary games 
that allows the use of nonrealistic means (e.g., thought-reading) for the presentation of realistic 
happenings.415‖ Make-believe is partly overridden or corrected by the cognitive outcomes of SF at read-
time, as implied or claimed by Suvin416, Paulson, and again, Lem: 
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[I]t is the premise of SF that anything shown shall in principle be interpretable empirically and 
rationally.417 
Ontologically complex counterfactuals in SF require imaginative cognitive estrangement from facts – not 
thoroughgoing make-believe with no information whatsoever from scientific, natural and ontologically 
real phenomena and objects. Wolfgang Iser held that ―referential meaning could not be of an aesthetic 
nature418,‖ because the aesthetic effect requires a gap in cognitive comprehension, and that it is not until ―the 
aesthetic nature of meaning constantly threatens to transmute itself into discursive determinacy419,‖ that 
reference and cognition take over. According to informationist SF theory, such an ‗aesthetic gap‘ in 
cognitive comprehension is preserved through sheer magnitude of the number of contributing 
information sources, veridical and otherwise, and of the unfamiliarity of many of them to the reader, 
necessitating synthesis of incipient pseudo-information at read-time for counterfactual fulfilment. The 
cognitive aesthetic of SF hybridises the fidelity constraint and make-believe through heterogeneous information synthesis.   
Paulson quotes Michel Serres on the intrinsic relation between reality and complexity:  
―If we wish to truly know the real…or to escape the hell of political and military violence…we 
must shift to ways of knowing that negotiate with complexity420.‖ 
Veridical information in a text, and especially in an informationally heterogeneous text, begets complexity 
which requires cognitive responses. Paulson sees cognitive demands on the reader of literature or poetry 
as a consequence of the lack of any discernible pre-established external rules and laws for determining the 
meaning of the text, such that the reader must employ ―considerable knowledge of linguistic and cultural 
codes to aid her in her task, but who must literally discover the autonomous codes by which a given text 
is itself organised.421‖ It is this requirement to overcome the informational indeterminacy which arises from 
the fact that a fiction text is noisy – does not communicate information without significant loss due to 
noise – which necessitates cognitive effort. 
Competent informationist SF texts exhibit informational and semantic complexity to a greater degree than 
texts of any other mode of fiction writing. The term complexity here is used in accordance with the 
meaning from the new science of complexity, wherein a system is complex if it has many intricately 
interoperating and unrelated parts in structured and unstructured configurations. It implies heterogeneity 
of structure. Lem thought SF uniquely adept at engaging with the complexities of society and complex 
technology through complex textual ―literary games‖ and narrative sophistication422 423. SF texts are 
informationally complex by virtue of heterogeneous information synthesis and the aesthetic of informational 
complexity in SF texts is intrinsically related to a cognitively realised aesthetic at read-time. The encoding 
of meaning in realist fiction involves a straightforward, analogical, metaphoric or implied reference from 
the text to the real in a counterfactual setting with an intended or implied ontological invariance from the 
actual world of readers and author: realist writing converges on the fidelity constraint of non-fiction. 
Counterfactually freed from the familiar constraints of the real, the SF author can employ ontological 
estrangement in character construction at or beyond the level attainable in fantasy and myth literature 
without semantically encoding the unrealities of magic or the supernatural424. SF texts can thus exhibit 
heteroglossia or polyphony to a greater extent and with more estranged effects than those of the realist 
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novel, but still naturalistically. Moreover, the SF text encapsulates symbols and signification that are 
instantiated across multiple logical and informational planes: the real, the counterfactual, the futurological 
counterfactual and the imaginary. A reader of such a text must respond cognitively to counterfactual 
speculative invention based on counterfactual pseudo-information because the novum of an SF story 
relies on these for the conveyance of meaning and cognitive-aesthetic fulfilment. 
That Lem‘s cognitive aesthetic425 is heightened by the informational aesthetic of complexity is evidenced 
in SF texts from Fred Hoyle‘s Black Cloud to Neal Stephenson‘s Cryptonomicon. In Banks The Algebraist, 
Banks admixes counterfactual ontologically estranged settings and objects with veridical information - 
known physical principles – in a highly emotively charged scene where human protagonist Fassin‘s whole 
clan has been annihilated, leaving him as a kind of omega man: 
It had been quick, instantaneous, but so What? They had felt no pain but they were dead, gone, 
beyond recall. Only they were not beyond recall…He could not cease bringing them back to 
life in his head…He thought of just letting the craft tip further …plummeting down into the 
great sucking breath of the gas-giant gravity, the gillfluid wrenched from him, perhaps taking 
some of his lungs with it…tearing him apart and letting him fill the bloody ragged remains with 
alien gas for his last scream – falsetto, like the voice you got when you sucked helium from a 
party balloon…426 
The aesthetic of complexity arises with informational complexity, where there are multiple information 
types from right across the spectrum of veridical to counterfactual and pure pseudo-information. Lem‘s 
cognitive aesthetic is here implemented through the combination of psychological and identity themes 
with physics-informed futurological counterfactual novums. 
INFORMATIONIST SPACE OPERA AND THE AESTHETIC OF COMPLEXITY 
The new informationist space opera and the futurological informationist SF text are SF sub-modes 
possessed of a higher level of informational, semiotic, discursive and textual variety and complexity than other (sub) modes of 
SF. Information-age space opera written by science and technology savvy authors such as Banks, and 
especially those written by working scientists like Vernor Vinge and Alistair Reynolds, tend to exhibit 
such informational complexity. In Alistair Reynold‘s Revelation Space, when the fictional characters Hegazi 
and Sylveste call up fictional navigational star maps from the future counterfactual fictive supercomputer 
on their fictive spacecraft, the result is informational complexity: 
 The image had the form of an orrery, the orbits of the system‘s eleven planets and largest 
minor planets and comets denoted by elegant coloured tracks...Because the scale was so large, 
the terrestrial planets – Resurgam included – were crammed into the middle; a tight scribble of 
concentric orbits banded around the star Delta Pavonis. The minor planets came next, 
followed by the gas giants and comets, occupying the system‘s middle ground. Then came two 
smaller sub-Jovian gas worlds, hardly giants at all, then a Plutonian world – not much more 
than a captured cometary husk, with two attendant moons. The system‘s Kuiper belt of 
primordial cometry matter was visible in the infrared as a curiously distorted shoal – one nubby 
end pointing out from the star. And then there was nothing at all for a further twenty 
AU427...428 
The setting and time frame is fictive, as are all the planets mentioned, including Resurgam, the etymology 
of which is the ecclesiastical latin for ‗I shall rise again‘429. Delta Pavonis and the Kuiper belt are real, and 
                                                 
425 So dubbed by Dagmar Barnouw in Barnouw, Dagmar. ―Science Fiction as a Model for Probabilistic Worlds: Lem's Fantastic Empiricism‖ 
Science Fiction Studies. # 18 = Volume 6, Part 2 = July 1979. March 2009 
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426 Banks, Iain M. The Algebraist. London: Orbit Time Warner, 2004, 281. 
427 Astronomical units 
428 Reynolds, A. Revelation Space. New York: Ace/Orion/Victor Gollancz/Penguin, 2000, 345. 
429 OED, Resurgam. At the time of Reynold‘s writing, Pluto was still classified as a planet. The change in the status of Pluto is exemplary of 
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the description of the effects of scale on the presentation of the visual information is also based on 
veridical scientific information. Reynold‘s writing style has been criticised along similar lines to that of 
many scientist-authors, who are often associated with the derogatory sense of the phrase ‗science 
imitating art‘. However, from the perspective of fictional discourse, this passage is not only exemplary of 
informational complexity, but arguably exhibits an associated poesy and mastery of description which 
captures the awe and ontological largeness of its counterfactually portrayed cosmological subject matter 
with aesthetic adeptness. It continues: 
―The protective caul of the star‘s magnetic field did not extend this far out, and objects here 
were buffeted by the ceaseless squall of the galactic magnetosphere; the great wind in which the 
magnetic fields of all the stars were embedded, like tiny eddies within a vaster cyclone.430‖ 
Reynolds uses the explication of the veridical galactic magnetosphere as an opportunity for further 
aesthetically pleasing description. This aesthetic quality is strengthened by the cognitive aesthetic 
stemming from the text‘s capacity to simultaneously elegantly introduce and expound cosmological 
concepts. The discursive hybridisation of astronomical language, with its accompanying documentarian, 
scientific and analytic voices, and fictive description with its artistically inclined narratologically attuned 
voice, result in a special interlaced content wherein the exactitude of specificity of the descriptive prose 
merges elegantly with its aesthetic and narratological mandates. Such interlinear cognitive-aesthetic 
assemblies require more attention from the reader, but need not break the flow of reading since they can be 
‗background processed‘ at read-time. The introduction of the acronym AU has a high surprisal value, and 
there is a cognitive satisfaction for the uninitiated reader who can synthesise from the information and 
semantics of the passage to arrive at astronomical unit. The effect of the technological viewing apparatus on 
the counterfactual Kuiper belt results in distorted information: a ―curiously distorted shoal‖: an example 
of meta-informational writing.  
META-INFORMATIONAL SF WRITING 
Following Pynchon‘s V. and Delany‘s Babel 17, meta-informational writing proliferated in information age 
SF texts of the 1970s and 1980s. Lem‘s 1970 Solaris contains the meta-informational ontologically 
estranged character referred to as the ocean(s) – the origin of a mega-text codon reprised either 
intertextually or inadvertently by the Jugglers of Reynold‘s Revelation Space. Ursula K. Le Guin‘s 1974 The 
Dispossessed refers to a novum mega-text codon - the ansible - introduced in the author‘s earlier Roccanon‟s 
World (1966). The ansible is a device which can ―permit communication without any time interval 
between two points in space.431‖ Le Guin‘s devising of the ansible is perhaps one of the best existing 
examples of subjunctive informationist novum: 
―The device will not transmit messages of course; simultaneity is identity. But to our 
perceptions, that simultaneity will function as a transmission, a sending. So we will be able to 
use it to talk between worlds, without the long waiting for the message to go and the reply to 
return that electromagnetic impulses require.432‖ 
It is hardly necessary to expound upon the references to information and communications theory. It also 
invokes mega-text codons of quantum entanglement433 and alludes to the communicative deficits of time-
dependent information transmission methods including the written text. Philip K. Dick‘s 1976 semi-
autobiographical Radio Free Albemuth is replete with meta-informational writing. Eccentric record store 
employee Nicholas regularly receives telepathic communications from alien superbeing Valis, which leads 
                                                 
430 Reynolds, A. Revelation Space. New York: Ace/Orion/Victor Gollancz/Penguin, 2000, 345. 
431 Le Guin, Ursula K. The Dispossessed: A Novel. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1974. 
432 Ibid. 
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his friends to believe him insane until one communication turns out, to their surprise, to demonstrably 
contain very specific veridical information which saves his sick unborn child434.  
Estranged communication techniques and languages are ubiquitous meta-informational novum codons in 
informationist SF. The central novum of Delany‘s Babel 17 involves an alien language so complex that it 
confounds all attempts to understand it, giving unprecedented superiority to its hidden alien native 
speakers – The Invaders - who have enslaved humanity. Central character Ryda Wong is an informational 
savant and the only human who is able to perceive the strange signals of The Invaders, which her 
colleagues think to be an encrypted military code, as a natural language. The counterfactual language in 
question itself is very informationally dense, a clear inferential citation of Delany‘s own convictions about 
the language of science fiction texts themselves:   
―For now it‘s called Babel 17. From what little I know about it already, most of its words carry 
more information about the things that they refer to than any four of five languages put 
together, and in less space.‖ She gave a brief translation for Mollya. 
―Who Speak?‖Mollya asked… 
I don‘t know. But I wish I did. That‘s what the main reason for this trip is – to find out.435” 
This fictive passage provides a parallel statement of one of the central posits of this thesis: Babel 17, like 
informational SF texts, is informationally heterogeneous and dense. The closing reference to inquiry is 
significant – a meta-fictional and metainformational reference to science fiction itself, a mode of writing 
which engages the ideological and methodological commitments of science. The cognitive aesthetic is 
often thus recursively meta-informationally nested in such works. I think these cognitive and aesthetic 
qualities signify Babel 17‟s status as the first serious informationist science fiction novel of the twentieth 
century, and a strong candidate to mark the beginning of the informationist mode of science fiction.  The 
passage refers implicitly and recursively to Shannon‘s ‗surprisal‘ value for words, messages and texts: the 
logarithmic statistical entropy function introduced in chapter two. The principles alluded to apply to the 
text itself recursively. As a language, Babel-17 is highly estranged, but not impossible. Its native speakers – 
The Invaders – are themselves informationally estranged by it. 
THE INFORMATIONAL ONTOLOGICALLY ESTRANGED CHARACTER-NOVUM 
Characters constructed as ontologically very informational are prone to ample estrangement and often 
constitute sophisticated informationist novums. Vernor Vinge is adept at the construction of 
counterfactual character-novum with curious informational identities and mentalities. This avails him of a 
unique ways of synthesising texts which achieve the cognitive aesthetic in accordance with Lem‘s 
definition of the same as engaging with social and technological complexity through ―the art of putting 
hypothetical premises into the very complicated stream of socio-psychological occurrences. 436‖ A Fire 
Upon the Deep contains many such estranged character-novums, the most interesting example being the 
multipart, collectively-conscious dog-like Tines, a hybridisation of alternative ideas of psychological and 
physical identity with concepts from data-communications and supercomputing science, which 
simultaneously invokes metaphorical impressions of the Egyptian mythological dog-being Anubis. This 
invokes a de-supernaturalising reference to another familiar SF mega-text codon of Egyptian god myths 
as originating with visits from extraterrestrials.  
To achieve full personal identity, the Tines employ a form of group-think telepathy which functions like a 
noise-affected broadcast computer network. Counterfactually furthering the informational synthesis 
between fiction, the SF mega-text, and information science, the more individual members each Tine 
assimilates into their person, the smarter they potentially are: like a multi-processing computer wherein 
the addition of more CPU modules results in increased processing power. The overall character and 
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personality of a Tine ‗pack-person‘ are also dictated by the strengths and weaknesses of their individual 
members, and by the way in which they are physically organised, which affects the efficiency of thought 
signal transmission. Both principles are not only analogically similar to, but ontologically consistent with 
multi-processing computer systems theory and mathematical communications theory: 
Take a group of ordinary people and train them to string out, not in packs but as individual 
members. If each member stayed just a few yards from its nearest neighbours, they could 
maintain something like the mentality of a trio. The group as a whole was scarcely brighter – 
you can‘t have much in the way of deep thoughts when it takes seconds for an idea to percolate 
across your mind.437 
This novum-dense passage also makes allusions to contemporary mathematical network theory, and to the 
philosophy of mind. In another unmistakeable reference to foundational computer networking and data 
communications principles, a lot of signal noise affects the Tine‘s ability to think. Tine Lord Steel finds that 
the materials and shape of the visiting human‘s ship‘s cargo hold amplify his own thoughts to the point of 
barely endurable pain and confusion438: 
He stuck his head through the hatch-and jerked back abruptly. The acoustics were 
deadly...How could the aliens bear it?...Echoes screamed at him-worse than from unpadded 
quartz.439 
The noise versus information and signal-to-noise ratio themes are engaged throughout the novel. In the 
aftermath of battle with the adult custodians of the human spacecraft, packs that are wounded and have 
lost members exist as pairs and individuals. Their mental capacities reduce to sub-linguistic levels, and 
their thought signals become chaotic, confusing noise: 
A mob of frags and wounded is a terrifying, mind numbing thing. Singletons, duos, trios, a few 
quads...A few yards from the mob and Peregrine WickWrackRum could feel consciousness 
slipping from him. If he concentrated really hard, he could remember who he was and that he 
must get to the other side of the meadow without attracting attention. Other thoughts, loud 
and unguarded, pummelled him.440 
It is a central tenet of (mathematical) communication theory that noise results in the degradation and loss 
of information transmitted from a source. These estranged character-novums, enrich the narrative by 
virtue of encoded counterfactual pseudo-informational references to scientifically and mathematically 
verifiable veridical information sources. They also result in interesting meta-informational effects in the 
language of the text which can avail the author of the opportunity for (or even necessitate) linguistic 
experimentation. When the ontology of the characters and setting is constructed with such extreme 
counterfactual estrangement, English can come under significant grammatical and functional strain as an 
artefactual tool for encoding semantics. Realising that English has no normative sentential or grammatical 
conventions for dealing with multipart individual subjects with physically and mentally swappable identity 
components, and demonstrating innovation in typographic experimentation, Vinge employs a morphemic 
textual device to make the experience of the character more palpable and assimilable through a special 
grammatic-linguistic association. As the four-member Perigrine WickWrackRum approaches the centre of 
the chaos of the post-battle milieu, his name begins to split in the text just as his consciousness is splitting 
in the story because of the thought noise cacophony assailing him: 
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Wik and Kwk and Rac and Rum tried to remember just why they was here and where they 
was going. Concentrate on direct sensation; what is really here: the sooty smell of the 
flamer‘s liquid fire... 441 
In addition to the morphemic device employed here in the text, which has a high surprisal value, the 
format and ontology of the character leads Vinge to alter the normal use of pronouns in conjunction with 
verbs and adverbs, thereby highlighting the stress that counterfactual pseudo-information, cognitive 
estrangement and the novum can place on the mechanisms for linguistic and grammatical encoding of 
meaning in English. The text as an artefactual source with lexical configuration must bend to the semantic 
imperatives of encoded counterfactual pseudo-information which extrapolates from veridical 
information: the rules for configuration of the lexeme, grapheme and morpheme are driven by the 
configuration of the veridical or counterfactual pseudo-informational source. The above passage also 
offers a reference to the contrast between veridical and pseudo-information which can be addressed using 
the ontology of information: the character lays hold of the natural veridical information available to him 
empirically in order to overcome the noise and pseudo-information442 arising from the din of the 
wounded, thus favouring verifiably veridical information sources over other types of source443.  Emerging 
from the battle‘s aftermath, his consciousness stabilises and coalesces again, which event is meta-
informationally signified by the syllabic/morphemic contraction of his name in the actual text: 
An awfully long time passed. Minutes. Wic-Kwk-Rac-Rum looked ahead. He was almost out 
of it…He dragged himself to a patch of clean ground…Sanity slowly returned. 
Wickwrackrum looked up.444 
This grammatical fragmenting and contracting of the proper name in accordance with its referent – the 
being and ontological identity of the counterfactual character – also reflects the overall object centric 
ontological concerns of SF. In keeping with the application of Clarke‘s ‗third law‘ to character 
construction, there is an undeniable familiarity to be found here in relation to mythological and fantasy 
genres and their texts, but the counterfactual is extrapolated within the bounds of the materialist closed 
system universe. In narratives encoded in fantasy texts, underlings approaching wizards possessed of 
magical powers of mind control may experience similar confusion to Tine Peregrin Wickwrackrum, but 
only in a supernaturalistic open-system context. In Vinge‘s SF text, the causality of the confusion is 
analytically explained and established with metaphorical/analogical and direct counterfactually seated 
general references to veridical sources of scientific information which describe the actual signal noise 
dynamics of communications systems. Such analysis and explication would be pointless, aesthetically 
dysfunctional and probably confusing where a fictive phenomenon was supposedly magically or 
supernaturally implemented. 
Tines can live for hundreds of years by adopting and assimilating ‗pups‘ into their packs. This delivers 
naturalistic informational estrangement of identity, and the aesthetic of complexity. The identity of a Tine 
is a communication-theoretic novum built upon a philosophical logical thought experiment: an 
informational and biological ship of Theseus. The pups inherit the information - and the knowledge and 
identity which supervene upon it - of the pack person as a whole, thereby perpetuating the pack personality 
and knowledge – its information - beyond the lifespan of its individual members. The mortal thus attains 
potential immortality not via supernatural or magical intervention, nor through scientific prowess, but 
naturalistically - simply as a result of very unusual evolutionary outcomes, and informationally. Thus are 
engaged the discourses of the social, evolutionary and psychological sciences. Correspondingly, further 
cognitively stimulating fictional outcomes ensue, as commensurate with Lem‘s socio-technological matrix. 
The ominous Flenser is internally conflicted through a clever twist accorded by the character‘s estranged 
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ontology. Flenser is injured in a political uprising and some of his members are separated from him. He 
eugenically repopulates his pack with members from a follower named Tyrathect. Initially willing, 
Tyrathect not only comes to resent the imposition on her person, which requires some of her members to 
be slain, but is of an altogether different personality type to the long-lived tyrant Flenser, and secretly plots 
the downfall of the regime: 
She knew now, from the inside, the evil that she had given herself to...Lord Steel was a killer; 
worse, a manipulator. But since the landing, Tyrathect knew that he was something else: deathly 
afraid...Even though the folk he feared might ultimately kill them all, in her secret soul she 
wished them well...445 
Her strength comes from the ontological configuration of the Tines as compound information sources. 
The Tines provide a superb, although unintentional, meta-informational picture of the principles of 
internal-external information source combination and synthesis as modelled by the ontology of 
information: 
Two of Tyrathect were of Flenser. The Master had miscalculated in thinking they could 
dominate the other three. Instead the conscience of the three had come to own the brilliance of 
the two. She had remembered almost everything the great Flenser had known, all the 
tricks and the betrayals. The two had given her an intensity that she had never had before…446 
Tyrathect‘s internal information sources are augmented and altered by synthesis with the internal 
information sources of the Flenser members with whom she is eugenically merged, and the troubled Tine 
becomes enormously internally conflicted because of the contrasting intentional and ideological concepts 
and convictions that come with assimilating new members, their information and their knowledge. The 
amount of cognitively facilitated imagination required on the part of the reader in read-time processing of 
the science fictive text, and by the author in the construction and interpretation of such intrigue, is 
arguably significantly more than would be required for similar plot devices outworked in familiar human 
characters. Vinge must pay careful attention to the systematic and internally consistent construction of the 
Tines, with all of their estranged ontology or identity, so that the reader can both follow the narrative and 
benefit aesthetically from the inventiveness inherent in the resulting character-novum. The read-time 
cognitive aesthetic outcome is a satisfaction at the intricacy of the device itself, as well as the reader‘s own 
success in semantically decoding the requisite structure and symbols, and thus exploiting the underlying 
synthesis of counterfactual pseudo-information and scientific veridical information in the text. 
SCIENCE FICTION TEXTS AS ANTI-SIMULACRA 
Broderick cites cognitive scientist Howard Gardner as suggesting that SF has little or limited value for 
actual science education because it proliferates ideas rooted in unscientific ‗lay-dynamics‘ which are 
―superficial, not rooted in experience, and of little practical use.447‖ He deferentially suggests that 
―[p]erhaps the pleasure of SF provides from its simulacrum of canonical dynamics – so delightful, 
compared with the grey drone of rote learned data and algorithms – offsets the errors it supports448.‖ 
Indeed, Broderick goes on to suggest that semiologically and in terms of its investment in a scientifically 
inspired and intertextually referenced SF mega-text, there may be even more to SF than that449. The 
combination of heterogeneous information types and disparate discourses from differently motivated 
sources in science and the SF text does not necessarily simply result in a confusing or obfuscating 
conflation of fact and fiction. SF heavily engages with thought experiment and extrapolative cognitive 
estrangement across multiple external and internal information sources and discursive fields, and this 
necessitates the referential inclusion of veridical information.  
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Unlike SF theorists Lem and Suvin, Jean Baudrillard was not convinced of the cognitively liberating and 
expanding potential of SF. In Simulacra and Science Fiction, he classifies modern science fiction as belonging 
to the second order of simulacra, those ―productive, productivist‖ types of simulacra motivated by the desire 
for the advantages of technologically enabled production, which embraces a ―promethean aim of 
continuous globalisation and expansion.450‖ There is also a third order of simulacra defined thus:  
[S]imulacra of simulation, founded on information, the model, the cybernetic game – total 
operationality, hyperreality, aim of total control451 
These are the informational type of simulacra which Baudrillard believed that SF was becoming subsumed 
to and which was rendering it redundant as a referential mode of fiction writing: simulacra arising out of 
the information based simulation, rather than the product of simple imaginative dissimulation, or of the 
materialist productive base of second order simulacra452. In terms of information ontology, such fictions 
have become based on pure pseudo-information which mimics and supplants veridical information but which 
bears no cogent or determinable cause-effect relationship to veridical information sources.  
Baudrillard defined hyperrealism in his 1981 Simulacra and Simulation. Baudrillard‘s own notorious prolixity 
and obfuscating language notwithstanding, informationally speaking his theory is effectively about the re-
representation and obfuscation of veridical sources of information: the loss of veridical information due 
to information type conversion. Baudrillard regarded SF texts as simulacra and as speaking of simulacra, 
and SF as a whole a simulacrum453. Hyperreality and simulacra arise when the abstractions and allegories 
begin to supplant the reality and meaning of those things and states of affairs they are intended to 
represent or simulate: 
Today abstraction is no longer that of the map…Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a 
referential being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is 
nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – precession of simulacra – that engenders the 
territory...454 
The term map here refers to the illustrative allegory of the map and territory in Borges‘ fable455 wherein 
cartographers of a fictive empire construct a map that has the same extent as their actual empire456. A map 
is an abstraction of something real which is intended to encode and convey, with information loss, 
information about something real – about something embodying far more information, and usually 
different types of information, than does the artefactual information of the map itself. If a real 
cartographic map is regarded as an information source, then it is veridical to the extent that it accurately 
depicts the real territory of which it is an abstract representation, and is thus a source in its own right on 
the same terms as I have stipulated for a text. It is an artefactual information source which exhibits the 
information loss associated with information type conversion and synthesis. Information loss and pseudo-
information hides the absence of veridical information: simulacra suppress the knowledge of the absence of 
any underlying reality. On Baudrillard‘s theory, the map simulacra become more robust than the reality 
which they have supplanted. It is reality that decays and ―[i]t is the real, and not the map, whose vestiges 
persist here and there in the deserts. 457‖ 
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For Baudrillard, SF is rendered impotent by the dimunition and vanishing of the discernible distance between 
the real and the imaginary458 459.  The collapsing of the distance between the imaginary and the real in SF, and 
the ―implosion of meaning‖ thus achieved, is ―where simulation begins.460‖ In utopian fiction ―dissociation 
from the real world is maximised.461‖ Thus counterfactual pseudo-information is maximally leveraged for the 
purpose of indirect reference to the real world through anticipation and critical projection. For 
Baudrillard, third order simulacrum SF cannot achieve this critical projection because of the collapsing of 
the imaginary with the real – the conflation of the real and the illusory. Simulations and models of the real 
(other than SF) are ―themselves an anticipation of the real‖ and thus their counterfactual re-
representation is pointless: they ―leave no room for any sort of imaginary transcendence.462‖ SF texts 
become recursive simulacra; recursively non-referential simulations of simulations which are effectively 
pure pseudo-information463. However, I think the view that SF is a thoroughgoing simulacrum is based 
on a limiting and ultimately flawed generalisation. Some SF of the postmodern era is co-opted to both the 
third and second order of simulacra. However, not all information age SF is like this, and much 
informationist SF, such as Philip K. Dick‘s The Simulacra and Gibson‘s Bridge Trilogy (Virtual Light, Idoru, 
All Tomorrow‟s Parties), is clearly metafictional and metainformational with regard to informational simulation 
and even (in the case of The Trilogy) Baudrillard‘s hyperreal simulacra464.  
The themes of information and simulation addressed in the narrative encoded upon these texts reflexively 
represent the informational structure and dynamics of the SF texts themselves, and their intertextual 
relationship to the SF mega-text. I posit that it is an inversion of the simulacrum that occurs with the meta-
informational narrative resources of possible worlds presented by much information age science fiction, 
and especially sub-modes like cyberpunk and informationist SF that engages communication theory and 
information science. I think this kind of information age SF, and especially informationist SF, operate 
cognitively as anti-simulacra. Such SF fictively depict simulacra and simulations as corrosive to the 
representation of reality and the reliable hi-fidelity conveyance or transmission of veridical information. 
Information age SF texts of this type openly engage the themes of information inundation and the 
psychological and cultural effects of immersive, delusive simulation: the counterfactual extrapolation of 
the known experience of the overload and wash of hyperreal pseudo-information. In an anti-simulacral text, 
the real is ‗referenced‘ via fictive speculation about counterfactual worlds, which are then set at a certain 
discursive and factual ‗distance465‘ from the real world, so the real is twice removed from the impression, 
model or simulation of it, but the objective is thus to highlight the deficiencies or problems of the real, 
thereby foregrounding it rather than obscuring it.  
For Baudrillard, technologically and scientifically facilitated space exploration leaves no room for the 
imaginary narratives of expansion of classic SF, because with it extra-terrestrial space has consequently 
become normalised to the quotidian and pedestrian levels of terrestrial human existence, and the 
hyperreal has thus expanded into the entire universe – the expansive domain of the SF imaginary466. Thus 
is brought about ―the end of metaphysics, the end of the phantasm, the end of science fiction,‖ and 
concomitantly ―the era of hyperreality begins.467‖ However, this assumption of universal hyperreality 
embraces some fallacies. Baudrillard starts with a flawed model of SF, one which excludes or minimises 
the cognitive aesthetic and cognitive estrangement. His apriori view of SF proper seems largely to 
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equivocate on fantasy: to wholly conflate SF with the thoroughgoing fantastical, open-system and 
mythologising text. Furthermore, Baudrillard employs a convoluted metaphoric illustration which uses the 
popular big bang model of the universe as a basis for the contrast between classic SF and later modes468. 
He analogises the expansion of generic systems – presumably including human systems - in history to the 
theoretical posits of the big bang-big crunch theory of the universe and the collapse of spent stars, 
wherein ―[w]hen a system reaches its own limits and becomes saturated, a reversal is produced.469‖ To 
pose a countering analogy: although the big bang theory is favoured, there are other models which cannot 
yet be ruled out – some of which do not involve expansion. Similarly, theories about SF are contentious 
and debateable. The boundaries of the counterfactual are less simply inscribable than the perceived 
boundaries putatively breached by the ‗conquest‘ of space. Counterfactual estrangement in SF relies in 
large part on the expanding capabilities of science and technology themselves. It is simply not clear, when 
one considers the counterfactual, that there is no more ―virgin territory,‖ nor that any artefactual map or 
fiction could cover the entire territory of the explored or unexplored cosmos. Baudrillard misses the true 
significance of the scientific enterprise, and thus misses the significance of discursive engagement with 
said enterprise.  He posits that: 
Perhaps science fiction from the cybernetic and hyperreal era can only exhaust itself, in its 
artificial resurrection of ―historical‖ worlds...in which fiction will never again be a mirror held 
toward the future, but a desperate rehallucination of the past.470 
That the language of this is subjunctive makes it a clever piece of dialogic Devil‘s advocacy: Baudrillard 
has it that SF and science have become seamlessly integrated as part of the same homogeneous 
simulacrum, and that ―science fiction is no longer anywhere, and it is everywhere, in the circulation of 
models, here and now, and in the very principle surrounding simulation.471‖ 
Baudrillard‘s position on SF is hardly surprising, since he believed that science itself had become 
subsumed, like the media,  to controlling social simulacra, and the subjects and objects of science to ―have 
become referential simulacra, and science itself has become pure simulation.472‖ Science seconded or co-
opted to political or ideological ends may result in a hyperreal, but true science, with its principles of 
mathematical rigour and evidentiary empiricism, is prone rather to provide cognitive tools to subvert pure 
pseudo-information: it is an anti-simulacrum. Although Baudrillard does not directly engage with 
information theory, the information available to and acquired by people as a basis for knowledge is a 
central concern of his theory. The delusiveness of simulacra is ultimately detrimental to the individual. 
The Bridge Trilogy is illustrative of just these very ideas and thus promotes Lem‘s cognitive aesthetic. 
This cultural-philosophical and psychological outlook on informational simulation and simulacra is 
important in much informationist SF.  
Gibson‘s texts subvert, challenge, and invert the simulacrum. At the end of the trilogy the avaricious and 
vicious Harwood achieves a kind of digital transcendence: 
―-Your friends aren‘t the only ones who learned how to secede…Harwood is going now, 
inverting himself into an informational wormhole…473‖ 
 
Harwood ‗secedes‘ by choice, but Laney must do so to survive the final effects of an illness: 
                                                 
468 The big bang theory holds sway because data from cosmic background radiation is seen to support it, but even today, other models are not 
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 And Laney is going too, though not with Harwood...And finds himself in Florida sunlight, 
upon the broad concrete steps leading up to the bland entrance to a federal orphanage...474 
Rationalist naturalistic metaphor here implicates as tenor the supernaturalistic resurrection and 
transcendence themes of various myth narratives implied at read-time for the reader familiar with them: 
transcendence is achieved naturally and technologically, that is, informationally. The simulacrum of 
mythologisation is subverted in the encoded semantics of the narrative by realism and materialism - via 
informationism. The passage is also meta-informational. The informational wormhole is a reference to information 
type conversion and to what is referred to as a sink or destination in electronic communication theory. It is 
more than metaphor: it is a cognitive component of the novum. Harwood and Laney actually undergo a 
physical metamorphosis from the material to the digital, from electrical matter to electricity, from material 
veridical information to artefactual veridical information475. They effectively convert themselves into a 
signal and transmit themselves to the sink that is the wormhole. Harwood and Laney are encoded into the 
narrative which supervenes on the selected message that is the SF text, the information from which 
message – behaving also as an information source – the reader synthesises with their internal concept 
sources whilst processing it. The supervenience of the narrative and characters on artefactual information 
- as informationally encoded upon and semantically encoded within the message of the text - mirrors the 
encoding of Laney and Hardwood in the artefactual substrate of DatAmerica. DatAmerica itself is a 
counterfactual fictive informational analogue to the text, as are the Jugglers of Reynold‘s Revelation Space, 
but DataAmerica is pointedly artefactual and so the metainformational implication of the text is perhaps 
even stronger. A reader of Gibson‘s text is now challenged with the same metaphysical uncertainty which 
afflicts Laney: faced with the spectre of the hyperreal. With fantasy, there would be no need for the reader 
to wonder about metaphysical nuances, to engage the ideation of causality and mechanism. With 
Gibson‘s text, as culturally orientated and scientifically approximate as it is, such futurological 
counterfactual and naturalistically inclined cognition is intrinsic to the reading experience. Harwood and 
Laney are a tokening of an informationist SF mega-text novum that an SF author might refer to with the 
neologism infomorph. 
THE INFOMORPH AND INFORMATIONAL GHOSTS 
Informationist SF frequently exhibits two aesthetically-charged character-novums or icons which I refer 
to as the infomorph and the natural informational ghost respectively. The informorph is an ontologically 
estranged character who metamorphoses from informational to material existence or vice versa. Arthur C. 
Clarke‘s 1973 Rendezvous with Rama contains an early example of information-to-matter metamorphosis as 
just one of a number of examples of meta-informational writing: 
―If we accept Dr Pererra‘s very plausible theory, which certainly fits all the facts, the creatures 
who have been observed inside Rama did not exist until a short time ago. Their patterns, or 
templates, were stored in some central information bank, and when the time was ripe they were 
manufactured from organic raw materials-presumably the organometallic soup of the cylindrical 
sea.476‖ 
This information-to-matter metamorphosis in character construction is a repeated codon in the 
informationist SF mega-text. In discussing Gibson‘s Neuromancer trilogy, Cordle identifies the intrigue of 
the AI character Wintermute as being associated with its ascension from an artificial intelligence limited in 
power by programmatically imposed laws, to a true super-sentient being with virtually unlimited capacities 
for knowledge and thought477. In Gibson‘s later Bridge Trilogy, the next step in the fictive evolution of 
the sentience coveting Wintermute is represented by the artificial intelligence named Rei Toei or The Idoru. 
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Rei Toei is introduced in Idoru as an AI singing idol, a digital simulacrum of a generic non-person: a  
hyperreal entity embodied as real in fiction478. She (it) is an artificial pseudo-person supervening on software. 
The technological and metaphysical significations of these two character-novum intersect: each yearns for 
an ontological transformation to a different form of existence, and both must effect their own 
transformation by leveraging their processing power – their artificial intellects – to overcome the material 
obstacles placed before them by human design and inadequacy in human design.  The infomorph is 
frequently, but not always, an AI. 
In All Tomorrow‟s Parties, protagonist Laney had his mind altered in childhood as the subject of clinical 
trials of an experimental drug479: 
The American‘s peculiar talents with data are a result of experimental trials, in a Federal 
orphanage in Florida, of a substance known as 5-SB. Laney has seen what Laney can do with 
data, and what data can do to Laney480. 
His material existence dwindles as his physical body becomes weaker due to the degenerative syndrome 5-
SB causes as a side effect. He himself becomes unsure as to his own ontology because of resulting 
memory loss, and there is persistent ambiguity throughout All Tomorrow‟s Parties as to whether he started 
as a real physical person, or as artefactual information: 
Something has happened to him…He has started to see that he previously had, in some 
unthinkably literal way, no self…what was there, he wonders, before? Sub routines: mal-
adaptive software behaviours desperately conspiring to approximate a presence that would be, 
and never quite be, Laney.481 
This ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding Laney‘s being makes him unsure of his own informational 
truth status: whether he is real – embodying mostly veridical information – or something else. 
Information loss and synthesis have resulted in greater uncertainty. In this recursive metafictional and meta-
informational sense, Laney is thus a character-novum embodying copious cognitive estrangement, through 
whom the text delivers the cognitive aesthetic and the aesthetic of informational complexity. Laney 
follows a trajectory from material existence to the informational, his persona ultimately absorbed into the 
informational milieu of the virtual world of DatAmerica. Simultaneously, Rei Toei follows an opposite 
ontological trajectory. Non-conformist security man and action anti-hero of the first two novels, Berry 
Rydell, and his offsider Sublett – a chronically allergic escapee from Reverend Lowell‘s puritanical sect of 
television obsessed god-seekers - first encounter Rei Toei as a mischievously projected anonymous 
hologram on a roadway482. Rydell and Sublett are ignorant of the technology behind the image, prompting 
nonsensical superstitious perorations from the supernaturalist Sublett and perplexed infatuation on the 
part of the rationalist Rydell: 
One full moon night Rydell had slung gunhead around a curve and frozen a naked woman in 
the headlights...long enough for Rydell to think ... she might‘ve been Japanese, which struck 
him right then as the weirdest thing about any of it. Then she saw him…and smiled. Then she 
was gone. Sublett had seen her, but it only kicked him into some motormouthed ecstasy of 
religious dread...483 
In a meta-informational symbolic emphasis of the surprisal value bound up with the Idoru novum, the 
‗woman‘ is not only naked and Japanese, but ―hadn‘t it looked like the shadowed darkness of her bush 
had been shaved into something like an exclamation point484.‖ The surprisal value associated with this 
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novum is meta-fictionally signified in sexual and racial context. The estrangement of the Idoru‘s identity 
and ontology is achieved meta-informationally.  
Rei Toei itself learns through the acquisition of true information: veridical information. As Laney realises 
when he is parsing its nodal points, both he, the Idoru‘s human partner Rez, and the rest of humanity are 
veridical sources from which Rei Toei synthesises knowledge from new information: 
The Idoru‘s data began somewhere after that, and it began as something smoothly formed, 
deliberate, lacking complexity. But at the points where it had swerved closest to Rez‘s data, he 
saw that it had begun to acquire a sort of complexity. Or randomness, he thought. The human 
thing. That‘s how she learns.485 
Meta-fictional references to informational complexity abound. Not content with one human from whom 
to learn, Rei Toei seeks to experience as many human sources as possible, and interacts with many of the 
characters in the book to this end: Berry Rydell, Fontaine the watch-man and Fontaine‘s autistic charge, 
the encyclopaedic savant Silencio. As she begins to discern Rez‘ shallowness, the idoru turns to Laney: 
[A]s her growing complexity continued to widen the distance she already knew she felt towards 
Rez, she had come to [Laney] and asked him to interpret the data as it flowed around herself 
and Rez.486 
Again, the text engages here meta-fictionally and meta-informationally with its own complexity.  
At the end of the novel, Laney‘s physical body dies from the syndrome to which all of the other 
inhabitants of the orphanage who were exposed to 5-SB have succumbed, while Rei Toei becomes a 
physically embodied individual through newly devised matter-copying technology. The Lucky Dragon 
Nanofax is installed throughout the real world in the chain stores of the Lucky Dragon franchise for the 
purpose of enabling customers to have exact duplicates of purchased items instantaneously manufactured 
for recipients at remote stores. Technology and science are co-opted by the simulated informational 
person of Rei Toei to allow her to become multiply instantiated as multiple real living organisms. In a deft 
stylistic manoeuvre, Gibson enlists the character of streetwise street-kid Boomzilla for the hybrid first-
person free-indirect discursive narrative coverage of Rei Toei‘s emergence from the Nanofax as a sentient 
physical organism. Discursive synthesis and complexity are elevated at this nodal point in the SF text: 
Light over the hatch turns green, and the hatch slides up and out crawls…this butt naked girl, 
black hair, maybe Chinese…she‘s smiling, and everybody…they jaw hang, eyes popped…But 
the crazy thing is, and he really doesn‘t get this, standing looking out through the vast doors at 
the video pylon...he sees her on every last screen, walking out of every Lucky Dragon in the 
world... 487 
Character-novum Rei Toei‘s transformation has a high surprisal value as a counterfactual estranged 
outcome. Concomitantly, the linguistic phrase which describes it is high information: individuals don‘t walk 
out of multiple disparate locations simultaneously, and the selection of a sentence upon which such 
meaning supervenes is thus statistically unlikely.  
Laney and Rei Toei are examples of both the infomorph and the informational ghost. The significant 
metafictional, intertextual and thematic reference to Baudrillard‘s theory within many information age SF 
texts and narratives serves to increase the presence of cognitively engaging philosophical discourse 
through discursive hybridisation and synthesis. In his Philip K Dick: Exhilaration and Terror in the Postmodern, 
Christopher Palmer – again confirming Lem‘s thesis of SF for social complexity - describes Dick‘s writing 
as an engagement with ―popular culture‘s staging of the claims of the group against those of the 
individual,‖ and as explorative of the balance of the human and the social in the context of postmodern 
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consumerism488. Palmer views as extreme Baudrillard‘s thesis that the subject is subsumed to the object 
through the consumption of commodities, but acknowledges its semblance in Dick‘s preoccupation with 
the uneasy balance in the relationship between individual and a control-orientated consumer society489. 
Broderick recognises, as a further marker of SF, the shift in narrative focus from subject to object in 
conjunction with the foregrounding of cosmological, natural, scientific and technological novum490. This 
fits with Baudrillard‘s view of the effect that hyper-commoditisation and social simulacra have on the 
individual subject. In informationist SF, something interesting happens in the subject-object balance: 
post-human informational characters – infomorphs and AIs – are or become part of the novum. Being more 
cognitively sophisticated than the cyborg, and not nearly so mechanical as the robotic android of the 
classic SF mega-text, infomorphs and other character-novums with complex informational ontologies 
embody the fluidity and complexity of information. The object and subject informationally merge in the 
narrative. Infomorph character-novums are informational subject-object hybrids. For Baudrillard the 
hyperreal and the simulacrum are the adopted tools of ruling power for the implementation of models for 
social control, wherein the individual is culturally and psychologically subjected and subsumed to the 
simulacra, circumventing their agency, self-realisation, and ability to resist: 
Such is the watershed of hyperreal sociality, in which the real is confused with the model...Such 
is the last stage of the social relation, ours, which is no longer one of persuasion…but one of 
deterrence. ―YOU are information, you are the social, you are the event, you are involved, you 
have the word…it becomes impossible to locate one instance of the model...491 
The deterrence of the real is the blocking of veridical information. From the perspective of an externalist 
informational epistemology, this translates to a concern about the amount of veridical information 
associated with the knowledge of the individual perceiving agent. Gibson‘s Laney as subject in the narrative 
becomes less substantive by virtue of the imposition of the informational novum on the narrative space, 
but simultaneously grows in complexity as part of a novum object. Laney‘s convergence on a total 
informational identity has the overall effect of diminishing him as human subject. The hypercommodity 
that is Rei Toei presents a further estranging challenge to normative subject-centricity in the text. The 
identities of Laney and Rei Toei are hybridisations of the data and the physical: of artefactual and natural 
veridical information. Laney‘s informational metamorphosis, together with the growing reality hole in his 
identity, make him a kind of informational ghost. Because of his informational lightness of being, his internal 
voice becomes doubly ghostly: 
Laney is in drift...It is a matter, he knows, of letting go. He admits the random. The danger of 
admitting the random is that the random may admit the hole. The hole is that which Laney‘s 
being is constructed around...The hole is that into which he has always stuffed things: drugs, 
career, women, information.  
Mainly - lately – information.  
Information. This flow. This ... corrosion. 
Drift.492 
Laney stares into the abyss, and the abyss doesn‘t just stare back, but it threatens to merge with him such 
that the hole overtakes him due to the syndrome and he converges on an informational reality. He is 
threatened with becoming the hole of the real: a hole where his person once was. His self-realisation as 
intimately entwined with artefactual information results in the potential vacuity of the real in his person: 
hyperreality in the form of third order informational simulacra. As a character, Laney serves to make the 
text anti-simulacral.  Laney is in this sense hyperreality personified; hence perhaps a hyperreality pervades 
his internal voice. His identity is eroded by the loss of veridical information through the conversion of 
natural veridical information (his physical being) to artefactually supervening veridical information (data and 
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software.) There remains the ambiguity of Laney‘s origin: he may have been an informational ghost to 
being with. Thus are engaged the themes of personal identity at root: the question of how human identity 
supervenes on the information in genetic codes combined with the digitalised information stored as 
electrical impulses in the brain. What seems like metaphysical dualism is suggested by the infomorphs in the 
Bridge trilogy, but as with most informationist SF, there is always a material substrate required for the 
sustenance of information in either organismic form or in artefactual computing systems: ultimately 
informationism is physicalist. In fact, the mechanism of a self-aware informational being as realised by 
computer systems suggests that the actualisation of organismic sentience is similarly achieved: an 
engagement with the philosophical conception of thought and consciousness as multiply-realisable. The 
informational metaphorphosis that is deleterious to Laney as natural veridical information, but which 
promotes him into artefactual information, has the effect of implicating the text itself, the counterfactual 
pseudo-information source upon which the entire narrative supervenes. Furthering the physicalist theme, 
Rei Toei the artificial persona begins as an informational ghost supervening on enormously powerful computer 
hardware. As he struggles to come to terms with the idoru, Berry Rydell puzzles about her pseudo-ghostly 
ontology and prospective apperception: 
What, he wondered, did the projector slung over his shoulder mean to her?…did the programs 
that generated her somehow provide some greater illusion of being there? But if you weren‘t 
real in the first place, what did you have to compare not being there too.493 
Rei Toei is determined to assert her own realness and when questioned by Rydell asserts that ―this is a 
hologram, ... but I am real494.‖ Information sources on Shannon‘s theory are any stochastic processes, and 
thus deterrence (hindering, arresting, checking) of every real process - ―deterring every real process by its 
operational double495‖ - involves the loss of information from veridical sources. Rei Toei supervenes on 
computer processes, but becomes otherwise real. In All Tomorrow‟s Parties, Laney is the quintessential 
process philosopher. For him ―everything is process...but the process is all a lot stranger than he ever 
bargained for...496‖ Laney is rendered more wraithlike by both his own estranging hyperreal informational 
status, but simultaneously becomes especially empowered by it – freed from material constraints. 
THE INFORMATIONAL NATURAL GOD AND ‗GODSHATTER‘ 
Another icon of informationist SF is embodied in an extension of the informational natural ghost codon 
which I will refer to as the informational natural god. Its distinguishing feature, aside from informational 
ontology, is an intrinsic reference to specifically informational epistemology. Metaphorical godhood or 
godlikeness is attained through extreme superiority via informational metamorphoses, usually achieved 
through corresponding technological and transhumanist or trans-sapient manifestations thereof. The 
Invaders of Delany‘s Babel 17 are empowered by the super-language Babel 17 which renders them almost 
god-like to their adversaries. In Banks‘ The Algebraist, the Dwellers are conventional in terms of being 
accessible to the other races, but hide the extreme otherness of which they are suspected of burying 
evidence of the existence of their super-advanced technologies deep within the magnitudinally 
intimidating temporally transcendent information archives of which they are masters. The Jugglers of 
Reynolds‘ Revelation Space are almost informationally empowered enough to be representative of this 
motif, but it is the ancient genocidal infomorphs the Shrouders who are archetypally representative of the 
codon497. One stereotypical meta-informational facet of such characters is their communicative and 
creative abilities. They communicate telepathically and multi-vocally, and control the dissemination of 
information. They create objects, and change matter to and from information, and control outcomes for 
lesser sentient beings with information. These are all metaphors for an author‘s informationally 
                                                 
493 Gibson, W. All Tomorrow‟s Parties. Victoria: Viking/Penguin, 1999, 247. 
494 Ibid., 153. 
495 Baudrillard, J. ―The Precession of Simulacra.‖ Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1994 (orig. 1981), 2. 
496 Gibson, W. All Tomorrow‟s Parties. Victoria: Viking/Penguin, 1999, 13. 
497 Reynolds, A. Revelation Space. New York: Ace/Orion/Victor Gollancz/Penguin, 2000, 511-12. 
CHAPTER 4-INFORMATIONIST SCIENCE FICTION AESTHETICS AND MOTIFS 
 
107 
 
supervening creative power at write-time synthesis, and a reader‘s cognitive engagement at read-time 
synthesis. 
The informational god codon is exemplified in the context of the counterfactually estranged mise en scène 
of Vinge‘s A Fire Upon the Deep, wherein the galaxy is partitioned into zones such that the speed of 
information processing and thought varies depending on one‘s location relative to the core of the galactic 
disk. Primitive sentients inhabit the slow zone in the matter dense region near the galactic disk, the 
intellectually and technologically superior Beyonders inhabit the more outward regions of The Beyond and 
High Beyond, and the god-like Transcended Powers have managed to move out and inhabit the far reaches of 
the galactic halo, The High Transcend. The Powers have long since accelerated their evolutionary process by 
leveraging science and technology to accelerate their development to the point where their thought is 
superluminal and they are regarded as god-like by lesser species498. Subsequent to becoming emotionally 
and sexually involved with archetypal space adventurer Pham Nuwen – whom Vinge, his metafictional 
tongue in his cheek, has the narrator recognise as such499 – human protagonist Ravna Bergsndot discovers 
that her human lover is not a natural human at all, but constructed from ancient human physical and 
mental debris by the transcended being Old One500. Pham‘s personality is the product of informational 
source synthesis: he‘s a meta-informational character-novum. Using Relay, Old One communicates with 
Ravna, her AI supervisor Grondr, and The Vrinimi Org501, the information and bandwidth trading super-
company for which Ravna works as a consultant human information specialist. Relay is a hub node of the 
vast galactic high-bandwidth data network referred to by the protagonists as The Known Net502. Subsequent 
to her discovery of Pham‘s informationally and ontologically estranged identity, Ravna uses a device 
provided by Grondr which tells her when Old One is using Pham as a close-controlled bidirectional 
conduit for surveillance and influence, which interactions alter Pham‘s personality: 
―You have a pipeline to god Mister, but let me tell you a little secret: I can tell whether it‘s open 
or closed... 
…―Oh? How is that?‖ 
―Pham Nuwen–left on his own-is a bright, egotistical guy, and about as subtle as a kick in the 
head…but I‘ve got a little help from my boss. He‘s cleared me to monitor transceiver 
usage.‖…―Right now, your Old One is getting less than 10 kilobits per second from all of 
Relay...which means…you are not being tele-operated.503‖ 
Ravna refers to Old One as ‗god‘ in accordance with the character-novum adaptation of Clarke‘s law: any 
being technologically advanced enough will appear as a god. This interaction between a human character 
and another human character with a high bandwidth internal link to a transcendent – but not supernatural 
– being continues the theme of explication and analytic engagement with the details of ontological 
mechanism underlying the action, which would not generally be cogent in a magical or supernaturalist 
fictional scenario. When Pham Nuwen changes his facial expression, Ravna suspects ‗close-control‘: 
The lazy smile faded from his face. She checked her dataset. No, Pham Nuwen was not 
possessed.504 
Again, supernaturalistic terminology is used to invoke Clarke‘s third law aphorism in relation to the 
character Old One and his technologically facilitated capabilities, resulting in an almost meta-fictional 
                                                 
498 At faster than light speed. FTL travel and the kind of technology that might facilitate it are a favourite trope in space opera, and involve 
significant counterfactual license, since Einstein‘s Theory of General Relativity prohibits FTL travel (except perhaps over the event horizon 
of a black hole.) 
499 Vinge, V. A Fire Upon the Deep. New York: Tor, 1992, 259. 
500 Ibid, 99-100. 
501 Ibid., 63.  
502 Hub node is a scientific neologism used in mathematical network theory and in data communications science. 
503 Vinge, V. A Fire Upon the Deep. New York: Tor, 1992, 174. 
504 Ibid., 175. (emphasis mine.) 
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reference to the parity and disparity between SF and fantasy writing, and their associated discourses. The 
cognitive aesthetic of SF is thus attained through discursive engagement with information science across 
different scientific disciplines. At no point do the characters of Vinge‘s A Fire Upon the Deep or Banks‘ The 
Algebraist embody the supernatural. All the informational god characters myriad abilities are associated 
with massive computational prowess and a total mastery of the material universe to the extent that they 
have virtually unlimited power over their existence. Mythological and fantasy literature is rarely interested 
with the how of a supernaturalism – magic just happens and it is its role in the narrative that is important. 
As with most religious writ, it is not the how or what of a thing that is of interest – only the who, and how 
much power and authority they have. There is no sense of mechanism. In A Fire Upon The Deep and 
Revelation Space, the characters are empowered by their mastery of technology and thereby the material 
universe. Such abilities are facilitated by scientific investigation and advancement, even if the science is 
counterfactually extrapolated in the extreme. One of the drawbacks of Pham‘s informational ontology 
and identity is that he is exposed to what Vinge terms godshatter: the propensity for massive information 
injections from Old One to cause him mental and physical damage505. Herein is a meta-informational and 
metaphorical reference to the deleterious effects of information overload and the hyperreal. 
HYPERREAL PSEUDO-INFORMATION AND THE SIMULATED UNIVERSE SETTING 
Jean Baudrillard‘s thesis of science as a simulacrum is partly motivated by the co-option of technology for 
the implementation of social control systems. On the hyperreality thesis, the former not only facilitates 
the latter, but technology is also itself an analogical model of the mechanism of the social – the socialising 
apparatus of state and power, and the engineering of the social. Social control systems both analogise and 
are augmented by computer control systems: 
Now it is the same model of programmatic infallibility, of maximum security and deterrence 
that today controls the spread of the social…the meticulous operation of technology serves as a 
model for the meticulous operation of the social.506 
In Banks‘ The Algebraist, the chief protagonist Fassin, and the novel‘s maleficent Luseferous, both muse 
on the prevailing religious viewpoint referred to as The Truth: centring on the belief that life and the 
universe are simply an enormous simulation being run by hyper-intelligent sentient gamesters: 
The Truth…It arose from the belief that what appeared to be real life must in fact-according to 
some piously invoked statistical certitudes - be a simulation being run within some prodigious 
computational substrate in a greater and more encompassing reality beyond.507 
Estranging engagement with N Katherine Hayles‘ computational regimen through this ontologically 
sophisticated meta-informational codon of comprehensive simulation is a common informationist SF 
mega-text codon. In Douglas Adams‘ Informationist SF parody The Hitch Hiker‟s Guide to the Galaxy, 
humanity and the planet Earth itself are a hyperreal material simulation, a gigantic teleological computer 
system designed and built by supercomputer AI Deep Thought, who explains to its pan-dimensional super-
being commissioners that Earth will be a ―computer of such infinite and subtle complexity that organic 
life itself shall form part of its operational matrix508‖. All of Earth‘s inhabitants are cast as informational 
‗punks‘ who are really just part of this program, and the commissioners of the project see them and the 
physical brain of the hapless protagonist Arthur Dent – which they attempt to excise from him for 
information gathering purposes - as simply elements of a giant material computer simulation: as 
informational commodities. In The Hitch-Hiker‟s Guide to the Galaxy even dolphins have access to more 
veridical information than humanity, being as they are aware of the fact that Earth is a computer 
                                                 
505 Ibid., 416, 417, 418, 422, 424, 436, 495. This codon is probably originally due to Gibson‘s Neuromancer and Johnny Mnemonic. In the latter, 
character Johnny Mnemonic uses his brain to smuggle massive amounts of uploaded data, which practice is potentially deadly. 
506 Baudrillard, J. ―The Precession of Simulacra.‖ Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1994 (orig. 1981), 34. 
507 Banks, Iain M. The Algebraist. London: Orbit Time Warner, 2004, 247. 
508 Adams, D. Six Stories By Douglas Adams: The Ultimate Hitchhiker‘s Guide. New York: Wing Books/Random House,, 1996, 122. 
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simulation, and so humanity is doubly ‗punked‘. Human beings are informational punks, but so are all of 
the other races in the galaxy. The narrow-minded bureaucratic Vogons and the fickle Galactic president 
Zaphod Beeblebrox are all lost in a hyperreal galactic simulacrum-society wherein no-one, even the 
philosopher-like planet-designing technician Slartibartfast and his pan-dimensional employers, have any 
idea what is really going on. Indeed, the platform for the absurdist comic denoument of the series is the 
super-beings‘ discovery that they must first determine the correct question of life, the universe and 
everything before they can find the answer. Slartibartfast is pessimistic in his existential angst: 
―The chance of finding out what is really going on in the universe is so absurdly remote that 
the best thing to do is hang the sense of it and keep yourself occupied.509‖ 
For Baudrillard, dissimulating is pretending that something is other than it is, whilst remaining cognisant 
of the real referent510 However, the third order of simulacra, of which Baudrillard thought emerging SF was an 
example, arise from simulations which have supplanted the real referent and occluded it, or hidden the fact of 
its absence, thus effecting hyperreality511. We will extend the information typology for counterfactuals and 
fictions to include Baudrillard‘s hyperreality, adding hyperreal artefactual pseudo-information. Hyperreal 
pseudo-information sources are artefactual pseudo-information sources which have been synthesised with 
the intention of obscuring or normalising information from veridical sources.  
Such settings provide scope for cognitive character-novum development. 5-SB makes The Bridge 
Trilogy‘s Laney an informational super-human, a living data-search engine512 513. He can parse and filter 
vast amounts of data in the novel‘s instantiation of the hyperreal simulated universe codon, named 
DatAmerica.  The narrative of The Bridge Trilogy simultaneously instantiates the SF codon of Clarke‘s 
third law, because Laney‘s capabilities are so mysterious as to give the character a seemingly preternatural 
superhero quality. However, the narrative also stipulates that these abilities are rationally accessible and 
naturalistically grounded, and that there is no magic or preternatural causality at work: 
But Laney isn‘t psychic in any non-rational sense; rather he is able, through the organic changes 
wrought long ago by 5-SB, this drug, to somehow perceive changes emerging from vast flows 
of data.514 
This character-novum also meta-fictionally implicates Baudrillard‘s conception of science and technology 
as productive of simulacra, since ―determination itself is aleatory in a non-linear world where it is 
impossible to chart causal mechanisms in a situation in which individuals are confronted with an 
overwhelming flux of images, codes, and models, any of which may shape an individual's thought or 
behavior.515‖ Laney is an informationally estranged denizen of the informational simulated universe that is 
DatAmerica. 
SCIENCE FICTION NODAL POINTS 
Laney‘s occupation involves mining for, interpreting and synthesising the information from nodal points in 
the data flow of DatAmerica, points of informational change and causality. They are a simultaneous 
intertextual reference to Riffatarre‘s literary critical device and to the geometric property of photographic 
lenses. They indicate nexuses of intersecting information. Rei Toei‘s nodal points reflect her informational 
strangeness. They indicate information which will have a marked effect on the real world: 
                                                 
509 Adams, D. Six Stories By Douglas Adams: The Ultimate Hitchhiker‘s Guide. New York: Wing Books/Random House, 1996, 127. 
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[H]e was an intuitive fisher of information...He‘d spent his time skimming vast floes of 
undifferentiated data, looking for ―nodal points‖ he‘d been trained to recognise by a team of 
French scientists...516 
The implication is that nodal points involve confluxes of causal influence and informational causal power 
within a sea of random artefactual information and noise. Note the ontological implications of the word 
floe: Laney is a character-novum built upon an informational ontological phenomena – his ability to 
interpret information flow. This sense of information flow is familiar from the work of informatinoist 
philosopher Dretske, and from computer science, wherein data flow modelling is a mainstay technique for 
networked systems design517. Laney is employed by a media production company to use his skills for 
trivial and predictable commercial purposes – informational commodification - but Laney suspects that 
nodal points might be the key to much greater knowledge: 
Perhaps the whole of DatAmerica possessed its own nodal points, infofaults that might be 
followed down to some other kind of truth, another mode of knowing…518 
This strikingly informationist passage addresses Dretske‘s axiom of information as necessarily true and 
suggests the supervenience relationship between information and knowledge, as well as my own 
distinction of true versus false or pseudo information. The fictive framing of nodal points is highly meta-
informational: there are points in an SF text where veridical information is implied or bound up in the 
counterfactual pseudo-information upon which the fiction supervenes. I suggest that the ‗nodal points‘ of 
an SF text, rather than being associated with the Riffatarre‘s abstract superreader perspective, instead 
correlate with phrases, novums and novum neologisms which are the product of write-time information 
synthesis involving scientific theory and fact. At read-time and in the text as a latent source, nodal points 
in an SF text are messages which exhibit informational heterogeneity, high information and elevated 
veridical information: these properties are due to the information source set which contributed to their 
write-time synthesis. The fiction and narrative encoded upon them invoke the epiphanic ‗aha‘ moments 
of cognitive estrangement and the cognitive aesthetic in read-time text processing. In Gibson‘s Bridge 
trilogy these informationist SF theoretic nodal points often indicate sites of meta-informational prose. For 
example, there exists the following astonishingly prescient self-conscious reference to information 
ontology in Idoru, where further complexity is being added to the character-novum that is Laney: 
Laney‘s ability to locate key data in apparently random wastes of incidental information 
earned him the envy and grudging admiration of more experienced researchers.519 
Gibson‘s metafictional reference to and implied definition of incidental information is presumably intuitively 
motivated, and yet it conceptually anticipates almost perfectly the definition of incidental information in 
the information typology of Long[2]520. Moreover, there is a strong meta-informational parallel between 
Laney and the stereotypical reader familiar with the SF mega-text capable of mining the data of an SF text 
for counterfactual pseudo-informational novums, and other SF codons. At SF nodal points, the reader 
can synthesise the counterfactual pseudo-information in an SF text source with that residing within their 
internal concept sources and generate incipient veridical or counterfactual information. The general reader 
who is not necessarily initiated into the SF mega-text, but is able to see the significance of the embedded 
semantic keys in the text - to decode the meaning of the novum and icons in the text by way of the 
information sources therein which provide the means to decode them - this reader perhaps benefits the 
most from anti-simulacra. I suggest that the mechanism of decoding is not dissimilar to the syntagmatic 
algorithm suggested by Delany: each sign and message, as sources of information with certain surprisal 
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values, are combined with information already encountered in the text. This progressive synthesis allows 
for semantic ‗bootstrapping‘ to facilitate decoding and understanding of counterfactual cognitively 
estranged novums and SF icons, and any veridical scientific information thus referenced. SF readers, like 
SF texts proper, are expected to circumvent the delusion of simulacra through synthesis at nodal points. 
Gibson‘s character-novum Laney provides a meta-informational model of such behaviour. They are anti-
simulacra personified, supervening upon counterfactual pseudo-information within an SF text. 
CHARACTER ANTI-SIMULACRA 
Gibson‘s Laney, by virtue of his conversion to one type of information – artefactual information - is a 
normalised simulacrum521. He is an anti-heroic technician-savant and a noble, vicissitudinous, tragic 
cyberpunk: the epitome of the flawed but valorous social underling, he uses his ability to discern nodal 
points (Gibson‘s usage) to help others despite persistent attacks upon him by greedy corporate stooges 
and their henchmen. Thus, although he is an informorph who ultimately becomes a simulation to survive 
the effects of the 5-SB syndrome – a personification of a third order simulacra – he is simultaneously a 
personification of anti-simulacra. As a tool and operative for surveillance he is tasked to acquire, and 
becomes exposed to, veridical information. In Virtual Light and Idoru, postmodern foot-soldier Berry Rydell 
personifies an anti-simulacrum through raw determined rationalist non-conformity. The unfortunate 
Alison Shires is also a character anti-simulacrum. She suicides because something allows her to discern 
her existence as subject to simulacra: 
―Because she knows. She can feel me watching.‖ 
―That‘s impossible, Laney…She can‘t know that.‖ 
―She does.‖...‖How could you possibly know that she is aware of your attention?‖ 
The nodal point, he wanted to say. But didn‘t.522‖ 
Both Shires and Berry Rydell  have a sense for the real and for veridical information. Both are subject to 
the simulacrum of social control but seek to numerously evade and escape it - Rydell by his 
unpredicatable and nonconformist behaviour and Shires through suicide. Each character is arguably a 
reflection of the SF reader‘s use of the SF text to escape or subvert the hyperreal pseudo-information of 
social simulacra. Like Rei Toei, they seek to subvert the simulacra. 
For Baudrillard, the medium is ―no longer a medium in the literal sense: it is now intangible, diffused and 
diffracted in the real, and one can no longer say that the medium is altered by it.523‖ It is not a reliable 
high fidelity information channel but is instead a kind of dissimulation pump524. It is a set of mutative 
sources of artefactual pseudo-information such that instead of expecting veridical artefactual information 
through the television and written reportage, ―[o]ne must think of the media as if they were, in outer 
orbit, a kind of genetic code that mutates the real into the hyperreal.525‖ In All Tomorrow‟s Parties, when the 
bridge which is the home of many of the primary characters, including the pawn shop vendor Fontaine, is 
burned down by Harwood, the media arrive in force: 
It‘s strange out there, very much the post disaster scenario...Media vehicles outnumber 
emergency...Probably…he‘ll never know what all of this was about, in terms of causality, 
though he has sure been witness to something.526 
In what may be a direct reference to Baudrillard‘s thesis of the loss of the cause-effect distinction under 
simulacra, the causality of Harwood‘s act of violence is inaccessible to Fontaine, but he knows that he is 
going to get numerous different equally uninformative re-representations of the effect through the media. 
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His understanding will still be lacking for the absence of veridical information, even though he 
experienced the disaster first hand. In Baudrillard‘s thesis, violence becomes like entertainment through 
the softening and occlusion of the real via informational simulacra and there is ―[n]o more violence or 
surveillance: only ―information‖527‖ However, hyperreality implemented thus ultimately and irrevocably 
undoes the power that wields it for social control and the implementation of the social control system 
facilitated by technology528. Rei Toei is a metaphysically and technologically estranged novum. ‗She‘ is an 
image without referent, an AI persona sui generis existing as ―a personality construct, a congeries of 
software agents, the creation of information designers.529‖ This computer simulation marketed as a 
human singing superstar is an informational hypercommodity subsisting on artefactual information: 
computer code. Her emergence is a meta-informational reference to the information synthesis that occurs 
in the read-time processing of the SF text. Just as a reader or writer synthesises information from various 
internal and external sources, thus reifying a narrative supervening upon artefactual information, so ―Rei 
Toei, The Idoru, was an emergent system, a self continually being iterated from experiential input.530‖ Rei 
Toei becomes the embodiment and realisation of simulacra thereby outmoding and overriding the media 
power which synthesised her. Laney and Rei Toei are meta-fictional instantiations of SF character-novum 
anti-simulacra: their struggle against the hyperreal in the story is a reflexive representation of Gibson‘s text 
as an informational anti-simulacrum. 
POSTMODERNISM, INFORMATIONISM, ESTRANGEMENT, AND UNCERTAINTY 
It is perhaps significant that Baudrillard associates uncertainty with informational third order simulacra531, 
since uncertainty of symbol selection in the syntagm or message – which reflects statistical uncertainty at 
the information source state at write-time – is intrinsic to the definition of Shannon information, a high 
value of which we have seen is a textual indicator of novums and their neologisms, and thus of SF proper. 
Information theory, with its rigorous mathematical foundations, might seem generally antithetical to the 
deconstructionist poststructuralist tenets of postmodernist thought. This is true when postmodern SF 
texts and postmodern theorists analogically misappropriate and co-opt scientific terminology for fictive or 
theoretic ends. To complicate matters further, verbs, nouns and natural kind terms often take on subtly 
different meanings when seconded to the task of the mathematician. The word uncertainty, for example, is 
notoriously polysemous, even within Shannon‘s mathematical theory of communication, wherein it refers 
to both the uncertainty of symbol selection at a source and the uncertainty of a transmitted message 
reaching a destination intact – giving rise to a semantic bifurcation in the very definition of entropy 
pursued therein532. Choice in Bayesian statistics is not about human agency, but refers only to possible 
outcomes533. Baudrillard uses the term uncertainty more normatively and in multiple contexts. It is evidently 
related to the empirical and psychological uncertainty of the individual about the real – or about whether 
a real state of affairs exists to correspond to the putative veridical information they are presented with. 
For SF it is also uncertainty about whether the preponderance of the hyperreal leaves anything to imagine 
in the text – any basis of the real from which to cognitively extrapolate or imaginatively speculate534. I 
have suggested that informationist SF codons such as novums, and associated SF text nodal points, 
correspond to elevated surprisal values in the syntagm at read-time, and contribute to anti-simulacra. A 
normalised fictional simulacrum reduces Shannon uncertainty by eliminating possibilities – reducing the 
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paradigmatic set of possible messages or symbols in the syntagm. However, when anti-simulacra exist 
within the text, the set of possibilities not only expands, but the type of information associated with the 
surprisal is no longer pure pseudo-information: it is counterfactual pseudo-information which implies 
veridical information. Thus Baudrillard in fact seems to almost stumble across information typology in his 
distinction between the real and the hyperreal and the application of this distinction to SF: ergo my earlier 
move to co-opt the term hyperreal to the typology of pseudo-information.  
I propose that this logical and conceptual intersection of postmodern theory with rigorous and 
mathematically underwritten information theory, on the basis of uncertainty, possibility and hyperreality, 
underlies the propensity for postmodern writers such as Delany and Gibson to embrace informational 
themes across scientific and socio-cultural epistemes, combining and hybridising the conception of 
information as mathematical and computational with the conception of information as human and social, 
resulting in the emergence of such SF codons as the infomorph. There is perhaps a parallel to this 
postmodern-structuralist hybridisation in the duality that Broderick tantalisingly reveals as the merging of 
structuralist and poststructuralist stylistic and semiotic commitments in Delany‘s novels Stars in My Pocket 
Like Grain of Sand, Babel 17, The Einstein Intersection and Empire Star: 
So while Delany is a declared poststructuralist, his fiction is articulated about a semiotic 
programme which seems, at its limit, to merge with humanist, albeit highly relativist, liberal 
pluralism. Even in his most strenuous efforts to attain the transgressive, to treat the human 
subject as an object of cultural manufacture, he seems to be writing his own life and his 
apologia for it from a position of extreme and admirable wilfulness.535 
This duality is reflected meta-fictionally and meta-informationally in informationist SF. We might 
associate a structuralist approach to literature with the original logical positivistic purview of 
mathematicians Frege, Whitehead and Russell, and thence with Wittgenstein‘s logical analyses of Tractatus 
Logico Philosophicus and the rise of the scientific method as championed by Popper. Perhaps, then, the 
emergence of new modal (subjunctive) logics during the 1960s and 1970s at the hands of Kripke, Lewis 
and Putnam is more theoretically commensurate with the postmodernist episteme than philosophers are 
generally prone to consider. Certainly the relatively new information-scientifically inspired fuzzy logic of 
computer scientist Dr. Lofti Zadeh, with its undecidability feature, relies on principles of contextually 
determined or uncertain set membership, making it prone to reference in postmodernist-informationist 
SF as early as Delany‘s Stars in My Pocket Like Grains of Sand: 
In a universe of c. six thousand two hundred worlds with human populations over two 
hundred and under five billion ―population‖ itself becomes a fuzzy edged concept‘... the 
hallways I walked down to ground level through were an allegory for the informational 
complexities that free Kantor both was and was made for...536 
This is another metainformational SF nodal point, since the conception of undecidability in fuzzy logic 
certainly fits the stylistic and de-centered characteristics of postmodern fiction. Fuzzy sets allow elements 
with degrees of set membership – rather than elements that are simply members of a set or not 
members537. The aesthetic value of most fiction relies in large part on suspense, mystery, plot twists, 
shocks, and so on, which arise from the uncertainty or ambiguity surrounding events in the narrative. 
Postmodern informationist SF, however, is further marked by this kind of ‗fuzziness‘ with regard to 
meaning, subject and the distinction between subject and object. We can get a feel for this informationist 
SF trait by considering at what point in the Bridge Trilogy Laney becomes more informational than 
human. The objective Bayesian statistical mathematics behind information theory involve similar set 
theoretic foundations to both classical, modal and fuzzy logics, but statistics employs different 
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mathematical, heuristic, and axiomatic machinery. Nevertheless, probability theory and logic are 
axiomatically related538.  
The themes of uncertainty and fuzzy undecidability are often reprised in informationist SF. However, the 
terminology of fuzzy logic in the hands of non-mathematicians is just as prone to involve whimsical, 
loose and basically inaccurate semantics, as that of information theory. The mathematical term fractal is 
often used loosely by SF authors seeking to leverage yet another mathematically spawned icon of 
uncertainty and indeterminism. However, in the text of Idoru Gibson applies it with reference to its use in 
computer graphics science to simulate natural or coarse surfaces like dirty walls: 
Fractal filth, bit rot, the corridor of their passage tented with crazy swoops of faintly flickering 
lines of some kind.539 
The language is highly stylised, but the selection of the message ―Fractal filth‖ is influenced by veridical 
sources relating to the use of fractal algorithms in computer graphics. Bit rot has been applied somewhat 
out of context, but is another term from computer science540.  In All Tomorrow‟s Parties the fractal is put to 
more scientific, meta-informational and discursively synthesising use in the narrative: 
All his life Laney had heard talk of the death of history, but confronted with the living shape of 
all human knowledge, all human memory, he begins to see the way in which there has never 
been any such thing…Only the shape, and it comprised of lesser shapes, in squirming fractal 
descent, on down to the infinitely finest of resolutions.541 
Gibson thus implements a novum involving information synthesis with sources associated with 
mathematics and chaos theory. It is a true scientific novum, because it is not metaphorical, but suggests a 
defeasible yet defensible real application of the theory. Modelled mathematically, human history may well 
appear fractal. 
CONCLUSION 
Modal logic lends itself to the formal consideration of counterfactual worlds, subjunctive language and 
speculation prevalent in science fiction. Information theory, and the ontology of information that I have 
leveraged herein, also provides a formal way of analysing SF texts and the SF codons encoded upon 
them. Between modal logic and information theory we have tools to help develop a formal framework for 
approaching both counterfactuals and syntagmatic uncertainty respectively. Novum in an SF text imbue 
the text with greater linguistic and narrative uncertainty, which leads to increased information. The 
counterfactual fictive nature of the semantics, settings and narrative encoded upon the SF text mean the 
information supervening upon it is pseudo-information of the counterfactual type, resulting in a text which 
constitutes a high counterfactual pseudo-information source. This highly formal and structured approach 
yields, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, outcomes that are recognisably affirming of some 
deconstructionist, or at least poststructuralist, theoretical tenets, as well as affirming of some structuralist 
formalisms. Texts that increase uncertainty and thus challenge and undermine – by their information 
profile and through counterfactual estrangement - favour the unknown and the cognitively motivated 
over what Broderick calls the ―comfortingly quotidian, the known.542‖ Informationist SF theory provides 
a formal way of identifying the textual and fictive properties of modern and postmodern, structuralist and 
poststructuralist SF texts by their informational profiles. Moreover, it seems that informationist SF texts 
constitute and semantically encode anti-simulacra which draw on a broad range of complex scientific, 
social-scientific, philosophical and psychological epistemes: such texts synthesise information from many 
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541 Gibson, W. All Tomorrow‟s Parties. Victoria: Viking/Penguin, 1999, 107. 
542 Broderick, D. Reading By Starlight: Postmodern Science Fiction. London: Routledge, 1995., 156. 
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types of contributing internal and external information sources, including a high proportion of veridical 
information sources. 
Many SF texts, or perhaps purported SF texts, in the information age have undoubtedly taken on the 
properties of both second and third order simulacra543. However, in necessarily engaging with the 
discourse of information science, information theory and the philosophy surrounding both, 
informationist SF has attained a special meta-informational and meta-fictional character, and its texts and 
narratives have become anti-simulacral through engagement with  technology, science, logic and 
philosophy. I have argued that these properties can be discerned by analysing the information age SF text 
information theoretically, observing a sound metaphysics of information. The narratives, semantics and 
codons of informationist SF texts supervene upon elevated veridical and counterfactual pseudo-
information and information type-heterogeneity, and the syntagms where such codons are implemented 
in such texts involve high surprisal values both in terms of language used and counterfactual concepts 
communicated through neologisms and other linguistic representations of such codons in a text.  
Information age science fiction proper, and especially informationist science fiction, is a mode of fiction 
writing that is situated at a linguistic, cultural, epistemological, discursive and metaphysical multivariate 
nexus. It stands apart from other modes of fiction due to the presence of special informational properties. 
I have suggested that there is a correlation between the information profile of competent SF and the 
‗observance‘ of materialism and even physicalism, and that the latter is critical to the cogency and 
cognitive-aesthetic interest of the SF naturalistic mise en scène and novum, which would arguably be 
largely robbed of their cognitive fascination – estranged or otherwise - in a supernaturalist or 
mythologised setting. Fantasy and its supernaturalism and mythologisation (Suvin‘s sense thereof) are 
generally not predominantly encoded upon what I call veridical information and counterfactual pseudo-
information. Science fiction proper, like science itself, is interested in, and interesting because of, the 
importance of material mechanism, which is largely either absent or moot in a fantasy. Informationist SF 
theory can arguably be applied to any fiction text, and I think that doing so will demonstrate further that 
science fiction proper, and especially informationist science fiction, employs and exhibits a kind of 
information synthesis that is special to it, which synthesis results in the potential for dramatically different 
and unique aesthetic and cognitive effects at read-time. SF proper and the sub-mode of informationist SF 
are more than just literatures of cognitive estrangement. Informationist science fictions supervene upon 
texts exhibiting elevated veridical and counterfactual pseudo-information, and upon corresponding 
heterogeneous information synthesis. Sf is the fiction of veridical information, counterfactual pseudo-
information, and information type heterogeneity. It can intertextually, meta-informationally and meta-
fictionally engage with, and simultaneously provide a foil to, hyperreal pseudo-information. The read-time 
and write-time synthesis associated with an informationist SF text, and with any text upon which is encoded 
the cognitive aesthetics, semantics and codons of SF proper, involves an increased proportion of 
contributing veridical information sources, and a preservation of veridical information through the 
promotion of counterfactual pseudo-information over pure and hyperreal pseudo-information. Sf proper 
and informationist SF are modes of fiction writing designed to subvert and undermine hyperreal narrative 
modes through read-time cognitive aesthetics and outcomes associated with elevated counterfactual and 
veridical information. Even in its postmodern manifestations, information age SF proper synthesises high 
levels of veridical information from the sciences, and inherits the de-mythologising paradigm of true 
materialist science as commensurate with Suvin‘s thesis, and as instantiative of Lem‘s aesthetic of social 
and technological complexity. 
 
 
                                                 
543 Baudrillard, J. "Simulacra and Science Fiction." Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan 
Press, 1994 (orig. 1981)., 121. 
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